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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I examine the introduction of technological systems -telegraphy, railways, 
naval shipbuilding and armaments- from Britain to post-Crimean Ottoman-Turkey, which 
had constituted a largely closed environment to European culture and technologies until 
the nineteenth century. I illustrate how the process was contingent upon the historical, 
cultural and geographical contexts of Britain and Turkey within the wider European 
power structure in the nineteenth century. Through its industrial enterprises, presented as 
a politically "peaceful solution" to the Eastern Question, Britain hoped to control the 
declining Ottoman Empire and to further its cultural and economic expansion. 
In Chapter One I characterise the flow of technologies to Turkey as the British technolog- 
ical crusade with reference to its range and cultural implications. I further examine how a 
traditional Islamic culture could develop an intellectual framework to accommodate and 
justify a technology which was originally thought to be of an "infidel" character. I argue 
that the military channel was the nucleus of Ottoman Europeanisation and its opening to 
the West. The military institutions, together with the Sultan's authority and sanction, 
formed the main agency for the legitimation of Western technology. Chapters Two, Three 
and Four examine the introduction by British engineers and enterprises of communication 
technologies, telegraphy and railways, to Asia Minor, which provided a junction and the 
shortest route to India and Central Asia. 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven present the efforts of the British government and 
entrepreneurs to introduce European naval shipbuilding and armament technologies to the 
Ottoman Empire. The British naval mission to Turkey began in the early nineteenth cen- 
tury originally as an important measure against Russian expansion to the Bosphorus and 
the Mediterranean to strengthen Ottoman naval defences by offering skilled officers and 
machinery. The mission, which continued until WWI, became an essential part of the 
wider British imperial policy in the East and industrial expansion overseas. British com- 
panies, including Napiers, Armstrongs and Vickers, expanding their enterprises overseas 
as a part of British imperial expansion, introduced to the Ottoman navy both naval 
machinery and its complementary features, technical instruction and infrastructure for 
their operation and maintenance. Finally, Chapter Eight emphasizes the close connection 
between Western technological systems and their wider Western cultural environments, 
such as industrial, educational, financial and legislative institutions. 
-ii- 
PASHA and PADISHAH 
East and West a hob-a-nobbing, 
Giaour and Moslem hand-in-hand, 
Fez and Chimney-pot a-bobbing, 
Side by side, along the Strand! 
Who says 'tis an age prosaic, 
Common-place, in dulness drowned, 
When, dovetailed in strange mosaic, 
Contrasts such as these are found? 
In the days of great AL-RASHID, 
What would Moslem Sheiks have thought, 
Had the CALIPH thus this rash head 
To the British Lions brought! 
Think of crews of red-cross Galleys, 
Rhodian warriors, or Maltese, 
Changing their crusading sallies 
For civilities like these! 
Lo, the stagnant East upheaving, 
Stirs with feverish unrest, 
Impulse 'gainst its will receiving 
From the forces of the West. 
Pasha, Padishah saluting, 
Through the Railway's rush and scream, 
See Kent's pleasant fields go shooting 
Past them, like a hachich-dream: 
See a country all of gardens, 
See a realm of steam and spade; 
Labour, Law, and Peace its wardens, 
None to make its sons afraid: 
See its fair face at the fairest, 
Not the nakedness below: 
Who art thou thy sores that barest? 
Pauper? -Hence, nor spoil the show! 
We've a Padishah to dazzle, 
We've a Pasha to amaze; 
We've to teach them England has all 
That makes prosper, all the pays. 
Keep the paupers in the Union, 
Lock the vagrants in the ward; 
From such frowsy, foul, communion 
Needs our Eastern Guests we guard. 
111 
Show our millions of toilers, 
Mete their work and count their pay: 
How the engines burst their boilers, 
Here and there, no need to say. 
If Trades-Unions threaten, picket, 
Ratten, murder, now and then- 
On such dark facts close the wicket- 
Blue Beard's closet o'er again. 
Don't present our guests to Bumble; 
Keep him from our village schools: 
There are things at which we fumble, 
Or come down between two stools. 
Union sick-wards smell unpleasant; 
Workhouse nurs'ries breed foul air: 
Don't show how we house the peasant, 
Or the Padishah might stare. 
If your House he deigns to visit, 
M. P. 's, let your hands be clean: 
Though that's scarce the feature (is it? ), 
By observers soonest seen. 
Would he learn how you can cobble? 
The Reform Bill let him see: 
Would he watch a party-hobble? 
Of the Carlton make him free. 
Generally, keep the platter, 
On the outside very clean.... 
Let sensation-writers chatter- 
Things are judged by what is seen. 
Eastern princes, stolid, stunted, 
Must be taught to know the West- 
So let ugly truths be stunted- 
Those that can't, make look their best. 
[On the occasion of the Sultan's visit to Britain in July, 1867, The PUNCH, vol. LIII, 20th 
July, 1867, p. 21. ] 
iv 
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INTRODUCTION: THE BRITISH TECHNOLOGICAL CRUSADE 
Only by bringing the decayed Ottoman civilisation into closer contact with 
the life and science and commerce of the West can we reasonably hope to 
avert its final fall. 1 
The railway and telegraph are not only of incalculable value as political 
instruments, but they are the pioneers of enlightenment and advancement: 
it is theirs to span the gulf which separates barbarism from civilisation; and 
this is an enviable lot, by whose exertions, the arts and industry, the capital 
and enterprise, the knowledge and humanity of Western Europe shall be 
familiarised and brought home to the dwellers in the East. 2 
1.1 The British Technological Crusade 
I use the term the technological crusade primarily to emphasise the technological 
aspect of the British attempt to increase its general influence in the Ottoman Empire 
significantly after the Crimean War (1853-56). The term crusade particularly 
expresses the scope and importance of new technologies as a means of imperial 
expansion. Through the introduction of large technological systems, Britain hoped to 
control the declining Ottoman Empire, both physically and culturally, for a more 
powerful and larger British Empire. In other words, the technological crusade was a 
part of the long term British objective for a "peaceful conquest" of a degenerated ori- 
ental empire. 3 
1 The Times, 26th May, 1856. 
2 W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India with Official Correspondence, 
H. Allen & Co.: London, 1857, pp. 161-162. 
3 For a valuable account on "peaceful conquest" through the industrial expansion, see Sidney 
Pollard, Peaceful Conquest: The Industrialisation of Europe 1760-1970, Oxford: Oxford Universi- 
1 
I also use the term technological crusade to point up the historical and cultural 
dimensions bonded to this technologically supported Western expansion. After the 
relatively unsuccessful Crusades by the European Christian alliance, not only the 
Middle East and most of the Islamic world remained outside the sphere of Western 
domination but also the establishment of the Ottoman Empire as a four-century-long 
strong imperial power formed a constant threat and even "terror" for Europe. As a 
result, Christianity and Islam became rival religions, and their cultural contacts were 
minimised as "closed" societies .4 
The Christian West, however, never gave up its romantic and religious idea of domi- 
nating or "civilising" this part of the world and beyond. The industrialisation and new 
technological innovations in Europe in the nineteenth century opened ways of 
expanding their powers to distances that had never been controlled before. Within the 
framework of the nineteenth century, I call this new European movement, particu- 
larly towards the Ottoman Empire and the rest of the non-Western world, the techno- 
logical crusade, since railways, electric telegraphy, steam ships and large guns were 
the main means to this geographical and cultural expansion. Headrick rightly defines 
these technological systems, particularly telegraphy, railways and steamships, as the 
"tools of empire". 5 In 1857, imperial railway and telegraph promoter W. P. Andrew 
ty Press, 1981. Cain and Hopkins emphasise the the British financial control as means British im- 
perialism in the Ottoman Empire. See P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innova- 
tion and Expansion, 1688-1914, London & New York: Longman, 1993, particularly Chapter 
Twelve, pp. 397-411; S. Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913: 
Trade, Investment and Production, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
4 Bernard Lewis presents an authoritative account on the development of a new relationship be- 
tween the Islamic world and Europe, particularly in the nineteenth century, in The Muslim Discov- 
ery of Europe, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1982. 
S Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nine- 
teenth century, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. 
2 
declared that: 
It is our manifest destiny to secure the perfection of a direct railway sys- 
tem between England and India, and the establishment of an unbroken 
chain of electric communication, going straight from the head-quarters of 
Queen Victoria's government to every extremity of her eastern empire. 6 
The term "the technological crusade" is more appropriate than "technological trans- 
fer" in the context of the non-Western world in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, simply because the "transfer" of a technological system from one context 
to another one involves a different process. "Transfer" usually begins as a result of 
the recipient country's planned demand and exchange of knowledge between the two 
contexts. In the Western world, especially among culturally related countries, this 
process has been more effective? However, technology transfer from the Western 
world to the non-Western world in the nineteenth and early twentieth century pre- 
sented rather different pictures: it was generally an one way process. For the export- 
ing countries, mainly the European imperial powers, it was a means of power and 
imposing their orders in other countries. Non-Western nations were usually reluctant 
to adopt new technologies from Europe, partly because they were aware of their 
imperialist objectives, and partly because of the conservative structure of local cul- 
ture and religion. Western technology inevitably would result in the creation of a new 
power relationship within traditional and well established power structures. Exam- 
pies are the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, Egypt, China and Japan. 
6 W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route, pp. 142-143. 
7 David J. Jeremy and Darwin H. Stapleton, "Transfers Between Culturally-Related Nations: 
The Movement of Textile and Railroad Technologies Between Britain and the United States, 
1780-1840", in David J. Jeremy(ed. ), International Technology Transfer: Europe, Japan and the 
USA, 1700-1914, Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar Pub. Co., 1991, pp. 31-48. 
3 
The technological crusade can be a useful analytical tool to understand the impor- 
tance and place of technology and industry in European imperialism in the nineteenth 
century. European imperialism was not solely commercially and economically ori- 
ented, but it was also missionary. In this respect, the term crusade attributes a new 
dimension to European expansion. In this thesis, I will confine myself to a much 
smaller picture, or pictures: an examination of the British technological crusade to 
the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, in the cases of electric telegraphy, railways, naval mis- 
sions and shipbuilding. Though it was and has been presented as pre-dominantly a 
commercial and political concern, the technological crusade did not exclude long 
term religious and cultural objectives. From a Westerner's point of view, the intro- 
duction of every Western technological system and innovation to a non-Western 
world implicitly meant civilising, which meant Christianising. This was thought to 
be "the natural result" of the expansion of Western science and technology to the new 
environment in question. John Wright, the Chairman of Southern Railways, in his 
article, "Christianity and Commerce, the Natural Results of the Geographical Pro- 
gression of Railway", 1849, advocated the construction of the Euphrates Railway 
from a missionary perspective. 8 To General Chesney, a most influential promoter of 
the Euphrates route to steam communication, the opening of the Euphrates Railway, 
the Suez Canal and telegraphic communication were the "the greatest blessings to his 
Eastern brethren", and would serve: 
the gradual introduction of Western Christianity with its humanising and 
civilising influences to the vast populations of Mesopotamia and Arabia. 9 
8 See J. Wright, Hints on the Times, London: M. S. Myers, 1847; Ireland the Restorer of Israel, 
..., London: M. S. Myers, 1853; Project for Constructing Railways in Algeria, London: M. S. My- 
ers, 1852. 
9 Stanley Lane-Poole (ed. ), The Life of General F R. Chesney, by Wife and Daughter, London, 
4 
The introduction of railways and telegraphy to Turkey were seen as a move towards 
its integration with the West. From a Westerner's point of view, the integration meant 
adoption of the whole Western culture, together with its science and technology. On 
the occasion of the laying of the foundation stone of the Smyrna railway station in 
November 1858, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the most influential British Ambas- 
sador in the Ottoman Empire, who won the title "Great Elchi", declared that: 
Western civilisation is knocking hard at the gates of the Levant, and if it be 
not allowed to win its way into the regions where it has hitherto been 
admitted so partially, it is but too capable of forcing the passage and 
asserting its pretensions with little regard for anything but their 
satisfaction. 10 
Western technologies, such as iron networks of railways and telegraphic communica- 
tion systems, he believed, were the basic means of implanting Western civilisation in 
the Ottoman Empire. They were the tools of opening and expanding the passage to 
this "old oriental empire". He further believed that these western technologies would 
lead to dramatic changes, and would also bring a "peaceable solution" to what was 
styled as the "Eastern Question", that is, what to do with the declining Ottoman 
Empire for the sake of the balance of power in Europe. 11 In the eyes of many Euro- 
pean intellectuals, the Ottoman Empire, being dominated by oriental culture and 
mind was incapable of progress. Edwin Pears wrote in The Nineteenth Century: 
1885, p. 429. 
10 See the extracts from his speech on the occasion of the laying of the foundation stone of 
Smyrna Station and opening of the first section of the line, The Times, 16th November, 1858; see 
also the appendix B in Sir MacDonald Stephenson, Railways in Turkey: Remarks upon the Practi- 
cability and Advantage of Railway Communication in European and Asiatic Turkey, London: John 
Weale, 1859, pp. 37-46, (My italics). 
lt Ibid. 
S 
The Turkish population has given no sign whatever that it possesses the 
capability of advancement in civilisation, while Christian populations have 
given many such signs. 12 
Such similar arguments seems to have been common in Europe at the time. In short, 
it was seen that "Every element that is progressive in Turkey is Christian,,. 
13 Euro- 
pean interest in the Ottoman Empire was followed by the formation of a large West- 
ern missionary movement, primarily through the educational system and religious 
circles. Western missionaries and diplomats encouraged the flow of British technol- 
ogy to the Ottoman Empire with the hope it will "soon be a Christian" country. Visit- 
ing Istanbul in 1856, the engineer Lewis Gordon wrote: 
My impression is, that an exodus of the Turks and an entrance of any 
northern nation into the Bosphorus and its towns and villages would be a 
glorious move. I partly guess, and partly hear from others, that the lower 
classes of Turks would become Christians and Northmen in everything but 
their worship. 14 
The term crusade also expresses the general outlook and attitude of the indigenous 
men towards the introduction of Western inventions. As a result of increasing con- 
tacts, particularly from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Ottoman society began 
to come under greater European influence both physically and culturally. In the local 
context, this brought about the question for the Ottomans to what extent European 
ways should be adopted or avoided. Inalcik and Quataert call this the "Western Ques- 
tion" in the Ottoman Empire, with reference to the Eastern Question in Europe. 15 
12 Edwin Pears, "A Programme of Reforms For Turkey", The Nineteenth Century, vol. 7, 
(1880), pp. 1020-1040,1020. 
13 op. cit. 
14 Thomas Constable, Memoir of Lewis D. B. Gordon, ER. S. E, Edinburgh, 1877, p. 60. 
15 H. Inalcik & D. Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 
1300-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 6. 
6 
From a local or an Islamic perspective, Western technological systems were part of 
an "infidel crusade", aimed at destroying the traditional Islamic power structure, and 
hence Islam as a whole. The introduction of the steamship, telegraph, and railway 
created an enormous impact on the public image of the West and its science and tech- 
nology as they were visual, practical and obviously influenced daily life. They threat- 
ened the authority of the Ulema, the muslim clergy class, educated in the traditional 
Islamic creed. The technological systems were seen as "infidel inventions" and as a 
source of sins and wickedness and a denial of religion. Some Ottoman intellectuals 
distinguished between Christianity and Western science and technology. An early 
twentieth century Ottoman scholar stated: 
The decline in religion is no longer confined to Europe because of the 
advancement of civilisation. Through the various means of civilisation, 
such as telegraph, post, railways, and steamships, it is contaminating every 
corner of the world. The Ottoman lands, being geographically closer as a 
result of the new means of communication and transportation, are not left 
untouched by the spread of atheism brought by science... 
16 
Nevertheless, Western science and technology, "wondrous and strange things", were 
still a Christian creation, and designed to deceive them and destroy God's Divine 
Law. 17 
The British technological crusade to the Ottoman Empire was, to a great extent, a 
result of new European industrial, economic and political power structures in the 
nineteenth century. Major European nations were in fierce competition for 
16 Quoted in N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, McGill, 1964, pp. 362-363, 
from Babazade Mustafa, "Muslimanlik Ilmi ve Fenni Bir Dindir", Sebil-ur Resad, No. 207,1912. 
17 Rudolph Peters, "Religious Attitudes Towards Modernisation in the Ottoman Empire: A 
Nineteenth Century Pious Text on Steamships, Factories and the Telegraphy", Die Welt des Islams, 
vol. 26, (1986), pp. 75-105. 
7 
commercial, military and political interests inside and outside Europe. The Ottoman 
Empire, due to its geographical location, was one of the earliest non-Western coun- 
tries to be exposed to European expansion eastwards. The British were particularly 
keen on the Ottoman Empire, since it meant control of the route to India, an essential 
part of the British Empire. Besides, it would serve British commercial interests and 
markets in the East. Turkey also formed a strong barrier against Russian expansion, 
which would otherwise threaten British and other European interests in the region. 
The Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838 and the Alliance in the Crimean War won 
Britain very important political, commercial and military privileges in the Ottoman 
Empire, which she effectively exercised thereafter. 
The British were fully aware of the role and position of the Ottoman Sultan as the 
Caliph in the Islamic world. In particular, his influence was essential to check Rus- 
sian expansion in Central Asia. In the words of Henry Trotter, the British Military 
Attache in Istanbul, "the alliance of the Caliph" was meant "to raise the populations 
of the Central Asian Khanates against their Russian masters". 18 The Sultan was the 
"absolute" ruler and the highest religious head. His authority was important for cen- 
tralised imperial powers in Europe. Through the new technological systems, such as 
telegraphy, railways and steamships, and administrative reforms on European models 
during the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state mechanism became more centralised 
and thus more capable of imposing its will on society. This was in part a common 
goal of the Ottoman elite and the Great Powers. Britain utilised its influence on the 
18 A Secret "Memorandum by Henry Trotter", 3rd January, 1888, Inclosure No. 3 in 
F0424/2032, "Papers Respecting the Construction of Turkish Railways in Asia Minor", Printed 
for the Use of the Foreign Office, February, 1888. 
8 
Sultan to its advantage, and remained a keen supporter of the preservation of the Sul- 
tanate until it was abolished after the First World War. 
1.2 Technological Transfer 
No single theory or model can alone adequately explain the complex process of the 
transmission of knowledge and technology from one context to another. Put simply, 
the pattern of the transfer is closely linked to the different cultural and physico- 
geographical or spatial characteristics of the different environments. The "style" is an 
important aspect of adaptation or transfer of technology from one environment to 
another one. 19 That is, the style and pattern of transfer of a technological system is 
unique due to the ways of transmission and new environment. 
The transmission of knowledge and technology to a new environment is a process in 
which the new environment acquires the knowledge and skills of a specific matter or 
technology and becomes able to reproduce and develop it. Often a distinction has 
been made between the transmission of scientific knowledge and technology; or pure 
and applied sciences, even though in practice this would be almost impossible to do. 
According to this perspective, the transmission at the level of scientific knowledge 
requires a change in the intellectual culture of the receptor country to accommodate 
the new ideas, such as the theory of evolution, theories of geological formations and 
19 Thomas P. Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems", in W. E. Bijker, T. P. 
Hughes, & T. J. Pinch (eds. ), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions 
in the Sociology and History of Technology, London: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 51-82,68-70. 
9 
so on. That means pure science is at least seemingly "more" culturally bonded than 
applied science. The adoption of technologies, on the other hand, often may not 
entail a significant change in the intellectual culture of the importer, such as building 
sophisticated nuclear power stations, electronic communication systems and so on? 0 
Today most non-Western countries, even those most hostile to the West, have been 
adopting Western technologies without a major intellectual difficulty. Thus, it has 
been possible theoretically to separate Western technological systems from their 
wider cultural context and implications. As I will explain later, this formed a basic 
tenet of the Ottoman Westernisation paradigm: to adopt European technology with- 
out accepting its intellectual and cultural environment. 
Technology transfer involves two main processes: first, the relocation of hardware 
and methods from one area to another, with experts to operate them; and secondly, 
the transmission of knowledge, skills, and attitudes related to a particular hardware or 
device. 21 Without the latter the technology transfer can be only a matter of moving 
some machinery from one place to another. This is the case with many developing 
countries, which have remained dependent on the exporter countries for the continua- 
tion of technological innovations, creating a vicious circle between industrial and 
developing countries in the twentieth century. 
20 Dolby points out a contrast between the nature of the adoption phase in the transmission of 
science and technology. In the former adoption is the judgement that the new scientific idea is 
"true", while in the adoption of the latter the innovation must be proven to be "useful". However, 
"truth" and "usefulness" are also socially constructed and culturally-laden concepts. For instance, 
the usefulness of the Ottoman telegraph was different for the Sultan and his officials, ordinary peo- 
ple, the clergy class and the British. See R. G. A. Dolby, "The Transmission of Science", History 
of Science, vol. 15, (1977), pp. 1-43,16. 
21 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperial- 
ism, 1850-1940, Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1988, pp. 3-17. 
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Beside socially, economically and geographically defined unique contexts, the trans- 
mission involves a process in which tacit rules and skills play an important role. 22 
These tacit rules or skills may be impossible to formulate in principle, especially 
when the different cultural contexts are dealt with. Written texts cannot be supple- 
mented by tacit knowledge or skills. These are best communicated by direct contact 
of scientists, engineers, students, experts and so on. Within Western culture the most 
effective means of the transmission of science and especially technology has been 
through the movement of skilled men. The tacit feature of know-how creates even 
greater difficulties for its transmission to, particularly, a "culturally unrelated" envi- 
ronment, e. g, to non-Western culture. In addition to a common industrial and reli- 
gious background, there had existed many networks in the form of the societies, uni- 
versities, research schools and written books and journals in Europe and the USA for 
transmission of ideas, technology and art since the seventeenth century. As a result, 
the transfer among these culturally related countries has been faster and more 
"efficient" 23 Conversely, the transfer of Western technology to the non-Western 
world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the exception of a few 
countries, significantly Japan, did not prove to be so rapid and complete. 
The introduction of Western technology to the non-Western world began primarily as 
22 H. M. Collins, "Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks", in Barry Barnes and David 
Edge(eds. ), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science, Milton Keynes: Open U. P., 
1982, pp. 44-64; H. M. Collins, "Expert Systems and the Science of Knowledge", W. E. Bijker, T. 
P. Hughes, & T. J. Pinch (eds. ), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions 
in the Sociology and History of Technology, London: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 329-348; On tacit 
knowledge, also see M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, New York: Anchor, 1967. 
23 D. J. Jeremy (ed. ), International Technology Transfer: Europe, Japan and the USA, 
1700-1914, see, particularly the article by Jeremy and Stapleton, "Transfers Between Culturally- 
Related Nations: The Movement of Textile and Railroad Technologies Between Britain and the 
United States, 1780-1840", pp. 31-48. 
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an integral part of European imperialist and economic expansion in the nineteenth 
century. The private and quasi-private European trade companies of textiles, ship- 
ping, railways, engineering, post and telegraphy, and armaments, which established 
their enterprises world-wide, became agents for Western technology and science. 
British engineering overseas proved to be highly effective, and provided an influen- 
tial tool for British, imperial expansion in the nineteenth century. 24 Most industrial 
establishments were built by imperial engineers and skilled men, or agents and 
skilled men of the European companies, which provided a center for the training of 
the indigenous men for their services. Furthermore, trade and commercial companies 
were often accompanied by missionaries, and the establishment of Western model 
institutions, such as schools and churches. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries Europe, Britain, France and Germany, and the USA established various 
schools and institutions around the world to teach their languages and their brand of 
culture. 25 
As I will explain later, military and naval institutions formed the main channel of 
European technology transfer to the Ottoman Empire. In addition to a large number 
of European renegades, independent and professional experts, who served in various 
Ottoman institutions, from the early nineteenth century Britain and France, and later 
Germany, the USA and other European powers, including Italy, sent official and 
24 See R. A. Buchanan, The Engineers: A History of the Engineering Profession in Britain 
1750-1914, London: Jessica Kingsley, 1989. 
25 Lewis Pyenson suggests that particularly French and German authorities undertook a pro- 
gramme, (German's Culture Minister, systematically from the last decade of the nineteenth centu- 
ry onwards), to establish and staff physical science-oriented and technical schools and institutions 
to achieve her imperial goals. See L. Pyenson, Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences: German 
Expansion Overseas, 1900-1930, New York, 1985; L. Pyenson, Civilizing Mission: Exact Sciences 
and French Overseas Expansion, 1830-1940, Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993. 
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semi-official missions to the Ottoman Empire. The British naval and German military 
missions were the largest ones, including hundreds of officers, engineers and many 
high ranking advisers. Their task not only consisted of training officers and indige- 
nous experts and helping with the establishment of Western model institutions and 
industries, but they also functioned as an effective medium between the Ottoman offi- 
cials and European military, naval and other industrial and commercial companies. 
Major British military and naval companies, including shipbuilders (Napier & Sons 
Co., the Thames Iron Works and Samudas & Sons Co. ) became the main suppliers of 
hardware, steam engines, naval ships, guns and other equipment to the Ottoman 
Empire. Particularly in the late nineteenth century, Armstrong and Vickers monopo- 
lised most of the Ottoman Empire's naval shipbuilding, construction works, arsenals 
and guns. They provided engineers, instruction texts and plans to teach the indige- 
nous men how to operate the systems and machinery. They allowed a number of local 
engineers to be trained in their naval yards and factories in Britain. British experts 
and skilled men were involved in other large technological systems, such as railway 
companies run by the British, and telegraphic communication networks, where they 
supplied most of the expertise, skills and hardware. Through these technological sys- 
tems came most European expertise and knowledge, which led to a whole Westerni- 
sation programme. 
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1.3 Technological Systems 
The idea of a technological system, particularly the one developed by Thomas 
Hughes, provides us with an analytical framework for studying the sociology and his- 
tory of technology. 26 Hughes understands technology in terms of a "systems" 
metaphor, in which technical, social, economic and political structures are incorpo- 
rated. Thus, his technological systems approach treats a large technological system in 
a much wider "environment" or as a large system of related and interacted compo- 
nents, which are "socially constructed and society shaping" 27 Technological systems 
not only consist of physical artifacts or hardware, but they also include legislative 
systems, manufacturing firms, banks, utilities, written texts, teaching and research 
programmes. 
Hughes applied his framework for large technological systems exclusively in Western 
society, particularly to the case of electrification between 1880-1930.28 However, his 
approach, especially some of his concepts, such as technological style and environ- 
ment and their control, can be applied to the technology transfer and formation of 
Western technological systems in the non-Western world. Western technological sys- 
tems in the non-Western world were built by Western engineers and companies at the 
26 Hughes' technological systems approach is best described in Thomas P. Hughes, "The Evo- 
lution of Large Technological Systems", in W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, & T. J. Pinch (eds. ), The 
Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of 
Technology, London: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 51-82; Also see T. P. Hughes, Networks of Power: 
Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930, Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1983; T. P. Hughes, "The 
Order of Technological World", History of Technology, 1980, pp. 1-16; Also see Jon Agar & Cros- 
bie Smith, "Introductory Essay" to Jon Agar & Crosbie Smith (eds. ), Making Space: Territorial 
Themes in the History of Science, (forthcoming, 1995), pp. 3-58,43-47. 
27 Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems", p. 51. 
28 T. P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930. 
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outset. The construction of the Ottoman telegraphic system serves as an illustrative 
example, particularly for the control of the environment. As Hughes puts it, over time 
technological systems increasingly incorporate environment into the system. A 
"closed system" is an ideal system, in which all environment is a part of the system 
itself. 29 The Ottoman telegraphic network was built by British and French telegraph 
engineers and skilled men, who also instructed and trained the local engineers to 
operate the system (Chapter 2). Most telegraphic artifacts, such as cables and tele- 
graph machines, were bought from British firms. 
The Ottoman cultural and physical contexts presented an alien and often hostile envi- 
ronment for the establishment of the new system, which required a new concept of 
geographical space and distance. In the West, telegraphic communication originated 
primarily as a part of the railway system, whereas the Ottoman telegraph was entirely 
an independent system, particularly favoured by the geographical environment, 
which being mostly mountainous, was too costly and hard for roads and railways. 
The telegraph was also an ideal system for the political structure of Turkey, in which 
the Sultan and his officials at the centre would find it easy to convey their orders all 
over the empire in a short time and more safely. The cultural and geographical envi- 
ronments played a significant role in making the regional style of the Ottoman tele- 
graphic system. 
The builders of the Ottoman telegraphic system did not behave merely as the techni- 
cal builders. They also had to deal with institutional and social environments where 
the telegraph was to be built. Indigenous people were ignorant of telegraphy and 
29 Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems", pp. 52-53. 
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unable to understand its nature at first. For instance, believing that the telegraph was 
of a satanic nature, some Ottomans even tried to determine how near to a mosque a 
telegraph line could pass. To prevent the destruction of the telegraph lines the 
Ottoman government introduced a new legislative system, which introduced heavy 
fines and imprisonment for those who harmed the telegraph and its institutions. Fur- 
thermore, to justify the system within the wider cultural and intellectual environment, 
the telegraph was presented as a military device, since the Ottoman society had a 
long tradition of accommodating European military innovations. 
Hoping to make it a safer system, British telegraph engineers and agents presented it 
as the messenger of the Sultan, the absolute ruler and lawgiver. 30 They were aware of 
the position and authority of the Sultanate as the most effective system of legitimacy. 
However, this alone could not stop serious hostility towards the telegraph lines and 
institutions in the distant parts of the Empire where the Sultan's control was weak, 
for example from the Bedouin and Arab tribes between Diyarbakir and Basra. During 
the construction of the Istanbul to Basra line as a part of the Europe-India overland 
telegraph, the British telegraph engineers, agents and geographers approved a plan to 
subsidise some of the chief men of the involved tribes to protect the telegraphic 
lines. 31 This enlisted the tribes' interests in favour of the telegraph. As a result, they 
became an interacting part of the Ottoman telegraphic system. In less than a decade, 
the Ottoman telegraph was extended all over the empire and formed a large techno- 
logical system, which incorporated telegraph houses and stations, repair works, a 
30 Y. Bektas, "La Telegraphie au Service du Sultan: Ou le Messager Imperial", Reseaux, No. 
67,1994, pp. 143-152. 
31 F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1, Public Record Of- 
fice, London. 
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large number of telegraphers and officers, a telegraph school and education, a tele- 
graph factory, a translation office and foreign language education, particularly 
French, an inspection system, a legislative system, international agreements and com- 
missions, telegraph news papers and many other institutions. 
The British naval shipbuilding and construction works in Turkey present another 
example, especially for expansion of a large technological system within military, 
political and economic contexts of the time (Chapters 5-6). British involvement in 
Ottoman naval matters began as a mission, mainly for helping the navy against Rus- 
sian expansion. However, soon the British companies were providing the Ottoman 
navy with naval vessels and machinery. Armstrong and later Vickers expanded their 
shipbuilding, guns and expertise to monopolise the whole Ottoman naval works 
(Chapter 7). When German firms, especially Krupp, became threatening rivals, they 
initiated new institutional, technical and political problem solving measures, an 
extensive alliance with other British firms being one. By the time they established a 
British industrial alliance in Turkey in the early twentieth century, Armstrong, and 
Vickers had acquired a mass of technical and organisational components: administra- 
tive and technical commissions, legislative and financial bodies, agent and communi- 
cation networks, shipbuilding, repair works, dockyard development, arsenals, techni- 
cal training centers. 
The growth and expansion of a technological system is not only subject to the inter- 
action or dynamics of the system components, but also it is an interaction with the 
society at large. That is, the society and social institutions undergo transformation 
and become redefined within the technological environment. In the late nineteenth 
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century, telegraphy, railways, steamships became a part of the Ottoman political sys- 
tem. Not only did they consolidate the central power but also ironically they made 
disintegration of the empire easier. In creating a new political, economic and intel- 
lectual environment within the traditional Ottoman society, the expansion and growth 
of these technological systems, which embodied numerous technical, social, military 
and economic institutions, derived from the European models, proved to be most 
effective. Not only were Western technological systems socially reconstructed 
within the wider Ottoman context, but also the new technological environment trans- 
formed Ottoman society. 
1.4 The Ottoman Westernisation Paradigm: Military Defence as the Prime 
Mover for Western Technology 
"Westernisation" and "modernisation" are words of protean meaning. I use the word 
"Westernisation" rather than "modernisation" in the Ottoman-Turkish context to 
mean the process of adaptation and transformation of traditional institutions to 
accommodate Western science and technology. Ottoman-Turks often referred to it as 
Europeanisation, since almost all early Western influence came from or through 
Europe exclusively. The term "modernisation" in the Ottoman and Turkish context 
always meant Westernisation. 32 
32 For a detailed analysis of the term, see C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization :A 
Study in Comparative History, New York: Harper & Row, 1966, especially first chapter; M. J. 
Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs, Princeton: 
Princeton U. P., 1966; John Brode, The Process of Modernization: An Annotated Bibliography on 
the Sociocultural Aspects of Development, Harvard: Harvard U. P., 1969. 
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The place of Western science and technology in the process of Turkey's Westernisa- 
tion has only recently attracted scholarly studies. Contemporary Ottoman studies 
have concentrated mostly on the traditional political, social and economic histories of 
both the Ottoman and Republican periods. Yet they have dealt with processes of 
transmission of Western science and technology only in a piecemeal way. However, 
European industrial and military technologies were prior to social and political West- 
ernisation. In this thesis I am dealing with the establishments of major Western tech- 
nological systems by the British. I argue that military defence was the main channel 
and environment where a programme of Westernisation could be formed. In the early 
stage it was purely a military reconstruction programme but was subsequently 
expanded to other areas: social, economic and political institutions. New legal, gov- 
ernmental and other institutional rearrangements on European models became 
keystones for the adoption of Western technology. 
Though the Ottoman Empire had always been physically in touch with Europe, the 
core of the Ottoman Empire was generally closed to Western culture, primarily 
because of the strong religious barrier, which traditionally regarded almost every- 
thing Western as "infidel" and "inflictive" with the exception of military ones. 33 Thus 
until the nineteenth century Ottoman muslim society in particular knew very little 
about Europe, and their image of Europe was mostly based on false accounts and leg- 
endary stories. For instance, not many Ottoman-Turks travelled beyond the Ottoman 
lands to Western Europe. What forced the Ottoman Empire to increase its contact 
33 The Islamic jihad principle that "fighting the infidel with his own weapons and devices" was 
justifiable was used to adopt military innovations. See U. Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and West- 
ernisation in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II", in U. Heyd (ed. ), Scripta Hierosolymitana, 
vol. IX: Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, Jerusalem, 1961, pp. 74-77. 
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with Europe was its successive military defeats and loss of territories to essentially 
Western powers from the early eighteenth century onwards. The first important 
Ottoman military retreat occasioned by the Christian West came in the early eigh- 
teenth century after the unsuccessful siege of Vienna, where it faced the Holy 
Alliance of Austria, Poland, Venice and the Pope, as well as Russia. This was fol- 
lowed by other defeats at the hands of Europeans and Russia, especially in the late 
eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries. In every case the victorious pow- 
ers were Europeans, or at least armies trained and equipped upon European ways. As 
a result, the military science and technology of Europeans became the best example 
for Ottoman Sultans to review their defence system. To remain as a powerful empire, 
Ottomans had to adopt military and naval technologies from Europe. All early 
reforms and innovations in the Ottoman Empire were in the military fields, such as in 
the late eighteenth century the establishment of the military and naval engineering 
schools with the help of Western instructors. There muslim students were instructed 
by teachers and experts whom they considered "infidel". 
The military Westernisation led to a wider programme of Westernisation, beginning 
with technical education, science teaching, diplomacy, translation, language learning 
and so on. This pattern of Westernisation has often been called defensive 
modernisation. 34 Though each was unique, Chinese and Japanese cases present the 
same pattern of "modernisation", in which Western military technologies were 
viewed as a desirable innovation for building an effective defence system. Western 
firearms and guns were followed by steam ships, iron foundries, electric 
34 Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, pp. 119-123. 
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communication, railways and coal mines, expanding into larger industrial and West- 
ernised systems. Western military technology could not be disentangled from its 
complex interrelationships with an evolving industrial and military order. 35 
An "advanced" military technology was the primary objective of the Ottoman 
reformist elite. This was the origin and core of Ottoman Westernisation. Western 
technology was transferred primarily through military channels. Even major techno- 
logical systems, telegraphy, railways, and steamships, which began to change the 
image of the West, were first introduced as military systems. The military was not 
only an established institutional channel or medium of technological transfer but also 
it functioned as the most significant etiquette to justify European innovations in a 
non-European technological environment. Beginning with the early nineteenth cen- 
tury, a number of Ottoman students and engineers were sent to major military and 
naval schools in Europe, such as Woolwich in England. In addition, the Ottoman 
government increased the number of European engineers, advisers and officers in the 
navy and army, especially to operate more complicated and technical tasks. 
The European (Britain and France) and Ottoman alliance against Russia during the 
Crimean War in the mid-nineteenth century opened a new phase in the Ottoman rela- 
tionship with and attitude towards Europe. In the words of W. P. Andrew: 
The relationship between the Porte and Western ' Powers has assumed a 
totally new aspect since the Allies interposed to save the "sick man" from 
the designs of the Czar. The Turks have now abandoned their jealousy, and 
forgotten their bigoted contempt of Frankish [European] visitors; while 
we, on our part, as we became better acquainted with the government and 
the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, have learnt to respect them more 
35 See Barton C. Hacker, "The Weapons of the West: Military Technology and Modernization 
in 19th Century China and Japan". Technology and Culture, vol. 18 (1977), pp. 43-55. 
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highly, and value them more, whether as allies or as customers. 36 
The cooperation with two major Western European armies helped to develop 
Ottoman confidence and friendly political, military and cultural relations with the 
West. Secondly, western technological systems, such as electric telegraphy, railways 
and naval steamships were introduced to Turkey during the war. It thus also demon- 
strated on a large scale the utility and power of Western technology. Furthermore, 
Britain and France gained important commercial and political privileges in the 
Ottoman Empire, which they began to exercise during and after the war. These 
included industrial enterprises and opportunities for Western entrepreneurs to exploit 
the resources of the country. The Ottoman reformist elite, on the other hand, used the 
war and defence as justification for the introduction of Western technological sys- 
tems. The post-Crimean political and military context of the Ottoman Empire pro- 
vided a more suitable environment and medium for the introduction of Western ideas 
and technology. 
What kind of Westernisation or Europeanisation paradigm dominated the minds of 
the Ottoman Westernising elite? What explanations or ideologies were produced 
within the indigenous intellectual and folk cultures to accommodate European sys- 
tems? Until the nineteenth century most Ottoman-Turks were generally alien to the 
conception of "natural philosophy" or "modern science", developed in Western 
Europe. 37 
36 W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route, p. 143. 
37 Here I will not deal with the question, why "modern science" did not develop in Islam or the 
East but only in the West. For such a recent study see T. E. Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Sci- 
ence: Islam, China and the West, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
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with Europe after the Crimean War: The Sultan Ball given by the Viscountess De Redcliffe, at the Istanbul, March 1856. [From the Illustrated London News. ] 
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The West and Islamic world produced two distinct concepts of knowledge -different 
ways of thinking about and mapping nature- due to different cultural and geographi- 
cal environments. A major difference between the two was on the question of 
"power": the Western conception of knowledge has been closely linked with "power". 
Natural philosophy meant an empirical and "experimental" approach to the under- 
standing and control of nature. This new attitude towards the problem of knowledge 
was best expressed, for instance, in the works of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), who 
stated that knowledge was power: "Human knowledge and human power meet in 
one". 38 This understanding also constituted the foundation of The Royal Society of 
London, for Improving of Natural Knowledge. 39 During the Industrial Revolution an 
ideology of "progress", "power" and utilitarian philosophy became part of the West- 
ern conception of knowledge 40 
The Islamic world, on the other hand, presented a very different picture. The repre- 
sentation of nature and knowledge in Islam greatly lacked a conception of power 
similar to the Western one 41 The cultural environment plays an essential role in 
39 Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, collected and edited by J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis 
and D. D. Heath, London, 1860, vol. IV, p. 47. 
39 See Michael Hunter, Establishing the New Science: The Experience of the Royal Society, 
Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1989, pp. 6,157, and especially chapter six. 
40 A. Q. Morton shows that in the mid-eighteenth century the way machines and human labour 
were described and perceived underwent significant changes, for example the comparisons of ma- 
chines and human labour in natural philosophy. See A. Q. Morton, "Concepts of Power: Natural 
Philosophy and the Uses of Machines in Mid-Eighteenth Century London", BJHS, vol. 28, (1995), 
63-78. 
41 An illustrative example is that Muslim scholars, unlike Western ones, who studied other reli- 
gion to expand their powers, mostly disdained any thorough study of other religions. To the Islam- 
ic view, Islam was the perfect and last religion, and all other religions contained erroneous ideas. 
The Muslims would not gain wisdom by studying them. On the contrary, the scholars who studied 
foreign religions might well become inflicted by erroneous ideas. See W. Montgomery Watt, Is- 
lamic Revelation in the Modern World, Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. P., 1969, pp. 61-64; Muslim- 
Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions, London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 42-53,72. 
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shaping and expressing knowledge. The Islamic conception of nature and knowledge 
was closely linked to the general Islamic world-view and political structure. Indeed, 
the construction of knowledge is a process which is interrelated with politics, particu- 
larly with reference to a social order. Shapin and Schaffer suggest: 
The problem of generating and protecting knowledge is a problem in poli- 
tics, and, conversely, the problem of political order always involves solu- 
tions to the problem of knowledge 42 
The Islamic conception of knowledge was the basis of the Islamic political order. 
Traditionally knowledge had no connections with a practical value, but its true value 
was in its abstractness and divine secrecy. Nature was perceived as God-made but an 
ordinary person had no access to the true knowledge of it. The material world was 
transitory and its knowledge was unreliable and deceitful 43 Primarily an essentialist 
approach towards nature and its knowledge emerged as a predominant view in 
Islamic thought. In Islam, the "Book of Nature" was of no great importance to com- 
pare with the "Book of Word". The former was perceived as symbolic and secondary. 
The latter was the actual Word of God without the admixture of anything human 
apart from the language, and it was of "universal validity". Thus, the "natural theol- 
ogy" which became an important part of empirical interpretation of "Book of Nature" 
in the West, such as in Paley's works in England, had no Islamic counterpart' In 
Islam true knowledge could be obtained only by meditation, and preaching. The 
42 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Ex- 
perimental Life, Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1985, p. 21. 
43 See W. M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. P., 
1973. 
44 For the relevance of natural theology to science, see J. H. Brooke, Science and Religion: 
Some Historical Perspectives, New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, espe- 
cially chapter 6, pp. 192-225. 
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preaching about God was entirely centered on its affirmations of Oneness and unity, 
of transcendence and subsistence, of absolute perfections. The forbidding inaccessi- 
bility of a divine nature was absolutely maintained. The description of God has 
always been in abstract forms. His nature was unique and could not be described in 
human terms. This was partly a result of Islamic monotheism. 
The same principle was at work in Islamic art. God was unique and could not be rep- 
resented in human arts. Furthermore, creativity only belonged to God. Art then imi- 
tated God's creation and therefore had to be avoided. Thus, the figurative art, which 
was crucially important for Christian and Western culture, was excluded from the 
core of Islamic culture. Islamic art mainly included two dimensional decorations, and 
calligraphy. It lacked perspective. In particular, the absence of visual culture in Islam 
resulted in the formation of a rather different understanding of the nature and the 
problem of knowledge. In her recent study, Alpers has suggested that different theo- 
ries of picturing expressed different conceptions of knowledge. 
5 The seventeenth 
century descriptive Dutch painter referred to the image cast by a camera obscura as a 
"truly natural painting". That is, the world described is the same as the world per- 
fectly seen. The same conception of representation was at work in the experimental 
programme in knowledge, such as the British experimental natural philosophy. 
46 
Both the experiment and "picture" or "representation" function for the same ends. 
Thus the fact that in Islamic culture representational art, or "visual culture", was 
absent established a primary obstacle for the development of an experimental or 
45 Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century, London: J. 
Murray, 1983, especially chapter 3. 
46 See M. Lynch and S. Woolgar, Representation in Scientific Practice, London: MIT Press, 
1990, pp. 29-31. 
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descriptive approach towards the understanding of nature. There human experiences 
could not be dealt with in terms of visual art or pictorial experiments. Instead this 
was expressed in symbolic and abstract forms. Islamic mysticism or sufism was 
partly the consequences of this understanding, together with the political structure. 
Knowledge was a corpus of eternal verities, which was conceived as a "timeless 
framework". 47 This meant knowledge was static, unchanging and therefore could not 
be modified. The structure and pursuit of knowledge was well suited to the traditional 
political and social orders. Partly as a result of this understanding of knowledge a 
critical mind and openness to change and innovations became much harder within the 
Islamic cultural environment. "Science" or knowledge was perceived as mainly "wis- 
dom" concerning the general conduct of human life. The clergy or learned class pro- 
moted such a conception of knowledge to increase and maintain their power struc- 
tures. However, the introduction of Western learning and technologies would entail a 
new power structure. In the Ottoman Empire the "high theology" or "Islamic sci- 
ences" were in the domain of the clergy. The establishment of Western science 
would not only mean the falsification of the local "high theology", but it also meant 
the humiliation of the clergy and its authority, and therefore, the destruction of their 
power structure 48 
To maintain traditional power order and avoid the conflict, when Western learning 
and knowledge began to influence Ottoman society, it was called 'fen" or art rather 
than "ilim"; the word for science in the Ottoman-Turkish language 49 The meanings 
47 B. Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, p. 229. 
48 See E. Gelner, Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History, London: Collins 
Harvill, 1988, pp. 216-219. 
49 A. A. Adivar, Osmanli Turklerinde Rim, Istanbul, 1982,4th edition, p. 222: First published 
in French as La Science chez les Turcs Ottomans, Paris, 1939. 
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of "ilim" and "fen" were reconstructed to make a new adjustment in language to 
reduce the external threat to the traditional social order and power structure. The 
"fen" was not only discredited as simply a practical skill in contrast to high theology, 
but also described the skill of deception and attributed it to Satan, often in pejorative 
language. The wider public ascribed Western technical inventions or innovations to 
satan or other evil superstitions. 50 Accordingly, the men of new learning or Western 
sciences were never called "alim" (man of science) or learned man but "mutefennin" 
(man of "fen") or "jack-of-all-trades". 51 
To an ordinary Ottoman-Muslim, Western science and technology were of an infidel 
character, and harmful to religion. The creation of a new ideology was necessary to 
justify Western technological systems in the long term in the local environment, in 
addition to the external justifications, such as a military defence system. As a part of 
such an ideology, an important number of Ottoman-Muslim intellectuals since the 
late nineteenth century have introduced a rigid division between "material civilisa- 
Lion" or material culture including technology, and "non-material civilisation" or cul- 
ture. An important representative of this intellectual movement was Ziya Gokalp 
(1876-1924), who believed that culture belonged to the nation, whereas, material 
civilisation had no national boundaries. 52 Ziya Gokalp and other intellectuals 
favoured the adoption of Western systems and technology without abandoning 
50 C. Hamlin, an American congregational missionary, the director of American Robert Col- 
lege, who was highly skillful in mechanical matters was introduced as "the most Satanic man in 
the Empire". See Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks, New York, 1878, p. 58. 
51 A. A. Adivar, Osmanli Turklerinde Him, p. 222. 
52 For his collections of essays, see Ziya Gokalp, Turklesmek, Islamlasmak and Muasirlasmak, 
Istanbul, 1918; U. Heyd, Foundation of Turkish Nationalism, London, 1950; N. Berkes, (translated 
and ed. ) Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation: Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp, London 
& New York, 1959. 
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national culture and identity. They treated Western technology as free of Western 
cultural values, such as religion and ethics. It was international and therefore could 
be adopted in the Islamic world. This understanding was naturally extended to an 
artificial division between science and technology. Atatürk, the founder of the new 
Turkish Republic in 1923, and other Republican reformists pursued the same ideol- 
ogy. However, this dilemma has prevented Islamic intellectuals seeing the very close 
links between Western technology and the Western cultural environment in which it 
was shaped and produced. Nevertheless, such an understanding justified the flow of 
Western technology among the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual and reformist elites. 
The Ottoman Westernisation was a small administrative elite initiated programme, 
was imposed from the top down, and was protected by the state. 
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Chapter Two 
ELECTRIC TELEGRAPHY: THE MESSENGER OF THE SULTAN 
Nothing will tend to bring Turkey into the European system and into the 
family of nations more than to make her the great highway between the 
enterprising West and the teeming lands of China, India, and Australia 
which the Anglo-Saxon race has marked out as its heritage. 1 
They [Turks] do not know what to make of the telegraph, and stand staring 
at the thin wire which is suspended above them as if it were the work of 
enchantment, and possessed of mystic powers which were not given to 
man comprehend. 2 
There is every reason to believe that the simple statement, that the Electric 
Telegraph was used to convey the messages of the Sultan, would protect it 
from all accidents. 3 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss the early stages of the introduction of electric telegraphy 
to the Ottoman Empire, with particular reference to the construction of the first tele- 
graph lines during the Crimean War by the British and French, and the establishment 
of overland telegraphic communication to India, in which mostly British expertise 
and materials were employed. Britain and France were involved in the establishment 
of telegraphic communication in the Ottoman Empire from the mid-1850s. I will 
focus mainly on the British connections, with regard to the transfer of skills and 
knowledge of electric telegraphy. I will also discuss how electric telegraphy was 
t The Times, 16th April, 1855, (Leading Article on Ottoman Telegraphy). 
2 The Times, 12th May, 1855, (Leading Article on Ottoman Telegraphy). 
3 William Ainsworth to W. P. Andrew, 13th August, 1856, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European 
and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
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accommodated in the Ottoman cultural context, and its role in the formation of a new 
conception of geographical space and distance, while the meaning of electric com- 
munication itself was reconstructed in the new environment. 
The electric telegraph, "the most beautiful and surprising invention of the age with 
rapid and wonderful results", 4 was a technology that influenced the Ottoman world 
view and society at large. The visual impact of telegraph houses, poles and tele- 
graphic wires extending from town to town, and village to village was one of great 
wonder, mystery and suspicion for the ordinary Ottoman, the country peasants and 
nomads. For many they symbolised the Sultan's authority and power. It was a device 
well suited to the image and position of the Sultan, the shadow of God on earth. The 
invisibility of electric communication was an inspiration for idealistic, mystical and 
religious thoughts. For people who were suspicious of Western technology, the tele- 
graph was a satanic messenger, and an infidel tool of atheism. Nevertheless, telegra- 
phy became an agent of new ideas, and provided a new spatial framework in Ottoman 
culture. 
In the West, the electric telegraph and the railways generally expanded together. 
Electric communication was originated primarily to regulate railway transport 
whereas the development of the Ottoman telegraph was entirely independent of the 
railway service. Telegraphic lines were extended into towns and places where rail- 
ways were unknown. The geographical and political structures of the Empire 
favoured the telegraph as an ideal communication system. Turkey, especially eastern 
Anatolia, is a very mountainous country and in the winters communication was 
4 W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, London: Wm. H. Allen & Co., 
1857, pp. 232. 
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hardly possible. Unlike railways and roads, telegraphic wires could be easily and 
cheaply built, and maintained throughout the year. Huge mountains, rivers and hos- 
tile climate were not very important barriers for the telegraph. In other words, teleg- 
raphy, to a great extent, "freed communication from the constraints of geography" by 
separating communication from transportation. 5 It eliminated an important aspect of 
space, the distance. 
2.2 Orientation with a Mysterious Instrument 
I will begin by examining how the Ottoman Sultan and elite began to favour the 
establishment of electric telegraphy in the Empire, which represented a degenerate 
and non-progressive oriental environment for new learning and technology in the 
eyes of many Europeans in the nineteenth century. The early encounter of the 
Ottoman elite with electric telegraphy began with the demonstration of telegraph 
apparatus by Western agents and diplomats to the Sultan and other high officials dur- 
ing the late 1830s, when electric communication had just become a reality in the 
West. 6 Samuel Morse in America succeeded in making a working model of his read- 
ing electric telegraph only by the mid-1830's. In Britain, William Cooke and Charles 
Wheatstone almost simultaneously built the first telegraph in 1837 primarily for 
s J. W. Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society, Boston: Unwin Hy- 
man, 1988, pp. 201-229. 
6 Earlier, the Ottomans had tried semaphore telegraph for the rapid military communication 
during their war with Russians in the late 1820s. See R. H. Davison, "The Advent of the Electric 
Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire" in R. H. Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 
1774-1923; The Impact of the West, Texas: McGill, 1990, pp. 133-165, (135). 
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railway services.? 
In 1839, shortly after Morse's code was patented, one of his associates, Chamberlain, 
came to Istanbul with a set of the newly invented telegraphic instruments to demon- 
strate to the Sultan and his ruling elite. Our knowledge about this early attempt to 
introduce electric telegraphy to the Empire comes from Cyrus Hamlin, an American 
congregational missionary, who was able to follow such developments during his res- 
idence in Istanbul for thirty-five years. 8 Hamlin helped Chamberlain with the experi- 
ments on electric telegraphy in Istanbul. The experimental trial at the American 
Robert College produced no positive result. Hamlin acknowledged that the telegraph 
instrument had many faults of construction, and therefore did not work well. 9 
About a decade later, J. Lawrence Smith, a distinguished American professor, while 
in the service of the Sultan as a geologist, 1846-1851, was able to demonstrate tele- 
graphic communication in Istanbul. He was originally appointed by President 
Buchanan as a "missionary of science to the old oriental Empire", particularly on a 
mission to teach Ottoman agriculturists the methods of cotton growing in 1846, upon 
a request of the Sultan for American "men of practical sciences". 10 But on his arrival 
in Turkey he was employed as a mining engineer to investigate the mineral resources 
of the Empire. During his employment for the Ottoman government for four years he 
" See Charles Singer (ed. ), A History of Technology, Oxford, 1958, vol. IV, pp. 644-662. 
8 Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks, New York: Carter and Brothers, 1878. For telegraphy see es- 
pecially chapter 12, pp. 185-194. 
9 Ibid., pp. 185-186; In order to get the necessary repairs done, Chamberlain set out for Vienna, 
but he was drowned when his Danube steamer capsized. See R. H. Davison, "The Advent of the 
Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire", p. 135. 
10 See John R. Sampey, " J. Lawrence Smith ", Journal of Chemical Education, Vol. 5, (1928), 
pp. 123-128; see also "Sketch of Dr. J. Lawrence Smith", The Popular Science Monthly, (Decem- 
ber, 1874), pp. 233-235. J. Lawrence Smith became the president of the American Association For 
the Advancement of Science in 1874. 
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discovered important deposits of emery, chrome, ore, and coal, which brought great 
wealth to the Empire. 11 
Professor Smith noticed that the Sultan and his officials knew nothing about tele- 
graphic communication. Upon his request a complete telegraph apparatus with con- 
ductors sufficient to connect the Sultan's palace with the Bosphorus was sent to Pro- 
fessor Smith from America by his friend Benjamin Silliman, a key figure for popular 
electricity. 12 Professor Smith demonstrated the operation before the Sultan at the 
Beylerbeyi Palace, and later at the Sublime Porte before the government and high 
officials. Cyrus Hamlin, J. P. Brown, Secretary of the American Legation and many 
other foreign officials were also present at the demonstrations. 13 Delighted by the 
invention, the Sultan sent Morse an imperial decoration made of diamonds, with an 
Imperial Certificate in recognition of his useful invention. Morse later sent to the Sul- 
tan a complete telegraphic instrument. 14 
However, though the Sultan was interested, no attempt was made, at least in practice, 
to construct a telegraphic line in the Ottoman Empire until the Crimean War. No 
obvious reasons have been recorded for this delay. 15 An explanation, which may not 
alone be fully satisfactory, comes again from Cyrus Hamlin. The pashas, he believed, 
had united against its establishment: "They wanted no such tell-tale to report their 
11 Benjamin Silliman, "Sketch of the Life and Scientific Work of Dr. J. Lawrence", in J. B. 
Marvin (ed), John Smith Lawrence, Original Researches in Mineralogy and Chemistry, Louisville, 
Ky, 1884, pp. xxix-xxxi. 
12 Ibid.; J. R. Sampey, "J. Lawrence Smith", Journal of Chemical Education, 
13 Benjamin Silliman, "Sketch of the Life and Scientific Work of Dr. J. Lawrence", in J. B. 
Marvin (ed), John Smith Lawrence, pp. xxix-xxxi; also, Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks, pp. 
187-192. 
14 R. H. Davison, "The Advent of the Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire", pp. 133-165. 
15 See Asaf Tanrikut, Turkiye Posta ve Telegraf ve Telefon Teskilat ve Mevzuat, Ankara, 1984, 
p. 550 
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doings everyday, while in the distant interior". 16 Most pashas were aware of the spa- 
tial implications of the telegraph. In the distant interior and faraway provinces they 
could rule like despots. The Sultan and his government were hardly able to check 
their doings. However, making geography and distance less relevant, the telegraph 
would diminish their powers and independence that they had enjoyed. It would pro- 
vide the Sultan and central government with an effective control mechanism. The 
Sultan's orders could be conveyed to the governors and officials in a brief amount of 
time, instead of weeks or months. Furthermore, public complaints and petitions about 
pashas and other matters could be communicated to the Sultan effectively. These 
were certainly not things that the pashas would desire. 
One would also expect strong objections from the Ulema, the clergy. However, on 
the contrary, in the early period there were influential supporters of the reforms 
among the members of the Ulema, especially official Ulema, over whom the Sultan 
and his government had greater power. The official clergy saw no threat to their 
immediate authority, since the telegraph was primarily a mechanism for military and 
official correspondence. 17 The clergy became the main centre of the oppositional 
forces against the reforms and Westernisation as a whole, particularly after the mid 
nineteenth century. However, only later in the century, partly as a result of an increas- 
ing general anti-western feeling, did Islamic reactions become more active and hos- 
tile. I will deal with religious reaction towards the telegraph in a later section in this 
16 Hamlin, Among Turks, p. 194. 
17 See E. Ihsanoglu, "Some Critical Notes on the Introduction of Modern Sciences to the Ot- 
toman State and the Relation Between Science and Religion up to the end of the Nineteenth Cen- 
tury", in J. L. Bacque-Grammont and E. von Donzel, The Proceedings of the Comite International 
D'Etudes Pre-Ottomanes et Ottomanes, VIth Symposium, Cambridge, Ist-4th July 1984, pp. 
235-251. 
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chapter (see Section 2.6). 
2.3 Telegraphy in the Crimean War 
The Crimean War (1853-1856) created an environment where the introduction of 
electric telegraphy to the Ottoman Empire was possible. From a military point of 
view it was deemed a necessity for rapid communication. The two Ottoman Euro- 
pean allies, Britain and France were ready to build the system, largely for their own 
service. Ottoman society accepted and adopted the system primarily on the basis of 
being a military device in the first place. In military matters, the opposition from 
either religious or others grounds were largely muted. Anything useful to winning 
the war was justifiable. 18 In other words, military defence legitimised the introduc- 
tion of Western telegraphic system, which brought together the other components of 
Western culture related to this technological system, such as industrial, educational 
and legislative institutions. This resulted in a large telegraphic environment in the 
Ottoman Empire. 
At the beginning of the war, the fastest message from the Crimea could reach London 
in five days: that is, two days from Crimea to Varna, and sixty hours from Varna to 
Bucharest, the nearest point that had been connected to the European telegraph lines 
through the Austrian lines. 19 The messages were carried by the Tartar Messengers 
18 Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982, 
pp. 221-238. 
19 Fredrick Cadogan to Edmond Hammond, 2nd January, 1855, F097-414 1854-1856 Tele- 
graph: Service in the East - Crimea, Varna, Bucharest, Sulmanie. 
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until the telegraph line was established. Shortly after joining the Ottoman armies at 
the Crimea against Russia, the British government was urged to construct a tele- 
graphic communication between Bucharest and Varna, and Varna and Crimea by a 
cable in the Black Sea. 20 They agreed on a convention to connect the headquarters of 
the allied armies and their governments in Paris, London and Istanbul, by telegraphic 
lines. In February 1855 the Queen of Britain and the French Emperor signed a con- 
vention regarding the establishment of an electric telegraph between Bucharest and 
Varna. 21 According to the agreement, a line of electric telegraph between these two 
stations, in continuance of Austrian lines, was to be laid down by the French govern- 
ment at the expense of both governments, and it would pass through Schumla, Silis- 
tra, and Rustschuk. The French government was also responsible for the superinten- 
dence and the working of the line. The British government, on the other hand, under- 
took to lay down a submarine line between Varna and Crimea, which would remain 
in the hands of the British, together with all stations to be established at Istanbul and 
Varna. 22 The telegraph from Bucharest to the Crimea was proposed to be, essentially, 
a government line, which would only transmit private messages that had been signed 
by the ministers of war in London and Paris, and in the Crimea by the principal staff 
officers of the Allied Armies23 
20 "Memorandum: Conversation with Mr Cadogan respected his proposal to carry out tele- 
graphic communication between Crimea and London, 4th December, 1854", by Earl of Clarendon, 
9th December, 1854; F. Cadogan to E. Hammond, 13th December, and 22nd December, 1854; and 
see the letter dated 28th January, 1855 for the proposed submarine telegraph between Varna and 
Crimea, F097-414 1854-1856 Telegraph: Service in the East - Crimea, Varna, Bucharest, Sul- 
manie. 
21 Convention between Her Majesty and the Emperor of the French, relative to the Establish- 
ment of a Line of Electric Telegraph between Bucharest and Varna. Signed at London, Ist Febru- 
ary, 1855, (Ratification exchanged at London, 28th February, 1855), F097-414 1854-1856 Tele- 
graph: Service in the East - Crimea, Varna, Bucharest, Sulmanie. 
22 See "Regulations for the Use of the Crimean Telegraphy", (28th February, 1855), Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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To lay down the Black Sea Submarine Telegraph, the British government made a 
contract with Newall and Co., which was at the time a prestigious company in the 
construction of submarine telegraphs, as it had manufactured cables and had already 
built several submarine lines, including Dover-Calais, the Haughe, the Great and Lit- 
tle Belt and the Mississippi. By the end of January, 1855, the steamer Black Sea was 
ready to leave with the Balaklava and Varna submarine telegraph cable of 400 miles, 
which weighed 400 tons, on board and the Newall and Co. 's staff of 60 persons, who 
were to lay down the cable and complete the necessary works. 24 C. E. Liddell, an 
experienced civil engineer, who had laid cables in the Mediterranean and other seas, 
was appointed by the company for the task. 25 He was accompanied by Royal Engi- 
neers, such as Captain Du Cane, with Captain Charles Robinson of the Royal Navy 
as superintendent of the expedition, and Major M. A. Biddulph of the Royal 
Artillery, the director of the telegraph in the Crimea and the East. 
The system which the cable line adopted was Morse's, but with some important mod- 
ifications by Carl Frischen, of Hannover, which had been patented by Newall and Co. 
Morse's apparatus printed messages on long slips of paper as they were received, and 
thus avoided the slow process of copying by pencil on to slips. The modifications 
introduced by Carl Frischen increased further the efficiency of the system, which 
made it possible for messages to be sent along one wire from both ends at the same 
instant of time. That meant the single wire between Varna and Balaklava could 
convey several messages simultaneously; and a clerk at Varna could be engaged tele- 
graphing Balaklava at the same time he would be receiving a message from there. 26 
24 The Times, 22nd January, 1855, (Leading Article on the Black Sea Telegraph). 
25 Ibid, 8th January, 1855. 
26 The Times, 22nd January, 1855, (The leading article on the Black Sea Telegraph). 
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The operation took about two months. According to Biddulph's Report, great diffi- 
culties were at first encountered in adapting the instruments furnished by the Newall 
& Co. to the cable, as well as in the manipulation of the telegraphists to overcome the 
disturbing influence of the strong return current, or induced charge. 27 Nevertheless, 
the cable communication was established in relatively short time because of its mili- 
tary importance. By the end of April, 1855, Balaklava was in communication with 
Varna by electric telegraph; messages in cipher were received at Varna, and transmit- 
ted to Paris and London. The whole operation took about five hours at that time. At 
least two hours of delay was caused by the fact that the cable under the river Danube 
had not yet been built, and therefore messages had to be carried to the other side 
manually. 28 A cable, manufactured by Newall & Co., was laid across the Danube by 
the French administration at the time when the Crimean cable was laid, but, it very 
soon failed to operate as a result of damage from passing vessels. According to Bid- 
dulph, the cable was not sufficiently strong for the purpose, as the smallest pattern of 
wire-covered cable was used. 29 The cable in the Black Sea connecting the Crimean 
peninsula with Varna was 340 miles long, the longest operating submarine cable so 
far laid in one length between any two points. 30 A temporary unarmoured cable, it 
remained in operation for about a year. 
In August the same year Newall & Co. contracted with the British government to 
establish telegraphic communication between Istanbul and Varna, so as to complete 
27 Major M. E Biddulph, Report to the War Department on the Telegraphic Communication 
from Constantinople through Vienna to England, and Generally on the Submarine Telegraph Ser- 
vice in the East, (The War Department, April, 1856), pp. 1-26. 
28 The Times, 12th May, 1655, (Leading Article). 
29 See Biddulph, Report, 1856, p. 5. 
30 op. cit., p. 3. 
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the telegraphic circuit to the seat of the Ottoman government. 150 miles of subma- 
rive cable between Istanbul and Varna was laid down by the British engineers in a 
short time, and by early October Istanbul was connected by electric telegraph to 
Europe via Varna and Bucharest. 31 The cable consisted of one copper wire, thickly 
insulated, and covered with iron wires to protect it from injury. The line was soon 
opened to business. 32 The telegraph from Varna to the Crimea, being essentially a 
government line, only transmitted private messages that had been signed by the min- 
isters of war in London and Paris, and in the Crimea by the principal staff officers of 
the Allied Armies. After the war all surviving lines were commercialised. 
As no indigenous Ottoman technical community with sufficient know-how to build 
and operate electric telegraphy existed at the time, the Ottoman role in the construc- 
tion of these lines was simply to grant necessary permission, and to provide poles, 
labour and guards to protect the lines. However, the Ottoman engineers were learning 
about telegraphy from British and French engineers directly in the field working with 
them. In the meantime, the Ottoman government initiated the construction of its own 
telegraphic network. A line between Istanbul and Adrianople had been projected for 
some years, but had not been built. In late 1854, the Grand Vizier Kibrisli Mehmet 
Pasha applied to the French government for telegraph experts. 
31 The Illustrated London News, 17th November, 1855, (On the Submarine Telegraph Between 
Constantinople and Varna). 
32 Biddulph, Report, 1856, p. 4. 
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As soon as De la Rue, the first telegraph engineer sent by the French government, 
arrived in Istanbul, he was asked by the Ottoman government to prepare a general 
project for establishment of telegraphic communication in the Empire. 
33 The Porte 
appointed a commission of some high officials and military men, including the Chief 
Translator of the Porte, to supervise the same task. The committee formed the 
nucleus of the the General Directorate of the Ottoman Telegraph, which was estab- 
lished in early 1855. This later developed into the Department of Telegraphy in the 
Ministry of Public Works. The committee first approved the construction of the 
Istanbul-Adrianople line. The contract was made with De la Rue, who was later 
joined by other French telegraph engineers. The project began in 1854, and com- 
pleted by the end of Summer 1855, being the first line built by the Ottoman 
government. 34 The Porte's contract with De la Rue included training the local men in 
telegraphy. This task helped the creation of the Ottoman indigenous telegraphic 
infrastructure. 
The British and French governments allowed the Turkish government to use the elec- 
tric telegraph established by them between Varna and Bucharest 
35 In addition, the 
British War Department allowed the Black Sea Submarine telegraph to be used by 
the Turkish authorities of corresponding rank to British, upon payment and subject to 
future regulations. 36 This was extended to other official correspondence. The Turkish 
33 A. Baha Gokoglu, Batida ve Doguda Telegrafcilik Nasil Dogdu: Yurdumuzda Telegrafcilik, 
Ilk Hatlar, Ilk Telegraf Tarifesi, Ilk Telegraf Turesi, Istanbul, 1935, pp. 48-57. 
34 S. Eyice, "Istanbul'da Ilk Telegrafhane-i Amire'nin Projesi, 1855", Istanbul Universitesi 
Edebiyat Fakultesi Dergisi, vol. 34, (1983-1984), pp. 61-66. 
35 Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl Clarendon, 11th October, 1855, F097-4141854-1856 Tele- 
graph: Service in the East - Crimea, Varna, Bucharest, Sulmanie. 
36 The War Department to Lord Wodehouse, 25th October, 1855, (Telegraphic Dispatch), 
F097-4141854-1856 Telegraph: Service in the East - Crimea, Varna, Bucharest, Sulmanie. 
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government was soon admitted as a party to the telegraph convention concluded 
between the British and French governments. 37 In return, the Turkish government 
agreed to do its best to protect the lines from injury and interruption. 38 
Telegraphic communication across the Bosphorus presented some problems. The 
first cable, constructed by Newall & Co, was laid down under the direction of Bid- 
dulph at the request of General Storks of the British army during the war. 39 However, 
it was very often damaged by ships' anchors. Later, another cable was laid by the 
Ottoman Administration but it was interrupted by the same causes. Finally, an ambi- 
tious plan was proposed by C. Liddell of Newall & Co. for suspending a wire cord 
from two iron columns, one of which was to be erected on the top of the Tower of 
Roumelihisar on the European side, and the other on a hill on the Asiatic side 40 
However, in the available records there is no mention that such a plan was ever tried. 
2.4 European and Indian Junction Telegraph: Uniting Continents 
After the war, European interest in telegraphic communication in the Ottoman 
Empire, in particular, as an junction between Europe and India, dramatically 
increased 41 British, French and Austrian governments intensified their efforts for 
new concessions to build the telegraph in the interior and periphery of the Ottoman 
37 op. cit., Lord Cowley to the Earl Clarendon, 17th November, 1855, Paris; Office of Commit- 
tee of Privy Council for Trade to the Lord Wodehouse, 24th November, 1855, 
38 op. cit., War Department to Lord Wodehouse, 5th December, 1855, 
39 Biddulph, Report, 1856, p. 5. 
40 Biddulph, Report, 1860, p. 13. 
41 See D. R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 
1851-1945, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 19-21. 
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Empire. European involvement in the Ottoman telegraphs largely originated from the 
reason that the Ottoman territories were on the paths of their imperialist expansion. 
Aware of the commercial and political prospects of the telegraph enterprises, British 
private companies, which often monopolised the production of telegraph materials, 
widened their initiatives. There was an urgent need in Britain to establish a tele- 
graphic communication with India to unite the Empire. In addition, early British 
involvement was also to a considerable extent provoked by her competition with 
France 42 As at the time ocean telegraphy was not easily applicable to long distances, 
an overland telegraph via Turkey to India attracted the most serious attention, though 
the British were keen on submarine lines, which would give them priority over the 
messages, whereas, in the land lines, the local governments would have priority. Asia 
Minor provided the shortest overland road, and was also geographically the most 
suitable junction for the telegraph to India. Furthermore, such a line would politi- 
cally form an important measure against Russian expansion. 43 
When both British and Ottoman governments began negotiations for building a tele- 
graph line through the Ottoman territories to India, there were several different routes 
to be followed, especially for the submarine telegraph. The Red Sea, the Euphrates 
via a Mediterranean submarine cable, and the overland telegraph through Asia Minor 
were the major routes to be considered. Prestigious British telegraph entrepreneurs, 
such as the Brett Brothers, and Lionel and Francis Gisborne, obtained exclusive con- 
cessions from the Ottoman government during the Crimean War to construct and 
operate a network of telegraphy in the Mediterranean towards India via the Red Sea. 
42 F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
43 W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, pp. 229-249. 
44 
The Brett Mediterranean Telegraph Company had been involved in the establishment 
of electric communication in the region since the beginning of 1850.44 In 1853 the 
company secured the concessions from the French and Sardinian governments, and 
also obtained an exclusive privilege for fifty years from the two governments, for 
transmission of all electric telegraph dispatches through these countries 45 
William Brooke O'Shaughnessy, 46 the superintendant of the Electric Telegraph in 
India, pointed out the difficulties with the Red Sea Route, which he believed could 
"only be accomplished by enormous outlay" in not less than six to eight years 47 He 
instead proposed a line from Karachi, on the coast of Scinde, to Basra, at the head of 
the Persian Gulf, and thence in the bed of the Tigris, with its terminus in the grounds 
of the British residency in Baghdad. From Baghdad, the line could extend either to 
Aleppo and Seleucia or Scanderoon (Iskenderun) on the Mediterranean, or Scutari, to 
meet lines then open to Constantinople 48 He proposed to construct the whole line 
and complete it in three years from the date of commencement, either as the 
employee of the government, or the representative of a private company ready to 
undertake the task. He urged that the British government should warn the Ottoman 
44 As early as 1845, John W. Brett proposed to Sir Robert Peel to carry out telegraphic commu- 
nication to India via France, Sardinia, Malta, and Alexandria. Submarine telegraphy was at the 
time unknown to the public, and looked upon as impracticable. See John Brett to the Chairman, 
Deputy Chairman, and Court of Directors of the East India Company, Ist April, 1856, (copy), 
F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1 
45 Ibid. 
46 While a physician in India, W. B. O'Shaughnessy (1809-1889) carried out experiments on 
submarine telegraphy, and invented an electric motor. Later, he played a leading role in the estab- 
lishment of electric telegraphy in India. See Mel Gorman, "An Early Electric Motor in India", 
Technology and Culture, 1968, vol. 9, pp. 185-; Mel Gorman, "Sir William O'Shaughnessy, Lord 
Dalhousie, and the Establishment of the Telegraph System in India", Technology and Culture, 
1971, vol. 12, pp. 581-60 1. 
47 W. B. O'Shaughnessy to Sir James C. Melvill, 28th April, 1856, F078-1420: 1856-1858 Eu- 
ropean and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1 
48 Ibid. 
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government to give no monopoly to any company, individual, or government for the 
construction of the whole line 49 
After investigating the plans of Gisborne and Brett for telegraphic communication by 
the Red Sea, O'Shaughnessy concluded that their route was impracticable, because it 
required a huge expenditure to build and maintain. For instance, with respect to the 
proposed line by Francis Gisborne, the length of the Red Sea route was 3,430 miles 
and would require 6,860 tons of cables, given that a mile required a minimum two 
tons of cable. The Persian Gulf route was only 1,270 miles and needed 2,540 tons of 
cable, which would save 4,320 tons over the former route 50 O'Shaughnessy pre- 
ferred a submarine line from Karachi to Basra, by the Persian Gulf, and then the 
overland route to Istanbul -from Baghdad via Mosul, Diyarbekir, Sivas, Tokat, Ama- 
sia, to Scutari, completing the line to Europe by a cable across the Bosphorus to 
Istanbul. The road from Scutari to Mosul was geographically practicable and rela- 
tively safe. 51 
In June the same year, under the leadership of W. P. Andrew, the chairman of the 
Scinde and the proposed Euphrates Railway, The European and Indian Junction Tele- 
graph Company was established in London originally with the view to connect the 
Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf by electric communication by the Euphrates 
route, thus completing the only remaining link between India and Britain. 52 
49 ibid. 
50 W. B. O'Shaughnessy to J. C. Melvill, the Secretary of the East India Company, 9th June, 
1856, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1 
51 Ibid. 
52 W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, pp. 229-249. 
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THE 
EUROPEAN AND INDIAN JUNCTION 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY LIMITED. 
(FROM SELEUCIA TO THE PERSIAN GULF. ) 
(Uniting the Lines of the English and Continental Telegraph Companies 
with the electric cable of the Honourable East India Company, from 
Kurrachee to the head of the Persian Gulf. ) 
dficts, rýIr i dI ýtxýrx. 
TO BE INCORPORATED BY ACT OF PARLIAMENT. 
CAPITAL £200,000, IN 20,000 SHARES oF£10 EACH. 
(Deposit, 10s. per Share. ) 
(WITH POWER TO INCREASE. ) 
The Directors feel assured of obtaining a Concession from the Ottoman 
Government, with the necessary powers and privileges. From the 
arrangements now in progress, a settled income may be expected on 
the Capital of the Company. 
Obairman. 
W. P. ANDREW, Esa. F. R. G. S., 
Chairman of the Euphrates Valley Railway and Scinde Railway Companies. 
Dirrctors. 
WILLIAM AINSWORTIH, Fsa, F. G. S., & F. R. G. S., late Geologist and 
Mineralogist to the Euphrates Expedition. 
PHILIP ANSTRUTIIER, Esa., late Secretary to Government, Ceylon, 
and Deputy Chairman Ceylon Railway Company. 
SIR FREDERICK L. ARTIIUIt, BART., Director of the Euphrates Valley 
Railway Company. 
HARRY BORRADAILE, Esn., late Bombay Civil Service, and Director of 
the Euphrates Valley Railway Company. 
SIR JAMES CARMICHAEL, BART., Chairman of the Submarine and 
Member of Council of the Mediterranean Telegraph Company. 
GEORGE B. CARR, Esa., 5, Lawrence Pountney Place. 
COLONEL A. COTTON, late Chief Engineer, Madras, 
THE HONOURABLE J. CADWALLADER ERSKINE, Chairman of the 
London and Eastern Banking Corporation. 
CAPT. II. B. LYNCH, C. B., I. N., late commanding on Euphrates and 
Tigris. 
SIR JOIIN MACNEILL, LL. D., F. R. S., Engineer-in-chief of the Euphrates 
Valley Railway Company. 
SIR T. HERBERT MADDOCK, M. P., late Deputy Governor of Bengal, 
and Director of the Scinde Railway Company. 
MAJOR J. A. MOORE, F. R. S., Es-Director of the Honourable East India 
Company, and Director of the National Provincial Bank of England. 
THOMAS \1ILLIAMS, Esa., Director of the Scinde, Euphrates Valley, and 
other Railway Companies. 
'ýtubllors. 
LIEUT. -COL. H. B. HENDERSON, late Officiating Military Auditor. 
General, Bengal. 
J. EDMUND ANDERDON, Ean., Director of the Dank of London. 
33anhcrs. 
Massas. GLYN, MILLS, & CO. TIIE OTTOMAN BANK. 
5olicftor. 'tccrctarp. J. A. M. PINNIGER, Esa. L. W. RAEBURN, Han. 
[From W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route, 18571 
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The other founding members included William Ainsworth, F. G. S and F. R. G. S, geolo- 
gist and mineralogist, Sir James Carmichael, chairman of the Submarine and member 
of Council of the Mediterranean Telegraph Company, Sir John MacNeill, LLD, 
F. R. S, the celebrated railway engineer, and Major J. A Moore, F. R. S, Ex-Director of 
the East India Company. 53 
The company applied to the East India Company and British government "in concert 
with the Brett and other European telegraph companies" and submitted a proposal to 
"complete the telegraph communication between England and India", by forming a 
connection at Seleucia or Iskenderun with the Brett's submarine cable, which was 
then advanced to Cagliari in the Island of Sardinia, and carrying the electric wire via 
Aleppo and the Euphrates, to the head of the Persian Gulf, and thence by submarine 
cable to Karachi in Scinde. 54 The company also requested the court of the East India 
Company to allow O'Shaughnessy to be the Consulting Engineer to the company for 
laying down the wires which would unite the English and Indian systems. To this the 
East India Company raised no objections, and left O'Shaughnessy at liberty to enter 
into any engagement with private companies. Furthermore, it reported its readiness to 
undertake the construction of a telegraphic line between Karachi and the Turkish ter- 
ritory, provided that the communication between this country and Kurnah had been 
established. 55 
William Ainsworth, a British geographer who had extensive knowledge of Asia 
53 For the details, see Ibid. 
54 W. P. Andrew to Sir James C. Melvill, 17th June, 1856, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European 
and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1; W. P. Andrew to the Earl Clarendon, 23rd June, 1856, Ibid. 
55 Sir James C. Melvill to W. P. Andrew, 10th July, 1856, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European 
and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1; W. P. Andrew to the Earl Clarendon, 23rd June, 1856, Ibid. 
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Minor, and other provinces of the Empire, reported that there existed no physical 
obstacles whatsoever to conveying an electric communication between the two points 
proposed. In January 1857 the British officials reported their willingness to enter 
into contract with the European and Indian Junction Company, and to obtain from the 
Ottoman government the authority for the execution of the line and whatever aid and 
protection may be necessary on the part of the Ottoman government. 56 The British 
officials then began negotiations with the Porte through its influential ambassador 
Stratford de Redcliffe and other agents in the Levant. 57 The East India Company had 
further sanctioned the project by allowing another two of its engineers, Captain 
Charles Douglas and Arthur Hawes, to be employed in the construction of the line. 58 
O'Shaughnessy proposed a "flying line", (a quickly-built temporary line), from 
Seleucia to Kurnah, which could be strengthened and rendered permanent at leisure. 
This was a cheap and rapid way of constructing the lines. It was by this method that 
4000 miles of telegraph lines were built in less than 18 months in India, first as "fly- 
ing lines", and then converted into permanent ones. 59 The company was ready to 
start construction. By late July 1857 it had already dispatched a large quantity of tele- 
graph stores to Baghdad. 60 However, primarily due to the active involvement of the 
French, some Ottoman officials opposed the British led-project. France feared that 
56 Copy of Treasury Minute dated 19th January, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and 
Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
57 The Treasury Chambers to Foreign Office, 21st March, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 Euro- 
pean and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
58 J. C. Melvill to W. P. Andrew, 25th March, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and In- 
dian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
59 W. P. Andrew to Edmond Hammond, 2nd July 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and 
Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
60 W. P. Andrew to Edmond Hammond, 23rd July, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and 
Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
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the British would monopolise the telegraph and use it to extend its sphere of influ- 
ence in the Ottoman Empire. The Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, being one of the original 
promoters, was in favour of the British plan. The British company had also persuaded 
Resid Pasha, who was the head of the Tanzimat Council, which was responsible for 
reforms. As a result, the project had been recommended by the Tanzimat, and the 
concession had been granted for the term of 99 years from the date of the Imperial 
Firman. 61 However, when it was finally brought before the Council of Ministers, 
Fuad Pasha, "the most active of the French party", opposed the whole project. This 
induced the Ministers to reject the whole proposal. 62 
Apart from the involvement of the French, an important part of the objection was that 
the Porte was most anxious that terminus of the line should be Istanbul. Therefore, 
O'Shaughnessy urged the Board of the Directors to start the line from Istanbul to 
Baghdad, which he had originally proposed to the East India Company. 63 Hoping to 
gain the consent of the Porte, the company made another attempt by proposing to 
build the line from Istanbul to the Persian Gulf overland. M However, the subsequent 
applications to the Ottoman government for a new concession produced no result. 
The Ottoman government was becoming aware of the economic and political impli- 
cations of such a project in the long run. Besides, French involvement proved the 
61 Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl Clarendon, 28th July and 12th August 1857; and also Stan- 
niforth to S. de Redcliffe, 11th August, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junc- 
tion Telegraph, vol. 1. 
62 S. de Redcliffe to the Earl Clarendon, Therapia, 22nd August, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 
European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
63 W. B. O'Shaughnessy to W. P. Andrew, 20th August, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 Euro- 
pean and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
64 W. P. Andrew to the Secretary to the Treasury, 22nd August, 1857; W. P. Andrew to E. Ham- 
mond, 27th August, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 
1. 
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importance of the line, which stimulated the Ottoman government to undertake the 
project by itself. As a result, they were becoming more and more "persistent in keep- 
ing the telegraphic communication towards India in their own hands". 65 The line 
from Constantinople overland passing through Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to 
Basra would link important Ottoman towns and provinces to the capital. 
However, anxious of the technical and financial difficulties of the undertaking, the 
Ottoman government was desirous of British cooperation. Therefore, the Porte soon 
reported its readiness to initiate a convention with the British government for a co- 
operative effort to construct and operate the line. 66 Though reluctant to grant a con- 
cession to the company, the Porte agreed to employ British engineers, and whatever 
stock of materials and whatever workmen the company had engaged for the service. 
In addition, they proposed that the line should be worked by two wires; one to be 
retained by the Porte for its own communication, the other should be appropriated to 
the Anglo-Indian communication, as the financial benefits of such a line to Turkey 
was obvious. 67 It further proposed to extend the telegraph to Basra if the East India 
Company would bring the Indian line to meet it there. 68 Explaining the advantages of 
the new line, Ali Pasha especially pointed to its fulfilling the object of facilitating 
Britain's communications with her Asiatic possessions, and at the same time render- 
ing an immense service to the province of the Empire through which it would pass. 
65 S. de Redcliffe to Lord Clarendon, Therapia, Ist September, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 
European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl Clarendon, 10th September, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 
European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
68 Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl Clarendon, (Telegram), 10th September, 1857, F078-1420: 
1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
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Besides, he believed the new project was more economical and technically easier to 
build and protect. 69 However, W. P. Andrew was disappointed by the Porte's deci- 
sion, and stated that the construction of the telegraph by the Ottoman government 
would be: 
A work in which they would inevitably fail, as the Arabs to the eastward of 
the Euphrates are badly disposed towards the Turkish government. 70 
He further believed that: 
The condition of the resources of the Ottoman government is such as 
would preclude them from undertaking the construction of a line of teleg- 
raphy which can be comparatively of little service to that government 
either in a political or monetary point of view. 71 
Nevertheless, the British government sanctioned the Porte's undertaking the con- 
struction of the line. In addition, it proposed to unite it to a submarine line at Basra, 
and agreed in principle to pay the Ottoman government from the completion of the 
Turkish portion of the line an annual subsidy on account of British messages. 72 Fol- 
lowing the British government, the East India Company also reported its willingness 
to take immediate steps for laying down the cable from Basra to Karachi. 73 
In the late autumn O'Shaughnessy visited Istanbul and met with Ali and Fuad Pashas 
on the subject of the telegraphic communication. His communications were in favour 
69 Ali Pasha to Musurus Bey, the Ottoman Ambassador at London, 30th September, 1857, 
F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1; "Correspondence re- 
specting the Establishment of Line of Telegraph between Constantinople and Basra", Parliamen- 
tary Papers, 15th April, 1858, vol. LX, p. 180. 
70 W. P. Andrew to E. Hammond, 18th September, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European 
and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Foreign Office to Stratford de Redcliffe, 14th September, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 Eu- 
ropean and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
73 James Melvill of the India House to the Secretary to the Indian Board, 24th September, 
1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
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of British support for the Turkish overland line. This was followed by the Privy 
Council's suggestion that every facility should be afforded by the government to the 
line. 74 However, the British government were also at the time involved with the pro- 
jects of Brett and Gisborne to connect India with Europe mostly by a submarine line. 
A concession for a line from Alexandria to India had been originally granted to 
Lionel Gisborne by the Ottoman government. However, it was made contingent upon 
the execution of the Istanbul to Alexandria line via the Dardanelles in April 1855, 
and it was amended in December, 185675 Gisborne later transferred this concession 
to the Austrian government. In November, 1857, the British government informed 
the Porte that it had already made arrangements with the Austrian government for its 
Indian telegraphic communication by a line to Alexandria, and therefore it did not 
enter into any engagements with the Porte in regard to the proposed line from Con- 
stantinople to Basra. 76 
2.5 Constantinople to Basra: The Overland Telegraph to India 
Though undertaking the project on its own account would certainly have benefited 
74 Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord Clarendon, 28th October, 1857; the Office of Committee of 
Privy Council for Trade to the Earl of Shelburne, 26th November, 1857, F078-1420: 1856-1858 
European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
75 Lionel Gisborne to Lord Clarendon, (private and confidential), 28th January, 1858, 
F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1; also see R. S. Newall, 
Observations on the Present Condition of Telegraphs in the Levant; with Special Reference to the 
Concession of the Line Between the Dardanelles and Alexandria, and to the Convention Between 
Austria and England with Regard to the Line Between Ragusa and Egypt, London, 1860, pp. 1-30. 
76 "Memorandum on the Establishment of a Line of Telegraph to India via Basra" by I. Irwing, 
3rd September, 1859, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 1. 
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the Porte in the long run, they lacked technical knowledge of telegraphy, cables and a 
sufficient number of trained engineers to construct them. They had to rely on Western 
assistance. Britain was the best country to import such technical expertise and mate- 
rials, since one of the most important objectives of the project was to serve the 
British and Indian telegraphic communication. The Ottoman authorities had also seen 
the operations of British engineers during the late war. The Ottoman government 
invited the agents and engineers of the former European and Indian Junction Tele- 
graph Company to build the line. The British government was most keen on the Red 
Sea project for Indian communication. However, at the time marine telegraphic engi- 
neering was not yet in a state to allow a long distance cable communication. Techni- 
cal problems needed to be solved. 77 In addition, the Indian mutiny of 1857 proved 
the importance of telegraphic communication with India, and the British were anx- 
ious to see the completion of the Ottoman line as an alternative for Indian communi- 
cation. 
After proposing its own line, the Ottoman government sent Mr. Stanniforth, the agent 
of the Indian Junction Telegraph Co., to London with instructions to purchase "the 
wire, instruments, and other necessary articles. "78 At the same time, M. Musurus, the 
Ottoman Ambassador in London, was instructed to select a distinguished British 
engineer to lay down the wire and also direct the works for the entire length of the 
proposed line. After his consultations with Clarendon, Musurus chose for the task 
77 On the technical adaptation of submarine telegraphy, see Crosbie Smith and M. Norton 
Wise, Energy and Empire: A Biographical Study of Lord Kelvin, Cambridge & New York: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1989, especially chapters 13 and 19. 
78 M. Musurus to the Earl of Clarendon, 27th January, 1858, in "Correspondence respecting the 
Establishment of Line of Telegraph between Constantinople and Basra", Parliamentary Papers, 
15th April, 1858, vol. LX, p. 206. 
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Colonel Biddulph, the head of the Crimean Telegraphy during the war. In early 
1858, the British government officially allowed Colonel Biddulph to be employed by 
the Ottoman government to assist in the construction of the telegraph. 79 As soon as 
Biddulph arrived in Istanbul, he was appointed as the Chief Engineer to the whole 
line by the Porte, and was put under the direction of Mehmet Efendi, the first General 
Director of the Ottoman Telegraph. 80 He was left free to employ whatever staff and 
men he needed for the construction of the line. The Ottoman government also 
obtained British permission for more telegraph officers and engineers, most of whom 
worked under Biddulph's direction during the construction of the Crimean telegraph, 
to enter the Ottoman telegraph service. The party included the engineers J. K. 
Holdsworth, C. Carthew, E. H. McCullum and J. Welsh from the Royal Artillery. 81 
All were soon employed by the Ottoman government under the direction of Bid- 
dulph. When the work began in August, 1858, the number the British engineers, 
staff, and workmen working under Biddulph's instructions increased. Thus by Octo- 
ber the same year, it reached about 16 construction engineers, linemen and surveyors. 
In addition there was a medical officer and an interpreter to the construction staff. 
82 
78 Ibid. 
79 War Office to Foreign Office, 3rd February, 1858; Foreign Office to Colonel Biddulph, 8th 
February, 1858; Also, "Memorandum on the Establishment of a Line of Telegraph to India via 
Basra" by I. Irwing, 3rd September, 1859, F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction 
Telegraph, vol. 1. 
80 Mehmet Efendi, the General Director of the Ottoman Telegraphs, to Colonel Biddulph, Con- 
stantinople, 11th August, 1858, (in French): it contains the Sublime Porte's instructions concern- 
ing Colonel Biddulph's mission, in M. A. Lieut-Colonel Biddulph, Report, Explanatory of a Map 
of the Telegraph Lines of the Ottoman Empire ... with an Appendix, 
Containing Correspondence 
and Papers Relating to the Line of Telegraph Between Constantinople and Basra, London; Edward 
Stanford, 1860, p. 17; also for the Imperial Firman see Irade Hariciye Tasnifi, no. 8297/1, The Ot- 
toman Archives. 
81 Colonel Biddulph to C. Alison, Charge d'affaires, Constantinople, 25th May, 1858, Bid- 
dulph, Report, 1860. 
82 His team included J. K. Holdsworth as an Assistant Engineer, C. Carthew, J. Welsh and H. E. 
McCullum, two former telegraphists, and C. Dukes, as Superintendents of Construction, J. Irving, 
Chatfield, Lawrence, Colvin, Nial, Thomas Humbly and W. Carr, two civilian, as linemen, and A. 
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The construction of the line was divided into several sections. Most of the labourers 
were Ottoman subjects. But soon Biddulph's troubles with the local authorities over 
the project began. Biddulph had been accustomed to telegraph services in Europe, 
and knew very little about Ottoman society and power structure. He wanted to act 
independently of the local authorities and did not like their interference. The situation 
was agitated especially by the appointment of local telegraphists, the founder of 
Turkish code of the Morse system, Mustafa Efendi, as Chief of the Staff of Construc- 
tion for the Izmit Section, and Remzi Efendi for the section from Sivas to the bound- 
ary of Baghdad province. This limited Biddulph's power over the construction of the 
line, where he wanted to exercise full control over the enterprise. 83 In his letter of 
complaint to the Grand Vizier, Ali Pasha, Biddulph wrote that: 
It is my firm belief that a good permanent line of Telegraph will never be 
constructed in connexion with the Telegraph Department of the Porte. 84 
The whole line was divided into three main sections: Istanbul to Sivas, Sivas to 
Baghdad, Baghdad to Basra. The necessary poles were arranged by the local authori- 
ties. About 75 miles of the line of the first section were completed before the winter 
of 1858-1859.85 In winter most of the work on the line would stop because of bad 
weather. Ottoman telegraph authorities were critical of Biddulph particularly for his 
frequent leaves. By the following spring, the Ottoman government's dissatisfaction 
with the services of Biddulph increased to an intolerable level, as Biddulph was 
Ross and W. Turnbull as Surveyors. See op. cit., Appendix no: 10. 
83 Colonel Biddulph to Mehmet Efendi, Constantinople, 14th August, 1858, Ibid. 
84 Colonel Biddulph to Ali Pasha, Constantinople, 14th August, 1858, Ibid. 
85 Sir H. C. Rawlinson, Notes on the Direct Overland Telegraph from Constantinople to 
Karachi, London: John Murray, 1861, A paper read at the meeting of the Royal Geographical So- 
ciety at Burlington House, 10th June, 1861. 
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mostly absent from his work. Biddulph claimed this was due to his being "constantly 
and seriously ill". 86 However, nobody had seen that this was the case with him. In 
fact, the Memoirs of Lewis Gordon reveals that Biddulph had a love affair with a 
lady in Crimea, and very often travelled there during his employment by the Ottoman 
government. 87 When his one year contract ended, the Ottoman government was not 
disposed to continue Biddulph's services beyond the time specified. 88 By the time 
Biddulph was obliged to abandon his employment in the late spring of 1859, only a 
line of about 150 miles from Scutari, by Izmit to Terekli, had been completed. 
Upon the recommendation of Henry Bulwer, the British ambassador at Constantino- 
ple, the Porte offered the Chief Engineer position for the line to Assistant Engineer, 
Lieutenant Holdsworth. Being an officer under Biddulph, he rejected the position. 89 
He and some of other Biddulph's staff retired at the same time. But most British 
employees remained in the service of the Ottoman government to carry out the work. 
The engineers, C. Carthew and the brothers E. H. McCullum and H. E. McCullum, 
who were retired non-commissioned officers of the Royal Artillery, became the lead- 
ing superintendents to the whole remaining line to Basra. C. Carthew was entrusted 
with construction of line between Mosul and Basra. He and his four assistants arrived 
at Baghdad in the summer of 1859 to construct the line 90 The McCullum brothers, 
86 Biddulph, Report, 1860, p. 9; Henry Bulwer to Lord John Russell, 30th May, 1860, 
F078-1634: 1860-1861 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 2. 
87 Thomas Constable, Memoir of Lewis D. B. Gordon, ER. S. E, Edinburgh, 1877, especially 
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the Lady Karani. 
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on the other hand, engaged in the continuation of the line already commenced from 
Scutari. 
The British government had capitulated and signed a fifty year contract with the Red 
Sea and India Telegraph Company to unite Britain with India. Between May 1859 
and early 1860, R. S. Newall, the contractor, laid the cable. However, it could not 
operate for telegraphic communication, as by March 1860 five of the six sections of 
the whole cable had failed, primarily because cables were not thick and insulators 
were not strong enough to enable telegraphic communication. This failure, in addi- 
tion to the failures of the Atlantic and Franco-Algerian lines, led the British to con- 
centrate their efforts on the land lines, which proved to be more reliable. Thus in 
early 1860, the British government directed their attention to the Turkish line, not 
simply as "an alternative line", but as "the only immediately practicable means of 
telegraphic communication with India". 91 Sir H. C. Rawlinson in his speech at the 
Royal Geographical Society in the summer of 1861 stated that the overland route in 
"the present state of oceanic telegraphy" was the "only practicable direction", and 
urged the society to encourage the line by introducing it to the more general notice of 
the British public as one of the instances of the application of geographical science to 
the "practical wants of the age" 92 In addition, the Secretary of State for India urged 
the government to make arrangements with the Porte for financial assistance towards 
the completion of the line. 93 As a result, the British government signed with the 
91 India Office to Foreign Office, 30th March, 1860, F078-1634: 1860-1861 European and In- 
dian Junction Telegraph, vol. 2. 
92 Sir H. C. Rawlinson, Notes on the Direct Overland Telegraph from Constantinople to 
Karachi, pp. 2,17. 
93 India Office to Foreign Office, 3rd April, 1860, F078-1634: 1860-1861 European and Indi- 
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58 
Ottoman government a draft convention, with a demand that Britain would have a 
separate wire for its Indian messages from the commencement of the Turkish tele- 
graphic system on the Austrian frontier to Basra. The Porte was promised financial 
and technical assistance on the conditions that the whole line through Turkey would 
be properly constructed and permanently maintained as an integral part of a line to 
India. 94 
The line between Istanbul and Baghdad was largely complete and working order by 
the end of 1860 95 About a month later Baghdad was in telegraphic communication 
with London. This was the nearest to India so far reached by international telegraphy. 
In the meantime, under the sanction of the Porte, Colonel A. B. Kemball, Consul 
General and Political Agent at Baghdad, was appointed by the British Secretary for 
India to inspect lines that were built and in progress in Turkey towards India 96 Mr 
Greener, a professional telegraphic engineer, accompanied the mission 97 The reports 
of their inspections on the lines, which were sent to the British Embassy at Con- 
stantinople and the India and Foreign Offices, helped the Ottoman Telegraph Depart- 
ment improve the conditions of the lines, and also to give a permanent working order 
to the already constructed ones. 
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Upon his arrival in Istanbul, Kemball at once began to inspect and obtain information 
on the condition of the telegraphic lines under construction between Constantinople 
and Baghdad. 98 In Istanbul he found the cable which connected Pera on the Euro- 
pean side and Scutari on the Asian side as "much too small as well as not being in a 
good state" 99 This short submarine cable, laid down by Newall and Co., was fre- 
quently damaged by the anchors of vessels travelling in and out of the Golden Horn. 
After many repairs, it was abandoned for sometime, and during this period the tele- 
grams from Europe to Asia and vice versa could only be passed across the Bosphorus 
by boat. 100 Kemball and his Assistant Engineer, Greener, proposed the Ottoman tele- 
graph authorities the use of sufficiently strong cables for the purpose, which could be 
tried at the narrowest part of the straits. 101 Greener recommended that each station 
alongside the line to Baghdad should be fitted with Morse's instruments complete 
with machine, relay, galvanometer, and key; and with batteries suitable for hot 
climates. 102 
Kemball and Greener inspected the whole telegraph line and every station, mainly, 
Scutari, Izmit, Bolu, Angora(Ankara), Yozgat, Sivas, Kharpoot and Diyarbekir, as far 
as Mosul by early April, 1861. Though they found a number of faults in construction, 
the line between Scutari and Diyarbekir, about 800 miles long, was generally in a 
98 Colonel Kemball's "Report on the Condition of Telegraphic Line Now Under Construction 
between Constantinople and Baghdad" to H. Bulwer, 22nd December, 1860, F078-1634: 
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satisfactory state for telegraphic communication. 103 However, in the line between 
Diyarbekir and Mosul, they found, greater signs of haste and carelessness in con- 
struction, as well the employment of unsuitable material, including the use of poplar 
poles too thin for the purpose. All these, they believed, were due to the absence from 
the outset of a qualified and responsible superintendent. 104 Kemball's reports and 
suggestions on the improvement of the line were communicated to the Porte and the 
Telegraph Department by the British government, which urged the Ottoman govern- 
ment to adopt Kemball's recommendations. 105 The Director of the Ottoman Tele- 
graph Department, Davud Efendi, was ready to cooperate with the British authorities 
for the improvement of the line. The Ottoman government proposed to secure the ser- 
vice of an efficient staff of British engineers for the remaining line, as soon as there 
was any prospect of communication being established with India by this route. 106 
The line between Mosul and the Persian Gulf at Fao was confronted with three main 
problems; the first was the question how to protect the section of line between Mosul 
and Baghdad, which was subject to possible attacks from the Bedouin tribes or 
"dwellers in tents". The second was on the problem of whether to lay down an aerial 
wire or subfluvial cable in the bed of the river Tigris between Baghdad and Basra. 
This was also partly related to the first question. The third was the dispute with the 
103 See for a lengthy report by Kemball to Lord John Russell, 5th April, 1861, Mosul, 
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Persian government over the section of the line which would pass through Persian 
territory. The problem of how to protect the overland telegraph was one of the major 
concerns of the projectors. The Ottoman authorities possessed only little control over 
the Bedouin and Arab tribes living alongside the projected line from the east of 
Diyarbekir to Basra. Most of the attacks did not appear to be inspired by any reli- 
gious factions or ideologies, but simply for economic reasons, and hostility of some 
of these tribes to the Ottoman rulers, as well the antagonism towards the 
telegraph. 107 For instance, there were reports that the "wire would be stripped of the 
telegraph to make heel-ropes for their horses. " 108 The poles would be taken away for 
domestic use, such as fuel in the winter. They also made a mark of the porcelain 
insulators to fire at. 109 O'Shaughnessy, confronted with similar difficulties in India, 
and Ainsworth, had earlier suggested that some of the chief men of the involved 
tribes should be subsidised to protect the line of the telegraph. 110 
In these areas the British government was prepared to share with the Porte any addi- 
tional expenses which might be requisite to maintain the security of the line. 
111 The 
Porte intented to construct a subfluvial cable on the bed of the Tigris, primarily with 
the idea that this would make it less liable to interruption by the tribes along the line. 
De la More, a French telegraph engineer, was appointed to build the cable between 
107 For detailed information on these tribes see F. J. Goldsmid, Telegraph and Travel. 
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Baghdad and Basra. 112 Most British authorities, however, saw such a plan as more 
expensive in terms of construction and repair as well as not necessarily reducing the 
external dangers. 113 Patric Stewart, a talented British engineer in Bengal, who was at 
the time Assistant Superintendent of Indian Telegraphs, urged the authorities to pre- 
fer an overland line. 114 Finally, subfluvial line was abandoned, not only because of 
high cost but important technical problems, such as the need for stronger insulator 
than the ones were available. 115 
The failures of the submarine cables in the early 1860s, primarily due to the difficulty 
of maintaining insulation, made an overland from Baghdad through Persia towards 
India a principal option. 116 Some British engineers and officials were already 
involved in projects for the Persian section of such an overland telegraph, and the 
representations at the Persian governments by the British were increased by the end 
of 1861.117 The following year Patric Stewart was sent to Persia on special duty in 
connection with the Persian portion of the proposed telegraph. 118 After his inspec- 
tions, he reported against the practicability of the present line which might be 
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continued through Persia to India overland. He instead suggested the Ottoman line 
should extended to the Persian Gulf, where it would meet the Indian submarine line. 
A separate line through Persia could be built later on. 
It was only by late 1862 that the prospect of the Scutari-Basra line becoming a part 
of Indian telegraphic communication was certain. The British government made 
attempts to construct the remaining section of the line between Baghdad and Persian 
Gulf on its own account. However, the Ottoman government decided to undertake the 
project by itself as soon as it should be assured of a point of junction where the 
Indian cable was to be established. 119 Meantime, the government of Bombay formed 
the Indo-European Telegraph Department to construct a telegraph for the Indian gov- 
ernment from Karachi, the country's most westernly town, to join the Turkish tele- 
graph at Fao on the Persian Gulf. The British government assured the completion of 
the submarine cable by 1864.120 This encouraged the Porte to speed up construction 
of the line. Ahmet Efendi, a Turkish engineer, and Carthew, were appointed as assis- 
tants to Colonel Kemball in the inspection of the country through which the telegraph 
was to pass between Baghdad and Basra. 121 By 1864 all arrangements requisite in 
Britain for extending the electric telegraph from Baghdad to India were complete, 
and the British government was ready to bind itself with the Porte with a temporary 
agreement for working of the line. 122 
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A draft convention had already been signed by Erskine, the British Charge d'affaires 
at Istanbul, and Ali Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister. 123 But it went through sev- 
eral changes. The British government attached great importance to the number of the 
British officers to work at Fao, and the employment of British clerks, or clerks 
acquainted with English in the telegraph stations between Istanbul and Baghdad. 124 
In anticipation of the opening of the line, an official convention was signed by the 
Queen and Sultan in September, 1864.125 The Ottoman government agreed to ensure 
that one wire of the main line from Istanbul to Fao should be exclusively devoted to 
Indo-European messages, and to employ at major stations along this line telegraphers 
who knew English. By late 1864, Patric Stuart reported that there was only one 
obstacle to the completion of telegraphic communication: the dispute between 
Turkey and Persia over about eighteen miles of their frontiers through which the line 
was to pass. 126 The British government made several attempts on behalf of both gov- 
ernments to reach an agreement. The dispute had caused a delay for nine months of 
the construction of the line in this area. Kemball suggested the area in dispute should 
be neutralised for the telegraph if the two governments were unable to come to an 
understanding for carrying the wire across their frontiers. 127 
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In Istanbul Colonel Stuart met with Ottoman officials, and warned them that if the 
dispute continued, the British government might make use of the Russo-Persian line. 
That meant the Ottoman telegraph would lose its political and financial prospects. 128 
By then the Russian line had been already completed by Tiflis, Tehran and Bushire. 
Indeed, this was politically very important to the Porte to keep the Russians out. The 
possibility of a Russian line extented to the Persian Gulf was a considerable impetus 
to the Porte's desire to complete the line as soon as possible. The British threat that 
the whole Indo-European traffic might be diverted from the Turkish to Russian line 
yielded the desired result over the dispute. 129 An agreement was signed between Ali 
Pasha and Mirza Khan, the Persian Minister. 130 Ali Pasha suggested the neutralisa- 
tion of the intermediate ground by the erection of alternate iron and wooden posts, 
with the work to be done under the direction of Colonel Kemball at the joint expense 
of the Ottoman and Persian governments. 131 The remaining line was completed in 
less than a month. Finally, the Ottoman land line met with the Indo-European subma- 
rive lines in January, 1865, which marked the first telegraphic communication 
between India and Europe. Though the line was from time to time interrupted by 
storms, snow, avalanches, technical faults and misuse, it nevertheless functioned on 
the whole as a permanent line. The line provided both a model for future projects 
and stimulated the rapid expansion of a telegraphic network throughout the Ottoman 
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Empire. Most importantly, it created a technological culture where Ottoman Turks 
learned about telegraphical engineering in the field, working with British and other 
engineers and telegraphers. 
The construction of the line had lasted more than seven years. During this period, 
many British engineers, linemen, inspectors, and geologists worked on the line. The 
list included Biddulph and his team of around eighteen before his resignation, 
McCullum Brothers, Carthew, W. B. O'Shaughnessy, Colonel Kemball, Stuart Patric 
and many others. The section of the line between Baghdad and Persian Gulf was con- 
structed with engineering and financial assistance from the British and Indian colo- 
nial government. Most workmen were Ottomans. After the completion of the line a 
number of British telegraph specialists were employed by the Ottoman government. 
In addition, the British were allowed to build an office at Fao, where as many as fifty 
British officers were to be employed. 132 Although an alternative Indo-European land 
line through Russia and Persia was also soon opened to telegraphic communication, 
the Istanbul and Fao line remained of great importance to the British at least until 
1870's, when Britain was linked to India and her other possessions by more reliable 
submarine lines. 
By the completion of the line in 1864, a local technical community with at least a 
fairly sufficient practical knowledge and skills of telegraphy was already established 
within the Telegraph Department of Ottoman Public Works, who extended the lines 
country wide. They included local specialists who learned mechanical skills at work 
from foreign experts, and a small number of individuals who had studied formerly in 
132 See "Convention ... ", Parliamentary Papers, vol. LVII, (1865), p. 487-495. 
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France. At the outset, Ottoman telegraph engineers and skilled men had been almost 
exclusively Europeans, mainly British and French. However, by 1870s there were a 
considerable number of indigenous technical men in telegraphy. The number of for- 
eign employees gradually decreased. They were replaced by natives, who were edu- 
cated in telegraphy. In 1861 the first state school, the Funun-i Telgrafiye Mektebi, the 
School of Telegraphic Science, was established with a two-year programme for tech- 
nical education in telegraphy. A second such school was established six years 
later. 133 When more telegraphers were needed, Galatasaray Lycee, a lycee estab- 
lished on the French model after the Sultan's visit to Europe in 1867, and Darus- 
safaka, an important secondary school for the orphan and poor, offered courses in 
telegraphy. Some Western experts, mostly French, taught practical and theoretical 
electrical telegraphy at these schools. Emile Lacoine, the French instructor, was the 
head of telegraphic science in the Foreign Ministry. 134 
Telegraphic materials, with exception of poles, were also exclusively imported from 
Europe, mostly from Britain and France for two decades of the first telegraphic sys- 
tem. Even the repair and maintenance of telegraphs were carried out by the foreign 
specialist in this early stage. However, by 1861, two Ottoman employees of the tele- 
graph office in Varna, Mikael Efendi and Besim Efendi, were able to make working 
telegraph machines. Soon in Istanbul some repair shops were set up to work on tele- 
graphs, in a similar way to watchmakers. In 1869 a repair shop was converted into a 
small factory which produced hundreds of machines within months. 135 By the late 
133 On these schools and their programmes see A. Tanrikut, Turkiye Posta ve Telegraf, pp. 
571-575 
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135 Nesimi Yazici, "Osmanli Telegraf Fabrikasi", Turk Dunya Arastirmalari, vol. 22, (Subar 
1983), pp. 70-81. 
68 
1870s, the factory was making a considerable number of telegraph machines that the 
Ottoman system needed. Its machines were exhibited in expositions at Vienna in 
1884, Chicago in 1893, and Turin in 1911, and won prizes. 136 
Telegraphy was the first major Western technology which stimulated a considerable 
number of the Ottomans to study foreign languages, primarily French, since most 
telegraph employees, native or foreign, were required to speak French. English 
became an important language, as well. The convention of 1864 between the 
Ottoman and British governments entailed the employment of telegraphers with 
knowledge of English in major stations. The first directors of the Telegraph Depart- 
ment came predominantly from the Translation Chamber, which was established in 
1820s, the only place the Ottoman Turks could master foreign languages at the time. 
Munif Pasha, the director of the telegraph commission, and the first directors of the 
Telegraph Department, such as Mehmet Efendi, Mustafa Efendi, Vulic Efendi and 
Mehmed Efendi were graduates of the Chamber. 
2.6 Sultanic Messenger versus Satanic Messenger 
The establishment of a telegraphic communication system in society as such was not 
only a matter of having skilled engineers and materials. The cooperation and support 
of the local governors, and especially the local peoples of the towns and villages to 
which wires would extend, was also essential. The telegraph was entirely new to 
136 A. Tanrikut, Turkiye Posta ve Telegraf, pp. 663-666. 
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them. There were many suspicions and superstitions about its nature. Asia Minor 
included a heterogeneous population, nomads, tribes with different races and reli- 
gions. The Sultan's authority and sanction for the telegraph in such a traditional 
society was one of the most influential sources of its justification, at least for the 
majority of ordinary people countrywide. His association with the telegraph was used 
as propaganda to legitimise the telegraph. The Sultan was the owner of the first 
Ottoman telegraph message during the experimental trial by Professor Smith at 
Beylerbeyi Palace. 137 William Ainsworth suggested that the simple statement that 
electric telegraphy was used "to convey the messages of the Sultan" would protect it 
from all accidents and dangers from the locals. 138 Indeed, this was a rather witty and 
practical way for overcoming difficulties which might be encountered with the intro- 
duction of other Western inventions. Building telegraphic lines across the Empire, the 
British engineers, agents, and also the Ottoman officials and telegraph elite, besides 
explaining the nature of electric communication to the locals, were spreading this 
propaganda. 139 
Especially in areas with a settled population and established authority no substantial 
reaction to telegraphy was expected. The Ottoman government had already intro- 
duced legislation for the protection of the lines, which included heavy fines and 
imprisonment for damaging any line. 140 Besides, the Sultan's sanction, which 
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presented the telegraph as an imperial design, functioned as a safeguard for the tele- 
graph. Telegraphy was introduced in the name of the Sultan, and was associated with 
the extension of his power. Witnessing the extension of telegraphic lines to the east- 
ern city of Diyarbekir, a local historian acknowledged that "all people watched the 
telegraph wires with great admiration, and prayed to the Sultan Abdulmecid 
wholeheartedly". 141 This propaganda worked well in the provinces where the Sul- 
tan's authority was firmly established. 
However, in the distant parts of the Empire where the Sultan's control was weak 
there was serious hostility towards the lines and the telegraph institutions, which 
caused delays and interruption. This formed an important obstacle for building the 
telegraph particularly from Mosul to Basra, which was the subject of likely attacks 
from hostile tribes. This was one of the major concerns of the projectors of the line. 
The Ottoman authorities possessed little control over the Bedouin and Arab tribes 
living along side the projected line from the east of Diyarbekir to Basra. Most attacks 
and damage were caused by antagonism of locals towards the telegraph. 142 In such 
areas the safety of the lines could be obtained by a very trifling subsidy, to be paid as 
long as the wire remained intact. This was the cheapest kind of surveillance that 
could be obtained in the provinces in question. 143 In this way the tribes were made 
an interactive part of the system. 
When in February 1861 a section of the line between Mosul and Baghdad was 
destroyed, Ismail Pasha, the governor Kerkuk, proposed to the Porte he should be 
141 A. Tanrikut, Opt. cit. p. 599. 
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allowed an irregular cavalry of 300 men for the special guardianship of the line. 1' 
However, Kernball, the British ambassador and agent in Baghdad, warned that the 
use of such a force might "render the telegraph a special object of attack". 145 Instead, 
he recommended the bestowal of a subsidy on the involved tribes as the most effec- 
tive solution. This aimed at enlisting the tribes' interests in favour of the telegraph, 
and effectually would remove this source of danger. Ismail Pasha and Kernball 
agreed on a plan to furnish patrols from the tribes along the line, and in return they 
would receive a certain monthly payment as long as the line which passed by their 
camps and villages was kept safe. 146 In the early 1870s Goldsmid reported that the 
local tribes were beginning to be accustomed to the telegraph. 147 
Ottoman society was generally reluctant to learn and adopt Western learning and 
technology, which was perceived as satanic or of infidel character. Such views were 
often justified on religious grounds. However, its entry as a military tool most proba- 
bly muted any important religious reactions against the introduction of telegraphy. 
There was no immediate threat to their power structure. Thus, during the construction 
of the Istanbul-Basra line, at least for the sections in Asia Minor, no religious or sec- 
tarian antipathy to the Ottoman telegraphs were reported. Goldsmid, who travelled 
alongside the Ottoman lines in the 1870s, observed "the friendly feeling towards the 
telegraph, amounting to appreciation of its value, in the towns possessing 
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stations". 148 The argument that the telegraph conveyed the Imperial will was also 
used against such arguments that it was of a satanic nature or infidel character. How- 
ever, reactions against the establishment of telegraphy continued, especially by the 
provincial clergy, and became stronger when the Sultan and central power were 
weak. By the end of the century, the telegraph was no longer a mere military tool but 
was becoming a widely used public communication system. Thus, in the late nine- 
teenth century opposition on religious grounds to telegraphy and other Western inno- 
vations alike became a bigger threat to the Ottoman Westernisation programme. For 
instance, in the 1890s Sir Charles Eliot wrote about the members of the clergy who 
seriously discussed how near to a mosque a telegraph wire could properly pass, see- 
ing that it was "a means of conveying the voice of Satan from one place to 
another". 149 
Furthermore, some recently revealed texts which were written in the late nineteenth 
century by Ottoman provincial religious scholars condemned Western technological 
inventions including steamships, railways, electric telegraphy and factories for 
destroying God's Divine Law and thus spreading atheism. 150 With these Western 
inventions, they believed, "one attains one's goal easily without effort", and "if some- 
one wishes to commit a sin in a far city, he can reach it quickly and do what he 
wishes". 151 In particular, the religious preachers and ordinary men found it difficult 
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to comprehend the nature of electric communication. The opposition to its establish- 
ment was, thus, not only provoked by the general biased attitudes towards the West, 
but was partly originated from the new spatial implications which telegraphy 
entailed. According to the Divine Law, the mountains, hills, rivers and all other geo- 
graphical barriers were there to maintain the peace and order among the villages, 
cities and nations. Without these barriers there would be disorder and ruin. With the 
telegraph these geographical barriers and distance became less important, which 
meant the Divine Law could not be maintained. Telegraphy could function as a tool 
for unbelievers and criminals. Furthermore, they believed that the telegraph, accord- 
ing to Divine Law, "can only furnish presumption and not certainty, and [therefore], 
it cannot serve as evidence for a legal verdict". 152 
However, religious reactions did not prevent electric communication becoming a 
most valuable political device for the centralisation of power and administrative 
structures in a vast empire. In days when there were neither railroads nor telegraphy, 
it was physically impossible for the Sultan and his Pashas to exercise effective con- 
trol over the most distant provinces. After the completion of the Istanbul and Fao 
line, the Ottoman government extended the network of telegraphic communication to 
towns and far provinces throughout the Empire. 153 The telegraph remained largely 
an official machine for the Sultan and his pashas, though the public and merchants 
had some access. In 1874, an American missionary in Beirut wrote that the Ottomans 
had "a postal telegraph service, enabling the central power in Constantinople to move 
the whole empire like a machine. " 154 
152 Ibid. 
153 F078-1420: 1856-1858 European and Indian Junction Telegraph, vol. 3. 
154 H. H. Jessup, Fifty-Three Years in Syria, New York, 1900, vol. 2, p. 438. 
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Electric telegraphy was yet to become the most remarkable political tool during the 
long reign of the Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), who ruled the Empire as a real 
autocrat for more than thirty years. Under his rule more than thirty thousand kilome- 
tres of lines were built, extending the system to remote corners of the empire. 155 The 
telegraph played a vital role in increasing the space and effectiveness of the Sultan's 
authority. In late nineteenth century Charles Eliot stated that: 
The present reign, ..., has witnessed a remarkable union of all the condi- 
tions required for real autocracy: an extension of the telegraph throughout 
the Empire; a prince who scorns delights, and is content to devote day and 
night to the examination of minutiae which most heads of departments 
would leave to their subordinates; and, lastly, an absence or elimination of 
all elements capable of withstanding the Imperial will. 156 
Even the Sultan's network of spies and secret agents throughout the Empire mostly 
depended on telegraphic communication. The Sultan was consciously trying to pre- 
sent the telegraph as a tool which served Islamic unity, especially when Damascus 
was connected to Mecca by a telegraphic line. This ideology served as the most use- 
ful propaganda for the justification of telegraphy. Later, the same propaganda was 
effectively at work for the Sultan's Hejaz railway project to keep the Empire united. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The introduction of Western telegraphic system to a non-Western environment, the 
post-Crimean Ottoman Empire, was relatively fast, once it had proved to be a 
155 N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, McGill, 1964, pp. 257. 
156 Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, London: Arnold, 1900, p. 130 
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powerful military and imperial tool, which justified the new technology within the 
Ottoman cultural context. The telegraph was well suited to the Sultan's image and 
position in Ottoman society. Its presentation as an Imperial design and messenger 
provided effective propaganda both for its accommodation and extension of Sultan's 
power. Telegraphy was the source of a new geographical spatiality in the Ottoman 
culture. It diminished, to a great extent, the role of geographical distance and barriers 
in communication. It thus constructed a new representation of space: the Ottoman 
world became larger and more international. The authority of the Sultan and his gov- 
ernment was consolidated. Above all, the Sultan's position and his relationship with 
his subjects and officials were transformed. 
The establishment of Ottoman telegraphy involved the formation of a new opera- 
tional environment and infrastructure for telegraphy, with its institutions, legislations 
and a technical community. In the early stage the transfer of telegraph technologies 
were simply a matter of the transfer of mechanical skills and hardware. Scientific 
knowledge of telegraphy was largely lacking, or inadequate. But telegraph engineers 
needed both practical skills and scientific knowledge of the system. The foundation 
of state telegraph schools and formal teaching of telegraphy in other established 
schools provided the main medium for the flow of scientific knowledge to the new 
technological environment. Text books for telegraphy were translated or written on 
Western models. Within a decade Ottoman telegraphy became a large technological 
system, and was well incorporated into the Ottoman political structure. 
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Chapter Three 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY: THE SHORTEST ROUTE TO 
INDIA 
It seems designed by Providence, as the natural, as it is the most direct, 
highway for the intercommunication of the nations of the East with those 
of the West. 1 
Now that the Temple of Janus is closed for a season, let us stamp on Asia 
the impress of our genius and power: let us render the invasion of Asia 
Minor by Russia forever impossible, by throwing open to the world, by 
irresistible power of steam, the rich and forgotten plains of the Euphrates 
and Tigris -the once famed granaries of the East- and subduing to industry 
their wild inhabitants. This would be a greater triumph than the recapture 
of Kars, and at once a colossal and enduring monument of our science and 
enlightenment, as well as of our energy and might as a people. 2 
3.1 Introduction: "The Missing Link" 
The establishment of railways in Turkey in Asia Minor was of primary importance to 
British imperial expansion eastwards, not only commercially, but also politically and 
strategically in communications with India and the East, Asia and Trans-Caucasia. 
Asia Minor, therefore, became a most attractive and key "junction" for direct British 
involvement and large enterprises in railway building, in addition to telegraphic 
communication. 3 This chapter discusses a vast British railway project to connect 
I W. P. Andrew to General Chesney and John MacNeill, 28th August, 1856, FO 78/1711, Eu- 
phrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
2 W. P. Andrew, The Scinde Railway and its Relations to the Euphrates Valley and other Routes 
to India, London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1856, p. 23. 
3 For a collection of papers on the importance of Turkish railways in Asia Minor for Britain, 
see FO 424/2032, Papers Respecting the Construction of Turkish Railways in Asia Minor, (Confi- 
dential and printed for the use of the Foreign Office), February, 1888; see also C. E. Austin, Unde- 
veloped Resources of Turkey in Asia, With Notes on the Railway to India, London: William Ridg- 
way, 1878, pp. 61-74,115-123. 
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Europe with Asia and India by the Euphrates valley route through Asiatic Turkey. It 
was the shortest route to India. Because of its commercial and political advantages, 
the project found considerable support among the politicians and engineers in 
Britain. Since its involvement in India, the British desire to find a more rapid alterna- 
tive route increased, as the travel by the sea route to India by the Cape of Good Hope 
would last months. The new developments in communication technologies, primar- 
ily in the applications of the steam engine and railways, resulted in the formation of 
grand scale projects by Victorian Britain and Napoleonic France in particular, such as 
trans-continental networks of communication and transportation systems. 
By the mid-nineteenth century two alternative routes connecting the Mediterranean 
to the Persian Gulf and India attracted the attentions of the commercial and political 
world in Europe. One was the Euphrates, and the other, the Suez, for which a canal 
was needed. The findings of General Chesney's expeditions of the Euphrates and 
Tigris in the mid-1830's had led to the popularisation of the Euphrates route as the 
shortest route to India. The British, due to political and commercial advantages, 
became more interested in the Euphrates route, which would open up steam inter- 
communication between the West and the East. The Euphrates route came to be con- 
sidered as the "Missing Link" in communication between Britain and India. It was 
also projected as the safest guarantee against Russian expansion in Central Asia, with 
the idea that the establishment of steam along the Euphrates would serve greatly "to 
counteract the designs of Russia" in the region .4 The preservation of the Ottoman 
Empire and its alliance with Western Europe could only be consolidated by such a 
4 W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India with Official Correspondence, 
H. Allen & Co.: London, 1857, p. 18. 
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communication system. In some quarters it became a rival project to the Suez Canal. 
The project was brought before both Houses of the British Parliament. The French 
opposed it fiercely until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The Euphrates Val- 
ley Railway scheme, though never built, represents the heart of the British interest, 
and also illustrates how far politics was involved in establishing railways in Turkey. 
3.2 The Super Highway Between Europe and Asia 
The idea of constructing a railway from Europe through Asia Minor, Persia, and 
finally to India was first developed and projected in England by travellers, surveyors 
and tradesmen as early as the late 1830s. 5 The earliest consideration of a "Euphrates 
route" was related to a postal route to India. The term had been commonly in use, 
especially in the political correspondences between the Indian and British govern- 
ments, since the early nineteenth century. 6 The route was almost exclusively used for 
the conveyance of mail-bags across the desert from Basrah to Aleppo and from 
Baghdad direct to Constantinople. It was later adapted to the use of travellers, and 
also to some extent, of merchandise.? However, the importance of the route as the 
most direct line of transit between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, and as an 
alternative means of communication with India, began with the expeditions and 
5 Among those travellers and surveyors in the 1850's were the respected members of the Royal 
Geographical Society, such as Sir Henry Rawlinson, A. H. Layard, W. Ainsworth, and Captain C. 
D. Campell. See W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, pp. 124-126. 
6 The Encyclopaedia Britannica; A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and General Literature, Edin- 
burgh, 1879, Ninth Edition, vol. 8, pp. 671-672. 
7 The Railway News, 6th August, 1864, p. 123. 
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exploration of the Euphrates by General Francis Rawdom Chesney, whose work 
introduced the idea of an overland route between India and Europe. 8 
General Chesney also became one of two most important promoters, the other being 
W. P. Andrew, of a railway projection alongside this route. The two men devoted 
most of their lives to the promotion of the Euphrates Railway in Britain, Europe and 
the Ottoman Empire. Together they played a very influential role in its popularisation 
and in bringing about its wider acceptance in both official and public circles. The 
construction of telegraphic communication and railway between Europe and India 
became their main occupation in the post-Crimean period. Chesney was originally 
sent to Constantinople in 1829 to render service to the Ottomans in their struggle 
with Russia. After finding the war was already over, he was then encouraged by Sir 
R. Gordon, British Ambassador at the Porte, to make a tour of inspection in Egypt 
and Syria. 9 From these journeys he returned with two very important observations. 
One was the Suez Canal, which he argued to be a feasible undertaking from an engi- 
neer's point of view, in spite of the adverse conclusions of Napoleon's surveyors. 
This report played a considerable role in M. de Lesseps undertaking of the Suez 
Canal project. He later styled Chesney "the father of the Suez Canal". 10 
The other was his exploration of the Euphrates Valley in 1831, which induced the 
British government to send out two subsequent expeditions to search for a shorter 
8 For an autobiography and works of Francis Rawdom Chesney, see Stanley Lane-Poole (ed. ), 
The Life of General E R. Chesney, by Wife and Daughter, London, 1885; see also DNB, vol. 4, pp. 
195-198. 
9 F. R. Chesney, The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris Carried on 
by Order of the British Government in the Years 1835,1836, and 1837 (etc. ), London: Longmans, 
1850, vol. 1, p. vii. 
10 DNB, vol. 4, p. 197. 
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route to India through Syria and the Persian Gulf. His report to the government urged 
by every means the adoption of the Euphrates route to India. Through influential 
connections, he managed to get a select committee appointed, which decided that the 
scheme of steam communication with India by way of the Euphrates deserved a care- 
ful trial. I l After the sanction of the British government, Chesney was sent on a new 
expedition, which was to be commanded by himself, to prove his theory that the 
Euphrates was navigable from the point nearest to the bay of Antioch (Antakiya) 
down to its mouth. 
In early 1835, with a company of thirteen officers and a small number of artillery- 
men, engineers, sappers, and miners, he set out on the expedition. 12 To demonstrate 
that the river was navigable, he began to transport two steamers from the Mediter- 
ranean to the Euphrates. After putting them together at Birecik in the north east of 
Aleppo, he attempted the descent of the river to the sea. One of these steamers was 
lost in a squall during the passage down the river, but the other performed the voyage 
safely, proving that the Euphrates was navigable for steam vessels through the entire 
course, from a point about 120 miles from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. 
His reports helped the Euphrates route to become the centre of considerations as a 
new alternative route to India. 13 
From the British point of view, the importance of such a line was, firstly, due to the 
II See "The Report from the Select Committee on Steam Navigation to India", 14th July, 1834, 
Parliamentary Papers, Session, 1834. 
12 Chesney, Expedition, vol. 1, p. x. 
13 He prepared and in 1850 published two volumes, geographical and historical, of his The Ex- 
pedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris Carried on by Order of the British Gov- 
ernment in the Years 1835,1836, and 1837 (etc. ), London: Longmans, 1850,2 volumes. It became 
a very important reference and guide book in Britain for the two rivers and countries along them. 
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fact that once it was built it would form the shortest road to India. Secondly, it would 
connect Britain with eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and beyond, such as 
Central Asia, Arabia and Persia. This was vital for British trade. Nevertheless, the 
British government did not take any initiatives to undertake a project for a rapid com- 
munication with India until the Crimean War, which gave considerable impetus to the 
search for an alternative route. During the war the transit of British goods to Persia 
and Syria via Trebizonde, (now Trabzon), on the Black Sea coast, faced obstacles 
arising from the war. This brought about an urgent need for an alternative route. 14 
A project of a railway line, either connecting the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf 
by way of the Euphrates valley, or a line from Europe to India through Istanbul and 
Asia Minor, came to be discussed among the government and business circles in 
London. General Chesney, by then very influential both in London and at the Porte, 
welcomed such a project with the greatest enthusiasm. He stated the project as a 
"momentous" consideration and a "gigantic extension" of British trade. He recom- 
mended the establishment of a company to construct a railway from the Mediter- 
ranean to the upper Euphrates. This project should also embrace a direct line from 
Germany to Istanbul, then to Persia and India, partly by land and partly by water. 15 
Spartali, an eminent Greek house in London with connections in Istanbul, referred to 
the route as "the most simple, the most natural and the least expensive" one, which 
14 In his letter to the Earl of Clarendon, Mr Moore acknowledged that since the early 1850's 
some capitalists in London were considering the practicability of establishing a railway from Sue- 
dia to Birecik, on the Euphrates, by way of Aleppo. See Mr Moore to the Earl of Clarendon, Bey- 
rout, 17th June 1854, FO 7811711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
15 Colonel Chesney to the Earl of Clarendon, 13th, 14th July, 1854, Colonel Chesney to the 
Earl of Clarendon, 7th Dec. 1854; see also for similar ideas and expressions, Mssr. Spartali of 
London to Colonel Chesney, 24th Nov. 1854, FO 7811711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 
1862, vol. 1. 
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would "bring India within a short fortnight from England". 16 
In late 1855 a plan of uniting Europe with India by a line of railway communication 
continued through Asiatic Turkey was projected and submitted to the British govern- 
ment by R. M. Stephenson, who later became the chairman of the Ottoman Railway 
Company from Smyrna to Aidin. 17 By 1856 the European railway network had 
reached Belgrade, and the projects for constructing railways from Belgrade to Con- 
stantinople were on the way. The remainder was a line from Constantinople to Bas- 
rah and then to India. The Indian colonial government was among the ones who 
approved the project most favourably, and furthermore expressed its readiness to ren- 
der assistance in the way of surveys and otherwise. G. F. Edmonstone, the Secretary 
to the India Office, stated that: 
such an undertaking, once completed, and reducing the distance between 
England and her dominions in India to little more than ten days' journey, 
would prove a vast national importance, and would be a great step in the 
progress of the world. 18 
However, no immediate steps were taken by the British government to put R. M. 
Stephenson's inter-continental railway project into practice. 
In mid-1856 another project was put forward by W. P. Andrew, who was the success- 
ful originator of the great system of railways in the North-Western districts of India, 
the founder and chairman of Scinde Puncap and Delhi Railway Company , which 
was established in 1855.19 Instead of a railway all the way from Europe to India, W. 
16 Mssr. Spartali of London to Colonel Chesney, 24th Nov. 1854, FO 78/1711, Euphrates Val- 
ley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
17 Mr. Edmonstone to R. M. Stephenson, 30th Jan, 1856, FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley Rail- 
way, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
18 Ibid. 
19 William Patric Andrew(1806-1887), born in Aberdeenshire, is founder of Scinde Puncap and 
Delhi Railway Co. in 1855, and its chairman until 1886. The great scheme of his life was the Eu- 
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P. Andrew proposed to construct a line of railway by way of the Euphrates valley 
route. He soon brought together a London based group, and formed a company, by 
the name of The Euphrates Railway Company Limited, "to connect the Mediter- 
ranean and the Persian Gulf by a railway from the ancient port of Seleucia by Anti- 
och and Aleppo to Faber castle on the Euphrates" 20 Thereby steam communication 
would be established with all parts of India. W. P. Andrew himself became the chair- 
man of the company. It included very influential men of various professions. General 
R. A. Chesney was naturally invited to take a prominent part in advocating this 
adaptation of his own scheme, with the position of the Consulting Engineer and Rep- 
resentative at the Porte. Sir John MacNeill, a leading Scottish railway engineer, 
became the Engineer in Chief. 21 William Ainsworth, the celebrated traveller, was 
attached to the company as geologist and mineralogist 22 General Chesney and W. P. 
Andrew met in London several times in May in 1856 with Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, 
who was then on a official visit to Britain, and Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman Ambas- 
sador at London. They found both "were as favourable to the project as (they) could 
desire". Together they arranged the preliminaries and basis of a concession for this 
phrates Valley Railway, from 1856 to his death. He was called "the apostle of railways" and con- 
sidered the British counterpart of de Lesseps. He was later knighted by patent in 1882, and became 
a member of C. I. E. and F. R. G. S. See Dictionary of Modern English Biography, vol. 4, p. 130. 
20 W. P. Andrew to the Earl of Shelburne, 26th Aug. 1856, FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley Rail- 
way, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
21 John Benjamin MacNeill (1789-1880) was a leading "railway mania" engineer. He was a 
surveyor and was responsible for the construction of several railways in Scotland, and especially in 
Ireland. See Ben Marsden, "Enginering Science in Glasgow: W. J. M. Rankine and the Motive 
Power of Air", Ph. D Thesis, 1992, the University Of Kent at Canterbury, pp. 63-69; R. A. 
Buchanan, The Engineers: A History of the Engineering Profession in Britain 1750-1914, London, 
1989, p. 167. 
22 The others included P. Anstruther, Sir Frederic Arthur, Harry Borradile, Barrow Ellis, Hon. J. 
C. Erksine, Captain B. K. Finnimore, Captain Lynch (of the Indian navy and a distinguished geog- 
rapher), Sir Herbert Maddock, Major J. A. Moore, Thomas Williams. See W. P. Andrew, Memoir 
on the Euphrates Valley Route, p. 178. 
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purpose with the Grand Vizier, who also promised to use his influence at the Porte 
for the grant of the Imperial Firman if necessary. 23 
The project received the countenance and support of the Court of Directors of the 
East India Company, the cordial cooperation of Lord Stafford de Redcliffe, then the 
British Ambassador at Istanbul, of Lord Clarendon, then Secretary of State for For- 
eign Affairs and of Lord Palmerston, the prime minister. 24 The government sanc- 
tioned an expedition to examine the feasibility of such a railway. In April 1856, 
accompanied by John MacNeill and a staff of engineers, Chesney proceeded to Istan- 
bul to prepare for the survey of the proposed railway. 25 Chesney, by a Resolution of 
the Board of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company, was appointed as Commis- 
sioner to Istanbul in company with John MacNeill, the Engineer in Chief, to repre- 
sent the interests of the company at the Porte and to obtain the firman and 
concession. 26 At the same time John MacNeill was instructed by the chairman of the 
company to proceed to Syria, accompanied by a staff of engineers, to make a prelimi- 
nary survey of the country between the Mediterranean and the Euphrates with a view 
to the selection of a port on the Mediterranean from which the railway should 
commence. 27 By December MacNeill had completed the preliminary survey of the 
first section of the proposed line, from Seleucia to Aleppo, and made a general 
23 Major General Chesney to the Earl of Clarendon, 24th June, 1856, FO 7811711, Euphrates 
Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
24 W. P. Andrew to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4th Oct. 1866, FO 
7811711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
25 General Chesney to the Earl of Clarendon, 11th April 1856, FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley 
Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
26 W. P. Andrew to General Chesney, 28th Aug. 1856, FO 7811711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 
1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
27 W. P. Andrew to John MacNeill, 28th Aug. 1856, vol. 1. FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley 







examination of the country. MacNeill made a second complete survey in the follow- 
ing year. All his reports were generally positive, but acknowledged some engineering 
difficulty with the proposed harbour, near the mouth of Orintos on the 
Mediterranean. 28 
In Istanbul Chesney held several meetings at the Porte. The Council of the Tanzimat, 
that is, the council of the ministers headed by the Grand Vizier, sanctioned the plan, 
and proudly declared the proposed railway "the greatest and most beneficial project 
of the age", and that they would do their utmost to carry it into successful 
operation. 29 There were no important obstacles to undertaking the project techni- 
cally. In June 1857, a deputation in favour of the British government granting pecu- 
niary support to the project had an interview with Lord Palmerston. It included men 
of high position in all ranks and diverse political interests. Lord Stratford de Red- 
cliffe, who held "the master-keys of Eastern policy", General Chesney, who was 
engaged in government surveys in the region of Euphrates, Sir Justin Shiel, the 
British Ambassador in Persia, Sir W. F. Williams of Kars, Sir Bartle Frere, the 
British Indian administrator, and John MacNeill were a few among a large party of 
influential men. 30 Their scheme was for the establishment of a railway line along the 
28 The Times, 20th Nov. 1856; J. MacNeill presented his report on this first survey, with a sec- 
ond one in 1857, to the Select Committee of House of Commons of 1871-72 in details. In his sur- 
vey he was accompanied by his son, Telford MacNeill, who also made report, especially on the 
calculations of length and time to India by the proposed railway. See the papers handed to the Se- 
lect Committee, "Report of Select Committee on Railway Communication between Mediter- 
ranean, Black Sea, and Persian Gulf", Parliamentary Papers, vol. 7, pp. 501-590. 
29 General Chesney to W. P. Andrew, 17th Nov. 1856, Constantinople, FO 7811711, Euphrates 
Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
30 See "The Euphrates and Indus Route to Centarl Asia" (Report of a Deputation to Lord 
Palmerston on the 22nd, 1857) in W. P. Andrew, The Euphrates Valley Route to India: A Paper 
Read Before the British Association at Brighton, in August, 1872, London: Wm. Allen & Co., 
1873, pp. 39-45; Morning Herald, 23rd June, 1857; The Railway News, 6th August, 1864, p. 123; 
also see W. P. Andrew to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4th Oct. 1866, 
F07812254 Euphrates Valley Railway, 1869 to 1872, vol. 2. 
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valley of the Euphrates, and the connection of Britain with the North-West frontier of 
India by a new overland route which would save 1,000 miles in distance and half of 
the time occupied in the journey. 31 Palmerston expressed cordial approbation for the 
project on the part of the government and promised any kind of moral support. How- 
ever, he declined to pledge himself as to the imperial guarantee for the capital. 32 The 
pecuniary assistance proposed by W. P. Andrew was not granted by the government. 
This created financial problems for the project. The company could not find the 
money for the deposit needed to initiate the construction. In addition to financial 
problems, some rival companies mainly under French direction, were established to 
compete for the same concession or to prevent the present project being carried out, 
particularly by a British company alone. This move was supported by the French 
government and its political agents in Istanbul. 
3.3 The Euphrates Railway versus the Suez Canal and the French Rivalry 
France and Austria presented to the Porte alternative projects for opening communi- 
cation between Europe and Central Asia through Turkey. 33 In early December 1856, 
the Porte announced that it had received another proposal for a concession to build 
all Turkish railways, but especially the Euphrates railway, for which no guarantee 
was required. It was a mixed company of French and English, but associated under 
31 On the distance and related survey, see the Letter from Captain W. B. Selby, the Surveyor in 
Mesopotamia, to W. P. Andrew, London, 12th June 1864, On the Importance and Necessity of the 
Establishment of the Euphrates Route, London: H. Allen & Co., (No date, perhaps 1864). 
32 Ibid. 
33 W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, p. 5. 
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they could upset the British project, and consequently nothing whatever would be 
done 39 In spite of the French opposition, in early 1857 an agreement between Gen- 
eral Chesney and the Turkish authorities for the construction of the proposed railway 
was reached 40 The Ottoman government guaranteed six per cent on the capital for 
99 years. An immediate deposit on the capital for the first section of the proposed 
railway was necessary in exchange for the Imperial Firman. The next object of the 
company was to persuade the British government to assist and participate more 
actively in the construction of the Euphrates Valley Railway. 
41 Even a "nominal 
guarantee" from the home government was acceptable to Chesney and the 
company. 42 To persuade the government to provide assistance, the promoters often 
used the strong French interest in the project as propaganda material. For instance, 
Chesney warned: 
If we do not avail ourselves of the present opportunity, the French will 
enchantingly open the line. French will then command one route to India, 
and we shall feel ere long that the commercial interests of our Empire have 
received an irreparable injury. 43 
While the French were concentrating their pressure for a share in the project, they, in 
the meantime, developed a strong interest in another grand undertaking, the projected 
maritime canal of the Isthmus of Suez, for which they were seeking a powerful part- 
nership. In his letter to Major J. A. Moore, Count de Warren, the influential French 
39 Stanley Lane-Poole (ed. ), The Life of General F R. Chesney, pp. 440-441. 
40 Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon, 12th Jan. 1857, Constantinople, FO 7811711, 
Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
41 General Chesney to the Earl of Clarendon, 28th Feb. 1857, Constantinople, FO 7811711, Eu- 
phrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
42 Stanley Lane-Poole (ed. ), The Life of General F R. Chesney, p. 444. 
43 General Chesney to the Earl of Clarendon, 28th Feb. 1857, Constantinople, FO 7811711, Eu- 
phrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. (Original italics). 
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politician, explained that the French government contemplated with much favour the 
establishment of the Euphrates Valley Railway, but it took at the same time still 
greater interest in the Suez Canal project. He acknowledged that the French engi- 
neers were anxious that the companies, the Euphrates Valley Railway and the Suez 
Canal should unite in a joint international company, with "the object of uniting the 
endeavours and capital of Western Europe for the accomplishment of both undertak- 
ings at the same time" 44 He openly warned that unless the Euphrates Railway Com- 
pany consented to this purpose of a union between the two companies, and the simul- 
taneous achievement of both undertakings under a joint-direction, containing mem- 
bers belonging to several nations' interests in the matter, the French government 
"would make a most desperate and absolute opposition to any further concession" 
that the British might expect to obtain from the Porte. 45 
In mid-March Count de Warren published a long article, where he gave a detailed 
history and prospects of the project, and also outlined, again, the French opposition 
to this scheme being exclusively British. He strongly suggested the amalgamation of 
the two companies 46 For Count de Warren, the Euphrates Valley Railway would not 
merely be confined to the conveyance of merchandise between Europe and the East, 
which could easily be defined, but it might serve as the bond of union between Persia 
and Europe. 
44 Extract from a letter from Count de Warren, 5th March 1857, Paris, to Major J. A. Moore, 
FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Count Edward de Warren, European Interests in Railways in the Valley of Euphrates, Trans- 
lated from the Revue Contemporaire (March 15th, 1857) with Notes, London, 1857, (Reprinted 
from the Morning Herald, of March 30th, April 4th, 11th and 18th. ) 
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Viewed as a commercial speculation, as a financial operation, as a measure 
of general interest to the whole human race -for the relief of the miseries 
of Europe in particular, as assurance against famines and periodical 
deaths, - and as a social and sound philanthropic work, the undertaking of 
the Euphrates Valley Railway is one of the most noble conceptions of the 
present day. 47 
However, he foresaw a real danger in such a huge undertaking being exclusively 
British: 
There is not, then, one of those nations -not a continental power of Europe, 
but what is directly interested in protesting against the concession of the 
Euphrates Valley Railway, and for whom the concession may be an actual 
and present danger, if the direction of this undertaking is confined to an 
administration exclusively English. 48 
The worries of the French originated from the fact that the British position in the 
domination of the the most important highways between Europe and the East would 
be strengthened by the project. Moreover, in the long term the Ottoman Empire 
might be colonised by the British, like British India, and her monopoly of the rail- 
ways would provide her with the best tool for this end. The character of the undertak- 
ing, would, however, be instantly changed, if placed under the "united administration 
of France and England". This might even include countries like Holland, Russia, and 
Austria. Count de Warren most willingly suggested the construction of a great inter- 
national company to undertake the task. Under such an administration: 
... like the war 
in the East [the Crimean War], the individual interest of 
each nation would be neutralised; there would be no fear, no surprise, no 
49 encroachment, no danger for Turkey, no uneasiness for Europe 
47 Count de Warren, pp. 20-28,28. 
48 Ibid, p. 29, (original italics). 
49 Ibid. 
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He saw the best consequences in the conversion of the Company into an Anglo- 
French company, and the coalition of the two undertakings. The Suez Canal and the 
Euphrates Valley Railway would be mutually serviceable to each other. For such a 
company he proposed the title, the International Company of Communication 
Between Europe and Asia, which would be under the direction of the Turkish, British 
and French governments. 50 The central administration would be based in London, 
with offices established in Paris. Under the direction of such a company, Count de 
Warren pointed out: 
The Euphrates Valley Railway would become only a great means of civili- 
sation for Asia; it would be the resuscitation of Turkey, whose agriculture 
and financial resources would be increased a hundredfold, order and har- 
mony restored. 51 
From the French point of view such an important project should not be undertaken by 
Britain alone, which would form a common danger to Europe and other nations. 
France should either actively co-operate in this undertaking, and have an important 
share in its direction and superintendence, or it ought resolutely to oppose its 
construction. 52 
After the French offer became formal, the Euphrates Valley Railway Company offi- 
cially asked the British government whether they objected to an amalgamation 
between their company and the Suez Canal Company. 53 Unwilling to commit itself 
to such a project, the government informed the Company: 
50 Ibid, p. 30. 
51 Ibid, p. 29. 
52 Ibid, p. 31. 
53 W. P. Andrew to the Earl of Clarendon, 26th March, 1857, London, FO 78/1711, Euphrates 
Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
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Her Majesty's government can have nothing to do with any such pursuit 
and must decline to offer any opinion upon it. 54 
The French opposition was essentially political, and it was eased after the construc- 
tion of the Suez Canal began by the French. The British government was opposed to 
the building of the Suez Canal, particularly by the French. However, there were some 
British politicians, who were critical of their government for throwing into the shade 
the Suez Canal project with prejudice and abandoning "Navigation Laws", which had 
been the source of the marine prosperity of Britain since George the Third. 55 The 
British objections originated from various grounds. One simple reason was on the 
ground that the canal would make it easier for a French fleet to sail through and 
attack British possessions in India. The canal would also separate Egypt and Turkey, 
while the British-Palmerstonian policy was to keep them united, particularly against 
a possible French invasion of Egypt. 56 Lord Palmerston was strongly opposed to the 
Suez Canal. However, the most important British objection came from Robert 
Stephenson, President of the Civil Institution of Engineers, and Member of Parlia- 
ment. He declared the canal a technical impossibility on the ground that the canal 
must have no current, as he wrongly assumed that the Red Sea was higher than the 
Mediterranean?? To many British, the project was also of insignificant value com- 
mercially. Furthermore, national pride consolidated the British objection to the 
54 Mr Hammond Esq. (From the Foreign Office) to W. P. Andrew, 6th April, 1857, London, FO 
78/1711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
55 See for instance, C. D. Griffith, M. P., The Euphrates Railway and the Suez Canal, London: J. 
E. Taylor, August 1857, pp. 4-7. 
56 Ibid., p. 9. 
57 D. F. Bradshaw, "A Decade of the British Opposition to the Suez Canal Project, 1854-1864, 
Transport History, vol. 9, (1978), pp. 15-23; See also Address of Robert Stephenson on His Elec- 
tion as President of the Institution of Civil Engineers Session 1855-56, London: William Clowes & 
Sons, 1856. 
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canal. They were jealous of the French undertaking the project alone. 
3.4 The Euphrates Question 
Most concessions to foreigners in the Ottoman Empire were obtained largely through 
diplomatic channels or powerful families. Western concessionaires had often strong 
connections with their home government. French companies and their overseas oper- 
ations were especially under the tied-control of the French government. Although the 
British overseas companies enjoyed considerable freedom, they had to consult and 
cooperate with the government in their politically and militarily oriented operations. 
Moreover, grand scale overseas projects entailed a strong political, and often finan- 
cial, involvement of the home government. In the early years of its formation the 
Euphrates Valley Railway Company was desperately seeking stronger support for its 
project from the British government, and also from the East India Company. 58 
The company, after obtaining the concession from the Ottoman government, applied 
to the British government for further support, including a British government guaran- 
tee. For them the guarantees given by the Ottoman government were alone not suffi- 
cient, as the financial and political future of the country was uncertain. To this pro- 
posal for an additional guarantee for the undertaking from the British government, 
the Ottoman government reacted negatively. It considered such a step as tending to 
58 See W. P. Andrew to the Earl of Shelburne, 5th Dec. 1856, London; also, General Chesney to 
W. P. Andrew, 17th Nov. 1856, Constantinople, FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 
1862, vol. 1. 
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violate the general principal according to which no foreign power can grant guaran- 
tees or any financial assistance for works undertaken in the territory of another 
power. 59 
However, though it was very enthusiastic and anxious to see a railway line connect- 
ing the Levant to the Persian Gulf, the British government rejected the company's 
proposal for an imperial guarantee. A frequent British government reply was: 
They are not prepared so far to change the course taken up to this time, by 
extending to the undertaking a government guarantee, which has been so 
often refused in respect to similar undertakings in the British colonies and 
at home. 60 
France pressurised the British government for not undertaking the project. Lord 
Palmerston, who had advocated the railway earlier, took a passive stand after his 
meeting with Louis Napoleon in 1858. He was tied by his French policy. 61 As the 
British government did not grant the necessary sanctions, the company did not raise 
and submit the deposit money required on the capital for the first section of the pro- 
posed railway, as well as the main capital itself until mid-1859. This meant failure to 
comply with the terms of the concession with regard to the deposit money. Therefore, 
the Ottoman government withdrew the original concession. 62 The chairman of the 
company, W. P. Andrew, blamed the Ottoman government for the impracticable con- 
ditions in the concession, such as the deposit on the main capital, and the refusal of 
59 Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador in London, to W. P. Andrew, 3rd September. 1857, 
FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
60 The Treasury Chamber to E. Hammond Esq., 7th July, 1857, London, FO 78/1711, Eu- 
phrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
61 S. Lane-Poole (ed. ), The Life of Chesney, p. 446. 
62 Mr. Musurus to W. P. Andrew, 20th May, 1859, FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 
to 1862, vol. 1. 
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the British government's co-operation, which would enable the necessary capital to 
be raised. The British government took a part of the blame for not providing stronger 
support. 63 
In his letter relating to the withdrawal of the concession, W. P. Andrew wrote to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs that the establishment of communication by a railway 
along the route in question could never be accomplished by means of private enter- 
prises and capital without the cordial cooperation of the British and Turkish govern- 
ments, but if the needed assistance were granted, this project might at once proceed, 
with the all preliminary surveys and investigations made by John MacNeill and engi- 
neering staff of the Company. 64 He made a last attempt by requesting the newly 
appointed Minister for a reconsideration of the issue, but it yielded no positive 
results. 65 This was formally the end of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company 
established by W. P. Andrew in London. However, the project continued to receive 
increasing attention, and discussions and publications on the issue never ceased. The 
India Office was closely concerned with the project, which helped to popularise it 
among government circles. 
General Chesney continued his efforts for the formation of a better environment for 
the implementation of the scheme. In his major Memorandum on the project in 1862, 
he was critical of the British government for its declining to offer any guarantee in 
63 W. P. Andrew to Mr. Musurus, 25th May, 1859, FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 
1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
64 W. P. Andrew to Lord Wodehouse, (For the information of Lord John Russell, the Minister 
for the Foreign Affairs), 23rd June, 1859, FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, 
vol. 1. 
65 Lord John Russell to W. P. Andrew, 28th June, 1859, FO 78/1711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 
1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
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spite of their great interest in the proposed railway. Chesney and W. P. Andrew 
demanded stronger support from the British government. 66 In 1861-1862 the ques- 
tion of the Euphrates revived, particularly with the concession of the Jaffa to 
Jerusalem Railway. Furthermore, Lynch Brothers & Co., which had maintained 
steamers on the Tigris and between the Persian Gulf and Baghdad since the Expedi- 
tion, was projecting a line to India by the Euphrates. 67 It also found a supporter in 
John Watson, the railway contractor, whose primary object was the construction of 
the Jaffa and Jerusalem line. 68 Furthermore, an international move by France, Lynch 
and others for building the Euphrates Railway was revealed. General Chesney, now 
seventy-three, visited Paris, Vienna and Istanbul, where he found the conditions most 
favourable. Back in London, he made a fresh attempt to secure the cooperation of 
Gladstone in the renewed Euphrates scheme, but in vain. He wrote: "Quite a damper 
to the railway by William Gladstone and Gurney declining to join it. I endeavoured 
to feel submissive though thrown back. "69 However, Chesney was encouraged by 
many others. General Sir A. Cotton wrote: 
I see nothing in the world to prevent the Euphrates line being worked. To 
the Turkish Empire it will be one of the greatest boons you can offer it. As 
for Arabs, one hundredth part of the money it would be worth our while to 
spend upon it would be beyond all their dreams, and would buy every man 
in the desert. 70 
The India Office was among the more favourable quarters. In their innumerable 
66 See General Chesney's "Memorandum on the Euphrates Valley Railway", May 1862, FO 
78/1711, Euphrates Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
67 S. Lane-Poole (ed. ), The Life of Chesney, p. 452-453. 
68 Ibid, p. 456. 
69 Ibid., p. 455. 
70 Ibid., pp. 455-456. 
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communications to the Foreign Office they suggested that the project should be 
regarded with utmost favour and carried by the British rather than a foreign power for 
the interests of India. They strongly backed that provision of political support for the 
project. The British Ambassador should be properly instructed to facilitate his 
endeavours to obtain from the Turkish government a renewal of the concession made 
in 1857. Soon afterwards the Porte undertook to guarantee the payment of interest at 
the rate of 8 per cent per annum on the capital to be employed instead of 6 per cent as 
originally intended, and the British Ambassador in Constantinople considered the the 
renewal of the concession as a settled fact71 However, no important initiative was 
taken for several years. 
But the project continued to occupy an important place in both the political and the 
commercial world. W. P. Andrew, even when the company was no longer in opera- 
Lion, concentrated his efforts to persuade the government, and especially the India 
Office of the political consequences of the proposed line and its importance for the 
British Empire. W. P. Andrew often presented the proposed railway as a great philan- 
thropic work: 
Never in the past history of this country have we been afforded a more glo- 
rious opportunity of aiding the cause of peace and the spread of enlighten- 
ment throughout the world than that which is now presented to us in the 
proposal to open up by the civilizing influences of steam, the ancient high- 
way of nations between the East and the West, by the route of the 
Euphrates. 72 
71 Henry Buchrer to the Earl Russell, 18th June 1862, Constantinople, FO 78/1711, Euphrates 
Valley Railway, 1854 to 1862, vol. 1. 
72 W. P. Andrew, The Euphrates Valley Route to India: A Paper Read Before the British Associ- 
ation at Brighton, in August, 1872, London: Wm. Allen & Co., 1873, p. 11, (My italics). 
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To publicise the project, General Chesney and W. P. Andrew published books, a sig- 
nificant number of articles, particularly in the Times, and wrote numerous letters to 
the government, mostly the Foreign and the India Offices, and influential people or 
companies. They insistently expressed the political importance of such a railway line 
for Britain and its eastern possessions. That the project was a guarantee against Rus- 
sian expansion and French influence in the territories where it would be built was one 
of the strongest arguments for a more active British involvement. Besides, due to its 
scope and political orientation, the railway was beyond the work of a private com- 
pany. W. P. Andrew declared: 
The proposed undertaking, important as it is on industrial and commercial 
considerations, is infinitely more so on account of its extraordinary politi- 
cal advantages, and it cannot, therefore, be considered to be fairly within 
the scope of private enterprise. 73 
As it would be the shortest steam communication to Asia, it was of crucial impor- 
tance to India from a British perspective. A popular expectation was, therefore, that 
such a railway would secure "the peaceable possession of India". 74 The line would 
also secure the British interest in Central Asia and Persia against Russian expansion, 
as Russian roads and railways were advancing towards Persia. 75 
73 W. P. Andrew to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4th October 1866, 
F0782254 Euphrates Valley Railway, 1869 to 1872, vol. 2. 
74 Ibid. 
75 W. P. Andrew to the Secretary of State for India, 18th Dec. 1867, F078/2254 Euphrates Val- 
ley Railway, 1869 to 1872, vol. 2. 
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3.5 The British Select Committee on the Euphrates Railway 
When opened in 1869, the Suez Canal provided the shortest maritime route between 
Europe and the Indian and Western oceans. Despite British doubts about its commer- 
cial prospects, it soon became one of the the world's most heavily used shipping 
lanes. Although, this did not lead to a total exclusion of the Euphrates Valley Rail- 
way, it diminished, to a large extent, the commercial and political importance 
attached to the Euphrates route in Britain. The Euphrates Railway project, neverthe- 
less, continued to be considered as an alternative route to India. Moreover, the open- 
ing of the Suez Canal stimulated British jealousy against the French success and, 
therefore, led to the revival the British project of the railway to India. W. P. Andrew's 
Euphrates project received much wider attention from the public, commercial and 
official circles in Britain. 
In 1870 the British government made a preliminary proposal to the Ottoman govern- 
ment to build a railway from Allexandrette to Aleppo, and from Aleppo to Baghdad 
and Basrah, at the head of the Persian Gulf, construction of which was to be under 
the direction and working of a mixed committee to be appointed jointly by the British 
and the Turkish governments. 76 The British government made this offer upon certain 
conditions. Firstly, it demanded that the Ottoman government guarantee to Britain 
the privilege of the conveyance of troops at all times by the railway to and from this 
country and any of her Eastern possessions?? Secondly, the transport of all British 
76 Sir George Jenkinson to Mr Musurus, the Ottoman Ambassador, 16th February, 1870, 
F078/2254 Euphrates Valley Railway, 1869 to 1872, vol. 2. 
77 Ibid. 
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mail to and from Britain would be free of charge at all times by the proposed railway. 
Thirdly, the funds were to be raised by means of an Ottoman loan, the interest of 
which was to be counter-guaranteed by Britain at the rate four per cent per annum. 
Fourthly, the proceeds of such a loan, when raised, would be deposited in the Bank of 
England, in the name of a mixed committee for the construction of the railway. All 
the lands necessary for the railway were to be provided by the Ottoman 
government 78 Shortly afterwards the Ottoman government declared that it would 
accept and undertake to carry out all the conditions put forward by the British gov- 
ernment for the proposed railway. 79 
This was a new beginning for the Euphrates Railway, as it raised the hopes of its pro- 
jectors that the construction would start soon. The British government and public 
increasingly favoured the scheme. In July 1871 a Select Committee of the House of 
Commons was appointed "to examine and report upon the whole subject of railway 
communication between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf°. 80 
The committee was presided over by Sir Stratford Northcote. For the use of this 
Committee, all the British consuls, either from the locality of their presence or from 
having served in parts of Turkey which would be on or near to the proposed line of 
communication with India through Turkey, were asked to report on the subject and 
forward to the Foreign Office by February 1872.81 Soon the Foreign Office began to 
78 For a detailed description of conditions of this British official proposal, see Sir George Jenk- 
inson to Mr. Musurus, the Ottoman Ambassador, 16th February, 1870, F07812254 Euphrates Val- 
ley Railway, 1869 to 1872, vol. 2. 
79 Mr Musurus to Sir George Jenkinson, 12th March, 1870, F078/2254 Euphrates Valley Rail- 
way, 1869 to 1872, vol. 2. 
80 "Report from the Select Committee on Euphrates Valley Railway, together with the Proceed- 
ings of the Committee", Minutes of evidence, appendix, and index., 27th July, 1871., Parliamen- 
tary Papers, 1871, vol. 7, pp. 501-590. 
81 From the Foreign Office to Her Majesty's Counsul at (Circular), 25th August, 1871, 
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receive a considerable number of reports, most of them including detailed informa- 
tion about the possible consequences of the proposed lines and their extensions. 
These were mostly in favour of the project. 82 
The engineering side of the proposed line was examined and assessed by the engi- 
neers and surveyors of the Euphrates Railway Company headed by J. MacNeill in 
1856 and 1857. MacNeill presented the extensive findings and reports to the Select 
Committee. According to his reports, from the engineering point of view, the project 
presented no difficulty and could be executed with "perfect ease and perfect 
certainty". 83 The line could be worked by locomotive engine. Furthermore, he 
reported that the previous engineering difficulties were no longer applicable due to 
advancing knowledge of railway engineering in the 1870's. On the question of 
whether the ordinary gauge of English railways or a narrower one was to be used, 
MacNeill suggested the latter for the Euphrates Railway, a3 feet gauge to the 4 feet 
8.5 inches gauge. The safe speed of a3 feet gauge railway then was 36 miles per 
hour. 84 The proposed gauge was the most economical. With this railway, J. MacNeill 
and his son, Telford MacNeill, calculated that the distance between London and Kur- 
rachee would be by seven to eight days shorter, in comparison to a journey by a 
steamer via the Suez Canal, and London-Bombay by two days and nine hours. 
85 The 
F07812254 Euphrates Valley Railway, 1869 to 1872, vol. 2. 
82 Most of these reports are compiled in the PRO's F078/2254 Euphrates Valley Railway, 1869 
to 1872, vol. 2. 
83 See MacNeill's papers and reports in "Report of Select Committee on Railway Communica- 
tion between Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Persian Gulf; with proceedings, Evidence, Appendix, 
and Index", Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 7, pp. 501-590. 
84 The safe speed of a4 feet 8 was 56 miles, and 63 miles per hour for a5 feet 3 inches gauge, 
as in Ireland, which was projected and implemented by J. MacNeill. See Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
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whole distance of the line was 992 miles. A telegraph line was proposed from end to 
end, from one station to another. With four or five contractors the whole line might 
be completed within four or five years. 86 There were large numbers of papers and 
reports from geologists, geographers, politicians, British military and commercial 
agents in the East. They all supported the building of the proposed railway. 
In July 1872 the Select Committee of the House of Commons made their report, in 
which they were generally in favour of the line. The committee acknowledged that 
there was no "insuperable obstacle" in the way of the construction of a railway from 
some suitable port on the Mediterranean to some other suitable port at or near the 
head of the Persian Gulf. It decided that there was no probability of the whole line 
being constructed by unassisted private enterprise. 87 The expense of a railway along 
the shortest route between the two seas was estimated to be around ten million ster- 
ling. There were three principal advantages to be gained from such a line. Firstly, it 
would mean the more rapid transmission of the mail between Britain and India. Sec- 
ondly, it would mean the possession of an alternative and more rapid route for the 
conveyance of troops, and thirdly, there would be a great extension of commerce 
after the opening of the line. However, on the question of how this capital was to be 
obtained, the committee did not venture a recommendation. The report did not 
include a clear plan how to finance the project. It simply suggested the cooperative 
support of the two governments to raise the necessary funds. 88 
86 Ibid. 
87 See "Report of Select Committee on Railway Communication between Mediterranean, Black 
Sea, and Persian Gulf; with proceedings, Evidence, Appendix, and Index", Parliamentary Papers, 
1872, vol. 9, pp. 171-414; also, "Memorandum: Respect to the Euphrates Valley Railway Scheme" 
by E. Camlet, 24th June, 1882, F07813864 Euphrates Valley Railway 1882-1885, vol. 3. 
88 Ibid. 
105 
However, no guarantees and money were promised. Indeed, there were some impor- 
tant objections to pecuniary assistance. Such a typical response came from General 
Sir Henry Rawlinson and his group. They claimed the project would be of consider- 
able, but not paramount, importance to the interests of India, particularly after deriv- 
ing great advantages from the opening of the Suez Canal. 89 Furthermore, this route 
entailed transshipment, unlike the Suez Canal and Cape of Good Hope, which ran 
without any risk in transshipment, and this would raise the cost of the transport of 
goods by the Euphrates route. Since they did not consider the project to be of vital 
importance, Rawlinson's group declared that they were "decidedly averse to any 
promise of pecuniary assistance being made. "90 Without a state guarantee no single 
company would take such a big financial risk to undertake the project. Thus, the 
whole scheme fell through. Nevertheless, it was never given up entirely. In Britain 
many articles were written, books published, and meetings held, strongly advocating 
the construction of the Euphrates Valley Railway, until the construction of the Bagh- 
dad railway by the Germans. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The Euphrates Railway, engineered in London by W. P. Andrew as the Chairman, 
with General Chesney as the Consulting engineer and John MacNeill, the Engineer in 




contemporary railway building engineering and technically almost everything was 
ready for its construction. However, establishing a large technological system is not a 
technical matter alone. It also involves a problem of building political, financial and 
social environments. The Euphrates Railway was beyond the scope of private enter- 
prise, and could not be accomplished without British imperial guarantee and financial 
help. It was a highly politically oriented project in its consequences. The Ottoman 
environment did not provide all the attractions for Western investors and system 
builders. Its political and financial structure was becoming increasingly dependent on 
European powers. For European and British capitalists, the Ottoman guarantees were 
not alone sufficient and safe for such a project. Therefore, they were reluctant to 
invest money, without a state assurance, in the Ottoman Empire, which was referred 
to as the Sick Man Of Europe. Most Europeans believed that its immediate collapse 
was underway. The Bombay Times expressed surprise and negative reaction to the 
fact that it was not the security of the British but of the Turkish government that 
shareholders had to rely on, and that the Porte, who guaranteed six per cent for 99 
years: 
He must be a bold politician who, after what has just occurred, would ven- 
ture to claim for the Turkish power an existence of half this duration, and 
if, in place of 99, we assumed nine as the extreme limit of the existence of 
an antiquated and effete empire. 91 
Thus, investing a sum of ten or twenty million on such a project was to throw away it 
on "wild-goose adventures". 92 
91 The paper wrote that "when the Euphrates Railway Company talked of the certainty of a 
guarantee the world received the assurance in the customary sense of a guarantee from the East In- 
dia Company". See "Euphrates Railway", From Bombay Times, The Times, 2nd December, 1856. 
92 Ibid. 
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The capitalists or investors looked for extra and safer guarantees. Therefore, General 
Chesney and W. P. Andrew made every effort to persuade the British government to 
provide guarantees and financial support for the undertaking. The British govern- 
ment supported the British scheme at the Sublime Porte, particularly against the rival 
companies. However, it never committed itself to provide any of the government 
guarantees and financial assistance needed. The parliamentary debates, and the Select 
Committee of House of Commons of 1871-1872 did not lead to any practical change 
in the government's policy towards the railway. It became less attractive to the 
British, at least commercially, especially after they gained a firm control in the Suez 
Canal, buying most shares of the company from the Khedive of Egypt in 1875. Fur- 
thermore, the French influence in the East was loosened due to its defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian War in 1870. Finally, Egypt was occupied by the British in 1882, 
and the communication with India became safer, no matter that it was not the shortest 
route. So, retaining its strong hold on the Egyptian line, the British government was 
far from embarking on so costly an undertaking merely for its possible political 
advantages. 
By 1880, then, the Euphrates Valley Railway was no longer a politically or commer- 
cially viable project for the British interest in the East. Most importantly Palmersto- 
nian traditional policy of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was abandoned. In 
addition, the new liberal policy led by Gladstone was against the Ottoman Empire. 
Gladstone's Crusade against Turkey was seen to be a major obstacle from the 
mid-1870's to the British support for the Euphrates Railway and other industrial pro- 
jects in Turkey. 93 The weakening position of the Ottoman Empire in the political and 
93 On Gladstone's crusade against Turkey, see, for instance, Captain Pim Bedford, Address to 
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financial world played a major negative role. The Encyclopaedia Britannica stated in 
1879 that there was no reasonable prospect of such a scheme being resumed under 
native auspices, as Asiatic Turkey threatened to become yearly more hopelessly dis- 
organised: 
It is only, indeed, in the possible event of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys 
falling into the hands of a European power that we can look with any hope 
to the construction of railways, or the scientific embankment of the rivers, 
or the excavation of canals, or any of those measures of internal 
improvement which, however, if executed with care and skill, would soon 
restore these now desolate regions to their former exceptional condition of 
populousness, wealth, and general prosperity. 94 
Thus, a gigantic imperial project, the Euphrates Valley Railway, remained only a 
momentous consideration. But it, nevertheless, became the foundation of the future 
Baghdad Railway. Referring to the concession of the Baghdad Railway by the 
Deutsche Bank in 1902, The Times stated that: 
the long story of the brilliant inception which distinguish the part taken by 
Great Britain, at intervals during a period of upwards of sixty years in 
endeavouring to inaugurate a system of direct land communication 
between Europe and the seas of the Southern Persia. 95 
the Working Men of Scotland on the "Position of Turkish Affairs", London, 1878. 
94 H. C. R., "Euphrates", The Encyclopaedia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences and 
General Literature, Edinburgh, 1879, Ninth Edition, vol. 8, pp. 668-672, (672). 
95 The Times, 24th January, 1902; For similar link, Sir Thomas Sanderson, "Memorandum on 
the Baghdad Railway", 23rd Feb. 1903, and also printed for the use of the Foreign Office, 14th 
April 1903, (Confidential), F07815322 Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways, 1903, vol. 3. 
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Chapter Four 
THE SMYRNA-AIDIN RAILWAY: EXPERIMENTAL LINE IN ASIA MINOR 
These works [railway] will do more to impress the people of the country 
with superior resources of Europeans than anything else. Already they 
begin to acknowledge this, and lament their want of instruction; they feel 
their natural capacity and quick perception, and wish only for the opportu- 
nity of educating these qualities. At every step which the railway proceeds 
their minds will be opened more and more, so that without hyperbole one 
might say that railways in Turkey will be like the furrows of the plough of 
Triptolemus opening the road to civilisation. 1 
Soon the prejudice which the first suggestion of its construction excited 
amongst the Mohammedan population subsided, and the doubts of its prac- 
ticability which followed disappeared with the first whistle of the engine. 2 
4.1 Introduction 
I have already stated in the previous chapter that the British saw the establishment of 
railways in Turkey in Asia Minor as vitally important to their political, military and 
commercial interests in the East. Turkey occupied an exceptional position on trade 
routes between Europe on the one hand and Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and even central Asia, 
on the other. Therefore, at the outset, building of railways in Turkey was primarily a 
British concern. While public and official debates over the Euphrates Railway pro- 
ject continued, British entrepreneurs projected plans to build small scale railway sys- 
terns in the region, particularly in the areas of rich agricultural products and valuable 
raw materials. Most of these small railway systems were originally proposed as profit 
I The Times, 6th April, 1858. 
2 The Illustrated London News, 20th November, 1858, pp. 511-512. 
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oriented rather than as big political and imperial projects. Investors and builders 
made sure that these railways would return their money. British and other European 
capitalists aimed at connecting by a system of railways rich towns in the interior with 
major seaports, where shipping allowed communication overseas. 
In Turkey the projected lines included the Smyrna to Aidin and Cassaba on the 
Agean Sea; the Mudanya to Brussa, and the Scutari and Ismid on the Sea of Mar- 
mara; Trebizonde, Samsun, Sinope and Kustenje on the Black Sea, and Mersina and 
Adana on the Mediterranean. 3 In this chapter, I will confine myself primarily to the 
British efforts to establish and "pioneer" the construction of railways in the Ottoman 
Empire in Asia. The railway building in European Turkey will be outside the scope 
of this study. I will particularly concentrate on the first railway construction in Asi- 
atic Turkey, the Smyrna to Aidin Railway. The system builders presented the under- 
taking as an "experimental line" and a model commercial enterprise in Turkey. Its 
perceived success would be used in future schemes as a strong rhetorical device. The 
line was constructed exclusively by British engineers and management, and only 
British material was employed. 
Within two decades after the first "railway mania" in 1830 in Britain, when steam 
locomotive trains were first run, railways became the most important symbol of 
industrial, economic and political power in Europe. As a large technological system, 
the railway entailed large systems of subsequent industrial innovations. The visual 
impact of the railway on the public image was very great and immediate .4 It often 
3 On the proposed railways in Turkey by European capitalists, see C. E. Austin, Undeveloped 
Resources of Turkey in Asia, With Notes on the Railway to India, London: William Ridgway, 1878, 
pp. 61-74. 
4 For a recent study of the image and impact of railways, see Nicholas Faith, The World the 
Railways Made London: The Bodley Head, 1990. 
111 
represented imperial power and authority. For a vast empire, railway was an essential 
tool for the central administration, as it connected the peripheral provinces to the 
centre with a network of rapid communication. Railways were seen to be the key to 
modernisation, progress and economic development, as they helped to create a new 
economic wealth, and opened new channels for manpower. 5 
After a rapid construction period, the major network of railways was largely com- 
plete in Britain by the mid-nineteenth century. 6 Then British railway engineers and 
investors turned their attention abroad: first, to Western Europe where the completion 
of major networks of railways was already underway, and the USA, where the con- 
struction of railways was rapidly growing on grand scales. The next was the non- 
Western world. As early as 1850, Britain and France began to project and construct 
railways, not only in their direct dominions but in the rest of the world. They were 
often carried out as instrumental to imperialist objectives. Because of their role in 
conquering and then controlling the empires built up during the nineteenth century, 
railways came to represent an imperial "tool" for penetration.? However, from a 
European perspective they were the source of civilisation and enlightenment in the 
non-Western world. 
s Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperial- 
ism, 1850-1940, New York & Oxford, 1988, pp. 49-96. 
6 H. Pollins, Britain's Railways, Newton Abbot, 1971, pp. 34-40; H. G. Lewin, Early British 
Railways, 1801-1844, London & New York, 1925, especially chapter 5. 
7 See Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of the Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in 
the Nineteenth Century, New York & Oxford, 1981, pp. 187-8. 
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4.2 The Imperial-Medjidieh-Ottoman Railways 
Sir William Fairbairn, the distinguished British engineer, arrived in Istanbul in 1839 
as a part of a "scientific mission", under the instructions of the late Sultan Mahmud 
11.8 The Sultan had earlier dispatched a commission to Britain and other Western 
countries, including America, for the purpose of making enquiries about "useful arts 
and manufactures" that might be introduced to his country, and men of "practical sci- 
ence" to survey and report upon the different establishments then in operation in the 
Ottoman Empire. 9 Fairbairn was one of these men of "practical science" to inspect 
and recommend on the Ottoman industrial and technical works. 10 He made valuable 
observations on the present state of the public works in Turkey and his remarks on 
Ottoman industrial enterprises also included railway communication. He had long 
meetings, and conversations with high officials, pashas and effendis, connected with 
different government departments such as the war and ordnance, were concentrated 
on "the improved state of practical science in England", and the introduction of 
s Fairbairn appears to have arrived in Istanbul a few days before the death of the Sultan, Mah- 
mud II. In the same letter he writes that his majesty died the very morning of his appointment with 
him for an audience at the palace. Due to the death of the Sultan his inspections and surveys of the 
public works were temporarily suspended until he received new orders from the Grand Vizier to 
proceed with the same. See The Life of Sir William Fairbairn, Bart, (Partly written by himself, 
edited and completed by William Pole). First published in 1877 by Longmans Green and Compa- 
ny. The reprint, 1970. Especially chapter XI, pp. 165-176. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Fairbairn acknowledges that he reported upon nearly all the government works. Later with 
his recommendation an Ottoman commission under Mr. Ohanes Dadian (Assoc. Inst. C. E. ) visited 
England, "in furtherance of the plans for ameliorating the state of the Turkish community by intro- 
ducing useful arts and manufactures". See Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engi- 
neers, (1843), vol. 2, pp. 125-126; William Fairbairn, "Experimental Researches into the Proper- 
ties of the Iron Ores of Samakoff, in Turkey, and of the Haematite Ores of Cumberland, with a 
View to Determine the Best Means for Reducing them into the Cast and Malleable States; and on 
the Relative Strength and Other Properties of Cast-Iron from the Turkish and Other Haematite 
Ores", (1844), vol. 3, pp. 225-241. 
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railways. From his observations Fairbairn stated that: 
[Railways] appeared to them inexplicable, if not entirely beyond their 
comprehension. They could not realise the idea of travelling at the rate of 
forty miles an hour, and doubted the correctness of the descriptions that 
reached them. 11 
Railways had not then extended beyond Western Europe. It was only during the 
Crimean War that the Ottomans experienced the railway communication system. 12 In 
addition to electric telegraphy, the railway system was employed during the war, 
which probably affected the outcome. The British built a railway, surveyed and engi- 
neered by D. Campbell, for purely military reasons between the camp of the allies at 
Sebastopol and their base of supplies at Balaklava, a distance of about eight miles. It 
was then extended to the village of Kadikoi. The railway was simply constructed. 
Rails were fastened down over the wooden sleepers which were laid over a bed of 
stones on the road. 13 With all sections, the railway was about twenty miles in length. 
Its significant role in the outcome of the war has been described by Cooke as "the 
railway that won a war". 14 It is also the earliest instance of a purely military railway 
being constructed during a war. 15 The Sultan and his officials developed a strong 
interest in railway building in their empire once it was proved to be a crucial system 
II The Life of Sir William Fairbairn, pp. 170-171. 
12 Though according to The Times' Turkish Number in 1938, the long history of Ottoman- 
Turkish railways began in 1836 with the proposal of a group to build a line in Anatolia, there is no 
written record that this was the case, or that such a project was ever carried out. See The New 
Turkey, Reprinted from the Turkish Number of The Times, 9th August, 1938, p. 80. 
13 In his book, which he calls "an engineer's version of the Crimean War", Cooke presents a 
readable account of this military railway. See Brian Cooke, The Grand Crimean Central Railway, 
the Railway that Won a War: The Story of the Railway built by the British in the Crimea during the 
War of 1854-1856, Cheshire, 1990. 
14 ibid., p. 3. 
15 E. A. Pratt, The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914, London, 1916, pp. 
206-211. 
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of communication, as it had been demonstrated most dramatically during the war. 
They were aware of economic, military and political benefits of a railway network in 
Turkey. 
In late 1855, even before the Crimean War ended, the Ottoman government declared 
and transmitted to the various Embassies and Legations throughout Europe "the fun- 
damental conditions" for the establishment of railways in the Ottoman Empire. To 
this end the government "resolved to address itself directly to the experiences and 
capital of Europe". 16 These conditions were in the first place proposed for the estab- 
lishment of a railway line between Constantinople and Belgrade, for which there had 
been some European projects. 17 But, later they were applied to other railway enter- 
prises in Turkey. It ruled that the construction, as well as the direction of the working, 
of railways shall always be under the high superintendence of the Sublime Porte. A 
company to construct a line could only be established under the name and title of 
Imperial Ottoman Company, which would always be subject to the general laws of 
the Ottoman Empire and remain as its property. Most importantly, foreigners could 
be shareholders without any distinction from the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. 
It took Europeans by surprise how quickly the Sultan and his government passed a 
Firman, Imperial Charter or bill, to allow European companies to build railways in 
various domains of the empire. Thus, referring to the concession for the railway from 
the Danube to the Archipelago port, The Times Constantinople correspondent wrote 
that he did not think "there ever was a project presented to the Ottoman Government 
16 Times, 2nd October, 1855, pp. 8-9. 
17 A report on the projected line from Constantinople to Belgrade was presented to the Ot- 
toman government in 1853, by Messr. Edmund and Matthew Leahey, the civil engineers who sur- 
veyed the whole line. See Times, 12th October, 1855. 
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The Crimean Railway 
which was so universally approved by all and found less objections". 18 Such a line 
was of the highest importance to the government, not only from a financial, but also 
from a political and military point of view, connecting the different provinces of 
European Turkey , and 
facilitating the movement of troops. A privately circulated 
official text by the Ottoman government or the Tanzimat administration declared: 
To develop, to the utmost extent, the resources of Turkey, to bring its capi- 
tal and its most productive provinces into the shortest communication with 
centre and west Europe, and at the same time to complete the European 
portion of the direct route to India, it is proposed to construct The Imperial 
Ottoman Railway. 19 
As evidence of his personal appreciation of the undertaking the Sultan wished his 
own name should be connected with it, and consequently that it should be "The 
Imperial-Medjidieh-Ottoman Railways"20 The line was proposed to connect the 
Danube at Rustchuk to Varna and Istanbul, and then unite them with the Black Sea 
and the Mediterranean. The commercial community of Istanbul, European and 
native, particularly welcomed and favoured the initiative. Soon after the plan was 
publicly known, some of the most influential and wealthy families in the city entered 
into an engagement to subscribe the sum of one million sterling for the project21 
Even the inhabitants of the two provinces through which the railway was to pass peti- 
tioned the government in favour of the scheme, offering to subscribe for the purchase 
of land belonging to private individuals, and to present it gratuitously to the state for 
18 The limes, January 30th. 1857. 
19 The Proposed Imperial (Medjidieh) Ottoman Railway, its Purposes and Prospects. 
Printed for private circulation only, 1857, London? or Constantinople?, British Library, Miscella- 
neous Tracts, 82925-1915. 
20 Ibid, p. 4. 
21 Ibid, pp. 4-5; The Morning Post, January 21st, 1857. 
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the purposes of the line. 22 The members of the diplomatic body recognised the enor- 
mous advantages which a railway could confer upon Turkey and upon Europe at 
large, and expressed themselves no less disposed towards the scheme. 23 
The line was projected to form the "great high road between the West and the East", 
and to be the "main artery" of the railway system of the European portion of the 
Ottoman Empire, providing an outlet for the vast produce of the richest, best inhab- 
ited, and most productive districts of Turkey in Europe. 24 The engineering examina- 
tion, with reference to a railway of the country between Rustchuk and Varna, had 
been already made during the Crimean War by British and French engineers, and the 
line had been strongly urged on the Ottoman Government by a commission to inquire 
into its capabilities and facility of construction and its commercial prospects. 
European engineers had also examined the country between Adrianople (Edirne) and 
Istanbul, and strongly recommended the construction of a line to the Ottoman gov- 
ernment and to capitalists. Some British officers during the Crimean War held high 
ranks in the Turkish army. They became intimately acquainted with the country 
through which the projected railway would pass, and they were employed officially 
to inspect it with a view to the construction of a military road between the capital and 
the Danube. 25 The proposed line had great commercial advantages as well as mili- 
tary and political advantages: it would be the most direct railway communication 
between western and central Europe and the East, including India, Australia, and 
22 The Proposed Imperial (Medjidieh) Ottoman Railway, p. 5. 
23 The recognition in Turkey of the importance of the proposed railway by Europe was noticed 
in the British papers, especially in The Times and The Morning Post 
24 The Proposed Imperial (Medjidieh) Ottoman Railway, pp. 6-15. 
25 Ibid, pp. 7-10. 
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China. From the British point of view the most important emphasis on the Imperial 
(Medjidieh) Ottoman Railway was the fact that it was going to be: 
the shortest and most direct line to India under every possible circum- 
stance, and whatever may be the changes which time bring about in the 
European systems of railway communication. 26 
These lines, once completed and united with the Austrian lines, would naturally form 
the great high road to all parts of the East, and also the route to be followed by 
British overland Indian mail. However, such a grand project was not put into practice 
before the 1870's. The first project that was put into practice was that of a British 
company connecting a commercial port town with another in the interior. 
4.3 The Experimental Line and the First Locomotive 
Though the Ottoman government and official elite were beginning to understand the 
importance of a railway network in their empire, they did not know about railway 
enterprise and construction works, as the country had no cultural and technical 
infrastructure to establish such a large technological system. Therefore, Europeans 
were invited to construct and operate railways in Turkey, where with the close of the 
Crimean War, a large number of government grants and European loans had been 
made available for railway enterprises. Having no experience of such business trans- 
actions with Europe the Ottoman government relied on the mediation of the Levan- 
tines, a class of opportunist men in Turkey with European knowledge and 
26 Ibid, p. 13. 
119 
languages. 27 They offered their services as mainly dragomen, and utilised the 
Ottoman ignorance of European ways and interactions for their own benefit. They 
became involved in the railway concessions granted by the Ottoman government to 
Europeans as agents and intermediaries. However, the Levantines, whom The Engi- 
neer referred to as a "gang of speculators" or "half-caste adventurers" in Turkey, 
knowing not much about railway construction and enterprise, soon turned the "con- 
cessions" process into profitable business. 28 According to The Engineer the general 
course of concession procceding was: 
A Levantine made application to some Turkish subordinate official or 
dependent on a minister- sometimes to a minister himself- representing 
that he was personally acquainted with Rothschild, or all the Rothschilds, 
and all the capitalists in Europe, and that he was ready to favour the gov- 
ernment by constructing forthwith three or four hundred miles of railway 
on a guarantee of 6 percent interest on 15,000 pounds a mile, and stating 
that the government would derive an enormous income from the surplus 
profit. The minister, well aware of the benefit railways were conferring in 
Europe, and having good examples in a tributary portion of the empire- 
Egypt-readily gave way to these requests, the more particularly as he knew 
the reputation of the English, and what they had done in Egypt. The gov- 
ernment firmly believed that they were dealing with Englishmen, and with 
the leading capitalists and engineers 29 
Their aim was not the introduction of railways to Turkey but was rather the sale of 
concessions. They used every means, even bribery or pretending to be representatives 
of some capitalist in Europe, to gain concessions from certain pashas. Then they 
would sell them to European investors, who often did not know the conditions of the 
27 C. Hamlin, who lived among them for about half a century, stated that "No particular race 
owns him. If there is a class of men on earth utterly destitute of the truth, to whom falsehood is 
sweeter than truth and who are sagacious to know in a given case how much a man can be made to 
swallow without arousing suspicions, it is these Levantines. They have a list of classic horrors 
about the "unspeakable Turk", to palm off upon all unsuspecting travellers. Our knowledge of 
Turkey really comes from them". See C. Hamlin, Among the Turks, p. 357. 
28 H. Clarke, "Railways in Turkey, P', The Engineer, 21st September, 1867, p. 344. 
29 Ibid. 
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country. 30 While the Levantines made large sums of money, there were too many 
concessions. However, not many of them were put into practice. This complexity 
deterred the leading engineers and contractors from engaging in Ottoman railways. 
Especially after some examination most Levantine projects would be found to be 
impracticable: 
The Levantine projectors had no notion of how a railway could be carried, 
and had lines laid down over high mountains, as if engines could hop over 
them as a bird hops over a straw. 31 
Therefore, only very few of these projected lines could be implemented before 
1860.32 One of these lines was the line from Symrna (Izmir) to Aidin (Aydin). Its 
concession was obtained by a British company in 1856. This was the first project to 
commence in Turkey in Asia. It, therefore, marked the beginning of railway enter- 
prise, and also the earliest such commercial undertaking by Europeans in Turkey. The 
country where the line would pass was one of the most important commercial and 
agricultural regions of Asiatic Turkey. 33 Smyrna, which is situated on the Agean Sea 
and the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean, was a very old commercial city-port 
in Turkey. 34 The city had also grown on the lands adjoining two large rivers. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 In European Turkey, the Kustenji, Rustchuk and Varna railways were local lines under other 
conditions, and without guarantees. Here I am not dealing with these lines. See F078-3194: 
1864-1879 Kustendjie Harbour dues, claim of the Danube and Black Sea Railway and Kustendjie 
Harbour Co. vol. 1. F078-3195: 1878-1888 Kustendjie Harbour dues, claim of the Danube and 
Black Sea Railway and Kustendjie Harbour Co. vol. 2. F078-4184: 1878-1881 Rustchuk and Var- 
na Railway F078-4185-4191(8 files), 1882-1888, Rustchuk and Varna Railway. 
33 For a statistical study of the region, see Hyde Clarke, Report on the Traffic of Smyrna, with 
Statistics of Trade, &c., London: Nissen & Parker, 1860. 
34 For a study of the economic and commercial importance of Smyrna at that time, see Mr. F. 
Wakefield, "Report upon Smyrna and its Producing Districts", 1857, in Sir R. M. Stephenson, 
Railways in Turkey: Remarks upon the Practicability and Advantage of Railway Communication 
in European and Asiatic Turkey, London: John Weale, 1859, pp. 30-38. 
121 
This illustrates that economic interests were preponderant in the undertaking. A rail- 
way in such a commercial city was to ensure good returns to its investors. It would 
enable Europeans to transport their manufactured goods from their ports to deep 
inside the Ottoman Empire, and in return, raw materials could be carried back to the 
European ports. It was estimated by a special commissioner that goods traffic from 
Aidin to Smyrna employed 10,000 camels and 500 mules, at the cost of over 400,000 
pounds per annum. Independent of those camels which were constantly employed to 
carry the traffic between the two towns, there were at least another 20,000 camels 
employed on various routes in conveying produce from the interior to the sea. 35 
When the railway to Aidin was completed, the traffic conveyed by at least half of 
20,000 camels would come to the line, and thus at once increase the existing amount 
of traffic between the two towns. The Austrian Consul at Smyrna, C. Zalloni's table 
for the trade of Smyrna for 1857 shows that imports for that year amounting to 
2,447,493 pounds and exports to 2,397,342.36 This illustrates the significance of 
Smyrna as a site for the first railway system. 
The concession was granted originally to a British group consisting of Joseph Pax- 
ton, Messr George Whthes, William Jackson, and A. W. Rixon. 37 The Firman, or the 
legislative sanction of the concession, was said to be a free grant by the Imperial 
Ottoman government to the concessionaires to encourage the undertaking. 38 
35 R. M. Stephenson, Railways in Turkey, 1859, p. 6; F. Wakefield, "Report upon Smyrna and 
its Producing Districts", 1857, pp. 30-37. 
36 "Abstract of Import and Export Trade of Smyrna, from Mr. Zalloni's Tables for 1857", see 
Appendix C in R. M. Stephenson, Railways in Turkey, 1859, pp. 46-48. 
37 For the original convention reached on 23rd September, 1856, see "Izmir-Aydin Demiryolu 
Imtiyaz Mukavelenamesi", "23 Eylul 1856 Osmanli Mevzuati Hukukiyesi", Sicilli Kavanin: Os- 
manli Mevzuati Hukukiyesi, 23 Eylul 1856 - 15 Mart 1917, (1935 edition), vol. 11, pp. 1-11; Mec- 
muai Mukavelat, (1856), vol. 1, p. 2. 
38 Ibid. 
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However, in the company's budget the concession appeared to have cost 40,000 
pounds. 39 This money must have been shared among the company's agents or the 
Levantines. The contract for originally 72 miles of railway, harbour works and stock 
was taken by Thomas Jackson at 1,030,000 pounds 40 The concession was conceded 
for 50 years after 1860, when it had to be completed and ready for traffic. The 
Ottoman government guaranteed to the company a net income of six percent on the 
capital expended on the actual construction of the line, but such expenditure was not 
to exceed 1,200,000 pounds. 41 
The capital was to be obtained by the issue of shares, one fourth being reserved for 
Turkey, and subscription was accordingly invited in 1857-8 for 60,000 shares of 20 
pounds each. 49,478 of the total shares were subscribed before the works were com- 
menced: 15,000 by the Ottoman government, 500 by the Sultan, 25,750 by the con- 
tractor, 6,500 by the concessionaires, 1,728 by the British public 42 The company 
that was to construct the proposed railway was established in London, by the name of 
The Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. 
Rowland MacDonald Stephenson, a distinguished civil engineer, contractor and man- 
aging director of the East Indian Railway Company, became the chairman of the 
company. 43 He was a man of grand projects. He, too, had projected the construction 
39 H. Clarke, "Railways in Turkey, I", The Engineer, p. 344. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 "Memorandum on Smyrna and Aidin Railway Company by the Committee of Investigation", 
F07812255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 1872. 
43 Sir Rowland MacDonald Stephenson (1808-1896), born in London and educated at Harrow, 
became a civil engineer from 1830. He was the secretary to the association established in 1835 for 
securing steam communication with India, and managing director and also deputy chairman of 
East Indian Railway Company. He was the author of some scientific books on railways, such as 
Science and Railway Construction (4th ed. by Nuget, 1869), Railways in Weale's Rudimentary se- 
ries. See The Illustrated London News, (1857), vol. 30, p. 338; Minutes of Proceedings of Institu- 
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of a railway between Europe and India and Central Asia. His railway engineering and 
managerial skills were employed in the construction of the East Indian railway. He 
was at the same time the chairman of a company established on the original basis of 
the Red Sea and India, to connect India by telegraphic lines. 44 He was later even 
involved in a project to construct the first railway in China in 1864, where, upon the 
suggestion of Jardine Matheson & Co., he undertook a preliminary survey and pro- 
posal for an "experimental line" between Shangai and Woosung. 45 With building the 
first line in Turkey, he believed that his company was to "pioneer" the construction of 
railways, and was also to provide a model for the whole of railway communication in 
Turkey. 46 As the first work of the kind in the Ottoman Empire, it possessed a more 
than ordinary interest, and its successful completion would have a special influence 
on all future enterprises of a like nature. 
The work began in the mid-autumn of 1857. It was constructed exclusively by British 
engineers and management, and only British material was used. It was built on the 
British model gauge, 4 feet 8.5 inches. When the work started, the chief engineer was 
George Meredith, who had been involved in many railway projects in Ireland, Hol- 
land and Britain, including the construction of the Liverpool and Manchester Rail- 
way under George Stephenson 47 Mr Jackson, the contractor, was described as an 
tion of Civil Engineers, (1896), vol. 128, pp. 451-62; Dictionary of Modern English Biography, 
vol. 3, p. 736. 
44 Bradshaw Shareholders Guide, Railway Manual and Directory, 1862. p. 462. 
45 There again he projected a vast network of lines ultimately extending to India. However, 
Chinese statesmen were alarmed and apprehensive at the prospect of the country being covered 
with railways under foreign ownership and management. The construction of the projected line 
only commenced in 1875. See Alan Reid, The Woosung Road: the Story of the first Railway in 
China 1875-1877, (Suffolk, 1977), pp. 1-14, (Published for Private distribution, Science Museum 
Library). 
46 A Memorandum by S. N. O'Conor to Landsowne, 24th September, 1905, Therepia, 
F078/5450 Extensions of Smyrna-Aidin Railway, 1902-1905. 
47 In addition to his service for the Ottoman Railway Company, he made a survey of a proposed 
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honourably distinguished able man in his business enterprises. His resident agent in 
Smyrna was Mr. Hammond, who had undertaken similar work in Britain and India 48 
The Illustrated London News described the commencement of the line as such a great 
event that marked a "new beginning" in Turkey: 
It appeared as if the whole city of Smyrna was formed in an animated cir- 
cle around the field where the ceremony was celebrated of this great under- 
taking which will establish a new era in Turkey. 49 
Mustapha Reshit Pasha, the influential man of the Tanzimat and Foreign Minister, 
many other pashas, Ali Efendi, Imperial Commissioner of Public Works, the civil and 
military authorities of the city were ready at the commencement ceremony. Shortly 
after, the Imperial troops, as a tradition the representatives of all the communities of 
the city and the consuls, appeared in order: 
The Mufti or High Priest; the Mallah, or Judge; and the imams or priests; 
likewise the Consuls; the Greek and Armenian Bishops, the great Babbi of 
the Jews, and the sundry communities of the city; all of whom took their 
position near the Pasha. Several elegantly dressed ladies were also 
present. 50 
Indeed, Smyrna was a well chosen city-port to construct the first railway in the 
Ottoman Empire, not only because of its economic and geographical advantages, but 
also because of its social and cultural structure. Its population consisted of many dif- 
ferent ethnic groups, primarily Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and many Euro- 
peans. It, accordingly, accommodated different religions and languages. 
line from Constantinople to Adrianople and returned to Britain with intentions of taking measures 
to have this line carried out, but he died soon afterwards. See Minutes of Proceedings of Institution 
of Civil Engineers, (Session 1865-66), vol. 25, pp. 515-6; The mimes, 16th November, 1858. 
48 Ibid. 
49 The Illustrated London News, p. 436,31th October, 1857. 
50 Ibid. 
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The introduction of the first locomotive by the Smyrna to Aidin Railway Company 
was a very important event. The company introduced a locomotive when only less 
than ten miles of the line was complete. It was a very great show for the general pub- 
lic. The ordinary people were suspicious and unable to understand the nature of the 
undertaking: 
They heard that if that Frankish "marifet" (marvel) was finished they could 
go in two hours from Aidin to Smyrna, a journey which, with considerable 
exertion, they may now accomplish in two days; they shook their heads 
and asked whether it was by flying through the air. Those who lived in 
Smyrna, and those who visited it looked with astonishment at the mounds 
of earth thrown to the right and left, at the rocks which were blasted and 
forced out, and the mysterious iron lines which were drawn with cabalistic 
calculations, without being able to understand how all these contrivances 
could in any way advance the object in view. 51 
Bearing in mind the general suspicion of the Ottoman public towards Western tech- 
nology and innovations, the system builders expected the first locomotive to produce 
a great effect in Turkey. In the words of The Times' correspondent, who was watch- 
ing the arrival of the first locomotive in Asia Minor, it would "make an epoch in the 
minds of the people in this part of the world". 52 Since the beginning, railway works 
had been the centre of attraction in the town. Curiosity was the highest when "a 
black-looking vessel was seen to drop its anchor in the bay to the west of the town 
fronting the line. It contained the mysterious engine", and was met by numerous 
crowds of people at Smyrna. They were described as belonging to not less than 
"nineteen different races and nationalities -English, Irish, Scotch, French, Americans, 
Italians, Slavonians, Armenians, Turks, Greeks, Poles, Albanians, Austrians, 
51 The Times, 6th April, 1858. 
52 Ibid. 
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Prussians, Hindoos, Negroes, Ionians, and Spaniards. "53 There were also several 
hundreds of camels encamped on the same spot, of which The Times correspondent 
wrote rather romantically that: 
The very camels -those representatives of Eastern dignity and the nil admi- 
rari- seemed to forget their ill temper for the moment, and chewed their 
chopped straw with an air of satisfaction, as if they suspected that the 
angry, puffing, and hurrying fire-car was destined to take off their loads of 
figs and raisins and carry for them. Poor deluded creatures! They little 
know that instead of diminishing it will rather increase their work, and if 
they will not have to come down to Smyrna they will have twice as much 
to do to feed the long string of waggons in which will be collected the pro- 
duce from all corners of the interior. 54 
The locomotive, named St. Sophia, decorated with the Turkish flag and the Union 
Jack, then carried up a band of musicians, who played the "Sultan's March". It first 
met with a scarcely finished building, the owner of which was being a native Turk, 
painted up the words "Railway Hotel". He asked for a drawing representing a loco- 
motive as his sign board. 55 The Times correspondent reported that the people of 
Aidin, the inland town at the other end of the line, say that they would sell, if neces- 
sary, "their shirts" to come up by the railway. 56 Now railway locomotion was within 
the grasp of the local people in Smyrna, while hitherto, the whole idea was vague and 
empty. It was the popular idea that the running of a locomotive would do more than 
anything else to convince the people of the country of the serious nature of the enter- 
prise and "the last doubts". 57 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador at 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, (original italics). 
55 The Times, 6th April, 1858; The Illustrated London News, 27th November, 1858, pp. 
512-513. 
56 Times, op-cit. 
57 Ibid. 
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Constantinople, who went to Smyrna on the occasion of the laying of the foundation 
stone of the Smyrna station in November 1858, strongly believed that the success of 
the railway would in all likelihood be the precursor of similar triumphs in other parts 
of the vast empire. In the near future, it would be intersected throughout by a net- 
work of iron communication. 58 He firmly believed that the railway and the tele- 
graph, as the basic means of Western civilisation, would lead to dramatic changes, 
and in this way the Ottoman Empire would soon become a part of Western 
civilisation. 59 
With the introduction of the locomotive, the attempts to systematise the whole con- 
struction of railways in Turkey under certain principles and laws became a main con- 
cern of system builders and the Ottoman government. M. Stephenson, who visited 
Smyrna in 1858 upon the request of the directors of the Ottoman Railway Company 
to inspect the progress of the works of the Smyrna and Aidin Railway offered his ser- 
vices to the Ottoman government. When he visited Istanbul, M. Stephenson was 
invited by the Ottoman Ministers to advise on the establishment of railways in the 
country. He chaired the meetings of the Constantinople Committee upon Railways in 
Turkey, which directed their resolutions to the accomplishment of basic conditions as 
preliminary to a future railway enterprise. These were primarily the general survey 
and level of the country, the settlements of the terms of concession, and the settle- 
ments of the tariff, bye-laws, and regulations of the companies 60 These would 
58 See the extracts from his speech on the occasion of the laying the foundation stone of Smyr- 
na Station and opening of the first section of the line, R. M. Stephenson, Railways in Turkey ..., 
pp. 37-46. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See "Minutes of Proceedings of the Constantinople Committee upon Railways in Turkey", in 
R. M. Stephenson, Railways in Turkey, 1859, pp. 53-56. 
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impart confidence to European capitalists. Stephenson made his report to the Grand 
Vizier, Ali Pasha, for the consideration of the Porte. 61 
The report identified the main objections to investing capital in railways in Turkey. 
Firstly, no system existed, and thereby no confidence was entertained. Secondly, the 
arrangements were complicated, and terms and conditions of the concessions all dif- 
fered, instead of being framed upon the same basis. Thirdly, the European capitalists 
and entrepreneurs, who would willingly subscribe if the conditions were fixed and 
well understood, did not know what changes might take place in future concessions, 
would not invest their money under any other system. 62 R. M. Stephenson suggested 
simplified arrangements, and the organisation of a system of regulations, conditions 
and law upon which all future concessions be granted, and further suggested the co- 
operation of all parties interested in Turkish railways to consider and decide in a 
committee in conjunction with committees appointed in London, Paris and Vienna. 63 
He also suggested that the Turkish government should proceed upon the basis of lim- 
iting their concessions at first to moderate lengths of line, and allowing the works to 
be extended according to the progress which had been made upon the first sections. 
To encourage to the utmost of their power the construction of railways, the govern- 
ment appointed a Department of Public Works, with special reference to the railways 
and telegraphs. This resulted in a chair de charges, or general code of regulations 
under which future lines in Turkey were to be sanctioned. M 
61 See "Copy of Letters Addressed to the Ministers at Constantinople", in R. M. Stephenson, 
Railways in Turkey, 1859, pp. 49-52. 
62 R. M. Stephenson to Ali Pasha, Grand Vizier, 10th November, 1858, in R. M. Stephenson, 
Railways in Turkey, 1859, pp. 51-52. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See "Chair des Charges de la Concession d'un Chemin de Fer", in R. M. Stephenson, Rail- 
ways in Turkey, 1859, pp. 63-80. 
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4.4 The Construction of the Smyrna to Aidin Railway 
Within the first year of its construction, the work on the Smyrna and Aidin railway 
went satisfactorily. R. M. Stephenson, who inspected the progress of the works per- 
sonally in 1858, reported that the line employed about 3,000 men of seventeen differ- 
ent nations, and found the works in all respects satisfactory. 
65 A section of 10 miles 
from Smyrna to Seydikoy was opened on 30th October 1858, about a year after the 
work had begun. The opening was a major event that built up the confidence in the 
works, and also impressed the local administration and people about the railway. M. 
Stephenson predicted that the works upon the forty miles out of Smyrna constituting 
the First Section, which was in rapid construction, would be completed in time to 
open the line before the end of 1859.66 
However, the construction of the line did not progress as it had been planned. By the 
end of 1860, the date that was originally proposed to be the date of the opening of the 
whole line, only 27 miles was built, which the government claimed had terminated at 
"the insignificant station of Tiranda", whilst at Aidin, the company had only com- 
menced the works of the tunnel of Saladdin Pass. 67 However, the engineers soon sug- 
gested an alternative route. Afterwards the Saladdin tunnel was abandoned, and the 
line carried through the Ephesus Pass. The new deviation lengthened the line by 
about ten miles, making the total length about 81.5 miles, and brought steep 
65 R. M. Stephenson, Railways in Turkey, 1859, pp. 3-4. 
66 Ibid, pp. 3,18. 
67 "Official Communication" of the Board of Public Works in response to the "Memorial of the 
three Anglo Turkish Railway Companies to the Turkish Government" (dated 29th April, 1868), 
September, 1868, F078/2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 1872. 
131 
gradients. This showed that the engineering survey of the line had not been done 
properly at the beginning. In addition to engineering difficulties, the Ottoman gov- 
ernment put the blame for the slow progress partly on the suspension of the works by 
the contractor. 68 1860 was a critical year for the company. It appeared that the sys- 
tern builders lacked practical knowledge of financial and construction works. Besides 
constant depreciation and the postponement of the promised opening, the contactor, 
T. Jackson, suspended payment and went into bankruptcy. As a result, the shares 
became unmarketable. The company's chief engineer, second engineer, secretary, 
general manager and agents at Istanbul and Smyrna were removed without better 
appointments being made by the Chairman, who himself also disappeared for a 
while 69 Hyde Clarke stated in The Engineer (1867) that the general impression in 
Istanbul was that: 
The Smyrna and Aidin Railway was nothing but waste, robbery, and pecu- 
lation administered by rogues and swindlers, with the complicity and con- 
nivance of fools and knaves in England 70 
The cost of construction was greater than anticipated and the estimated capital of 1.2 
million pounds proved too small. The company claimed that the main difficulty was 
caused by its having been constituted as a "Societe Anonyme" with shares payable to 
bearer, and transferable without deed or registration, thus involving no responsibility 
beyond the amount actually paid from time to time upon the shares. 71 The state of 
68 Ibid. 
69 H. Clarke, "Railways in Turkey, II", The Engineer, Ist November, 1867, p. 372. 
70 Ibid.; see also "Memorandum on Smyrna and Aidin Railway" by the Ottoman Railway 
Company, F0781'2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 1872, pp. 225-228. 
71 See "Memorandum on Smyrna and Aidin Railway" by the Ottoman Railway Company, 
F078/2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 1872, pp. 225-228. 
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the enterprise created agitation in Turkey and Britain. It also prevented the construc- 
tion of the other lines projected by new promoters. The new engineers, agents and 
other system builders were appointed only after a long interval. The list included 
Edwin Clark as the Consulting Engineer, Edward Purser as the Engineer in Chief, S. 
J. Cooke as the Secretary, W. F. Fergusson for the Traffic and Locomotive Supt., 
with T. R. Crampton as the new contractor. 72 In March, 1861 the government agreed 
to grant a prolongation of 3 years for the completion of the line, which was to expire 
in May, 1864. In consideration of this extension the company would not receive inter- 
est on the caution money until the opening of the line. The government also autho- 
rised debentures to the extent of 250,000 pounds for five years at 6 per cent to restore 
confidence amongst the shareholders 73 
When the first section of 41 miles which terminated at Karbounar was opened in 
November, 1861, the government allowed the company to draw the guaranteed pro- 
portion of 39,360 pounds per annum. In 1863 the capital was increased from the 
original sum of 1,200,000 pounds to 1,784,000 pounds, and the government 
increased the guaranteed income on the same ratio, that is, from 72,000 to 112,000 
pounds per annum. 74 The whole line to Aidin, after a further delay, was only com- 
pleted in July, 1866. The stations were completed after the line was opened. The 
government authorities were complaining that the rolling stock was incomplete, and 
there were no turntables or sidings, in addition to the lack of locomotives and trucks. 
72 Bradshaw General Railway Publication, Shareholders Guide: Railway Manual and Directo- 
ryfor 1862, London: W. J. Adams, 1862, pp. 347-348. 
73 "Official Communication" of the Board of Public Works in respond to the "Memorial of the 
three Anglo Turkish Railway Companies to the Turkish Government" (dated 29th April, 1868), 
September, 1868, F078/2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 1872. 
74 Ibid. 
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These complaints were rejected by the managers of the company at Smyrna. E. 
Purser claimed that there was a 40 foot engine turntable at Aidin, and there was no 
call for any more, and there was a loading siding at each station. 75 He further 
reported that two new and very powerful goods engines by Stephensons Co. were 
obtained expressly for the new section, and were running in July, and that two ballast 
engines were taken over from the contractor. In addition, twenty six wagons were 
added just before the opening of the line and sixteen immediately after. 76 Two years 
later, Edward Purser, then the general manager and engineer of the company reported 
from Smyrna that since the opening of the whole line the Aidin traffic by camels 
entirely ceased between that town and Smyrna. 77 
This railway had been originally proposed to provide a model for railway enterprise 
in Turkey. However, it did not provide an impressively good example for the whole. 
Its overall cost was much higher than had been expected, even though R. M. 
Stephenson predicted that the cost of building a railway there would be cheaper than 
anywhere else. 78 According to the company, the cost was 15,500 pounds per mile. 79 
But, it was claimed the actual cost of a mile was around 22,000 pounds. 80 The public 
and government's image of the company was influenced by its long prolongation and 
75 Edward Purser, General Manager & Engineer, to the Chairman and Directors of the Ottoman 
Railway Company, 8th October, 1868, Smyrna, F078/2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman 
Railway), 1867 to 1872. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Edward Purser to the Chairman and Directors of the Ottoman Railway Company, Smyrna, 
8th October, 1868, FO78/2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 1872. 
78 R. M. Stephenson, Railways in Turkey, 1859, p. 15. 
79 Smyrna and Aidin Railway Company, "A report on the late allegations and replies to them 
-for those shareholders who may have been unable to attend the late meetings. ", May, 1867, 
F078/2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 1872. 
80 Smyrna and Aidin Company, "Report of the Committee of Investigation to be presented to 
the shareholders at their Adjourned Eighteenth Half-Yearly General Meeting", 21st May, 1867, 
FO78/2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 1872. 
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often partly bad management of the railway. Hoping to put an end to the monopoly of 
the company, the government sanctioned the establishment of rival companies. In 
spite of the Smyrna-Aidin Company's opposition to the granting of concessions to 
another company, in 1863 the Ottoman government granted a new concession to 
Edward Price, a British railway engineer and contractor, who had a link with Robert 
Stephenson, to build a new line from Smyrna to another town, Cassaba (now 
Turgutlu). 81 The length of the line was originally 58.25 miles. It was to serve very 
fertile and rich country. E. Price soon transferred the concessions to a British com- 
pany, the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, established in London to construct the line. The 
company began construction in 1864, and completed the largest section, from 
Smyrna to Manisa, 41 miles, in October, 1865, and with the completion of the 
remaining 17.25 miles in the following year, the whole line was opened to traffic 
even earlier than the Smyrna and Aidin line in 1866. The company received the 
praise and pleasure of the government for their success: 
We have an example in the Railway from Smyrna to Cassaba, which is 
constructed with economy and administered with intelligence, the revenue 
of which very nearly comes up to the guarantee from the state, and which 
has never had with the state any dispute, nor given it any trouble, and 
shows that in Turkey just like elsewhere, railways can succeed, provided 
they are in the hands of administrators, who are clever, economical, and 
above all, sincerely loyal to their duties towards the public and the state. 82 
81 Edward Price (1805? -1871) was involved in the construction of several tunnels in Britain and 
France. In 1851-4 he built the Benha and Kaffre Azayat bridges over the Nile for Robert Stephen- 
son, and part of the Alexandria-Cairo Railway. Later he contracted for the Dom Pedro Segundo 
Railway in Brazil, from Rio de Janeiro to the foot of the Serra S. Anna (40 miles). Further foreign 
contracts followed in Portugal and Asia Minor. The Smyrna-Cassaba Railway was one his last 
contracts. See J. Marshall, A Biographical Dictionary of Railway Engineers, David & Charles, 
1978, p. 174; also Min. Proc. ICE, volume 33, (1871-2), pp. 267-9. 
82 "Official Communication" of the Board of Public Works in Response to the "Memorial of the 
Three Anglo Turkish Railway Companies to the Turkish Government" (dated 29th April, 1868), 
September, 1868, F078/2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 1872. 
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It met no important management and construction difficulties. Besides, the cost of the 
construction per mile was much cheaper than that of the Smyrna and Aidin Railway. 
The company obtained another concession in 1871 for an extension to Alasehir, a 
further distance of 47.50 miles. This was built on the government's own account, and 
was operated by the Smyrna-Cassaba Company. The company made a loan of 
500,000 pounds to the government for the extension, on which interest at 7 per cent, 
and amortisation at the rate of 1 per cent, were guaranteed by the government share 
in the revenue of the railway. It was opened to traffic in March 1875 and operated by 
the same company. The new line, thus, ended the monopoly of the Smyrna and Aidin 
Railway, and encouraged competition between the two for new concessions to build 
railways. 
The engines, rolling stock and other materials for building railways came almost 
exclusively from Britain. The first locomotive engines for the Smyrna and Aidin 
Railway were purchased from Robert Stephenson Company Limited, which at the 
time was a world famous locomotive builder. 83 They were 4-4-0 type, and the com- 
pany was the only supplier of the locomotives for some decades. 84 The Smyrna and 
Cassaba Railway, on the other hand, purchased nearly all early locomotive engines 
from Beyer Peacock. The first such engines came in 1864, and were 0-4-2 type. The 
supplies of the engines from Beyer Peacock continued until the line passed to 
83 Edward Purser, the general manager and engineer of the company, to R. M. Stephenson, 8th 
October, 1868, Smyrna, F078/2255, Smyrna and Aidin Railway (Ottoman Railway), 1867 to 
1872. 
84 By 1855 the company had built over one thousand locomotives. Its customers, besides 
Turkey, included Austria, Egypt, India, Ceylon, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, etc. See J. G. H. 
Warren, A Century of Locomotive Building by Robert Stephenson & Co., 1823-1923, Newcastle, 
1923, pp. 612-614. 
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Nagelmackers, and afterwards no further orders were placed with British firms. 85 
Both lines were built on the British system and broad gauge. In the early 1870's the 
British system of construction of railways employed in Turkey came under some crit- 
icisms, especially by the French. A French railway engineer, J. H. Haddan, criticised 
the British broad gauge system on the grounds of its being so costly and extravagant, 
and not necessarily good' for both the geographical and financial conditions of 
Turkey, as they differed fundamentally from those of England. 86 He claimed that if 
the narrow gauge, at 3 feet wide, were implemented, it would reduce the cost of the 
current railways by well over 50 percent. Besides, the narrow gauge was the most 
suitable system particularly for mountainous countries, such as Turkey. 87 He urged a 
scientific Medjlis presided by Rashed Pasha, Minister of Public Works, to be estab- 
lished in order to solve the problems of the railway construction quickly and 
definitely. 88 Such suggestions seem to have remained theoretical, and any specialist 
committee that was established lacked continuity due to political and financial insta- 
bility. 
Nevertheless, by the late 1860's railways came to attract increasing attention from the 
Sultan and the Porte. After their opening to goods and passenger traffic the Smyrna- 
Aidin and Smyrna-Cassaba railways yielded very good traffic and attracted a wider 
public attention. In the summer of 1867 the Sultan Abdulaziz visited major European 
85 For the list of locomotive engines purchased by the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, see E. Talbot, 
Steam in Turkey: An Enthusiasts' Guide to the Steam Locomotives of Turkey, London: The Conti- 
nental Railway Circle, 1981, p. 41. 
86 J. L. Haddan, Le Largeur : De Voie Convenable four Les Chemins de Fer de la Turquie, 
(Constantinople, Imprimerie et Litographie Centrales, 1873), pp. 1-8. 
87 Ibid, p. 7-17. 
88 Ibid. 
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countries including Britain, being the first Sultan ever to visit Europe. He also 
attended the Paris Exhibition of 1867. The visit also meant the Sultan's first railway 
journey, which began in his own dominions in Rustchuk. The line from Rustchuk to 
Varna, built and operated by the British, was about 120 miles in length, and ran 
through some of the finest hill and wood sceneries of Bulgaria, then a province of the 
Ottoman Empire: 
His Majesty, after a stay of two days at Rustchuk, left that city on the 
morning of the 6th ult. in a train consisting of nine carriages, painted white 
and emblazoned with the star and crescent in white and gold. The engine 
was also elaborately ornamented, and was in charge of an English driver 
named Frank White. The journey occupied seven hours, as the Sultan 
received deputations en route at Rasgard, the Shun-da-road, and Pravadi. 
The embarkation at Varna was made before the sunset, a stay of only three 
hours being made at that port. The Imperial suite of 700 persons, with their 
baggage, horses, etc., were conveyed to Varna in nine special trains, and no 
hitch of any kind occurred during the journey. 89 
The Engineer (1867) declared that "the Sultan's visit brought Turkey nearer to 
Europe. "90 In Europe the Sultan expressed a desire to extend railways throughout the 
empire 91 It was an excellent opportunity for the Sultan to experience railway jour- 
neys and other industrial enterprises during his journey. The Times reported that 
Of all the strange things the Sultan saw on his journey nothing seems to 
have produced a greater impression than the rapid means of locomotion by 
rail, nothing seems to have caused greater satisfaction than re-entering his 
own dominions by the Rustchuk and Varna Railway, a railway in his own 
dominions 92 
The visit encouraged the projectors of the great lines from Belgrade to 
89 The Railway News, 7th September, 1867, p. 238. 
90 H. Clarke, "Railways in Turkey, III", The Engineer, 22nd November, 1867, p. 436-437. 
91 The Railway News, 21st September, 1867, pp. 296-297. 
92 The Times, 15th January, 1868, and 28th January, 1868. 
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Constantinople, and from Scutari across Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to Basra, who 
then found the government willing to listen to their proposals 93 It was reported that 
since the Sultan's return the two main subjects to which attention was chiefly 
directed were means of communication and western style schools. One of the fruits 
of the Sultan's journey was already materialised in early 1868 in the establishment of 
a Lycee, which came to be known as the Galatasaray Lycee, on the model of the 
French Institution. 94 The Sultan had already shown a great interest in railway build- 
ing, beginning with the Smyrna to Aidin Railway, for which he bought a large num- 
ber of shares. Particularly after the Sultan's European tour there were increasing 
numbers of new negotiations between the Ottoman government and various Euro- 
pean entrepreneurs to build railways in the dominions of the empire. 
Haddan, who urged the Ottoman government to adopt a better system for railways, 
acknowledged in 1873 that "Constantinople is full of engineers. "95 The railway 
mania among the Ottoman administrative elite mounted particularly in this period. 
The Sultan himself appeared most keen to see a large network of railway communi- 
cation in his empire. In 1873, referring to the political disturbances around the Sul- 
tan Abdulaziz, Count N. P. Ignatyev, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, 
reported that he was "victim of a veritable railroad fever. "96 In spite of the strong 
desire to extend the network of railways in Turkey, because of the internal and exter- 
nal political problems and economic difficulties no important railway projects were 
93 The Times, 15th January, 1868. 
93 ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 J. L. Haddan, Le Largeur, p. 8. 
96 R. H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876, Princeton, 1963, p. 237. 
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put into practice. The Sultan, on the contrary, perhaps after having seen luxury 
palaces in Europe, spent enormous amounts of money to build himself a very expen- 
sive palace, the Dolmabahce Palace on the Bosphorus. When he was deposed from 
power in 1876, only a few hundreds of miles of constructed railways existed in Asi- 
atic Turkey. 
4.5 The Decline of British Railway Building and German Monopoly in Turkey 
During the long reign of the Sultan Abdul Hamid 11 (1876-1908), railways became a 
strong political and military power in Turkey, which enhanced the Sultan and his 
elite's ability to retain their power over the far-flung empire till WWI. Multi-national 
European companies were encouraged to build railways in Turkey. The Sultan Abdul 
Hamid himself felt an urgent need to construct a network of railways across Asia 
Minor to Baghdad and the Arabian Peninsula. New concessions were granted to the 
existing and new companies. Germany emerged as the strongest power, while the 
British lost new concessions, though it had monopolised the railway building since 
its inception in the empire. By the late 1870's the relations between the Ottoman 
Empire and its Western alliance, Britain and France, began to change. In addition to 
Russia, now Britain and France were aiming at military and political designs over the 
Ottoman dominions. In Britain, the traditional approach to the Eastern Question was 
abandoned to a large extent. William Gladstone had launched his anti-Turk crusade. 
Britain increased its military presence in Egypt after the Franco-German War in 
1870, and occupied it in 1882. France, on the other hand, was collaborating with 
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Russia against the Ottoman Empire, in addition to its occupation of Algeria. 
Germany was just becoming a major European industrial and military power, which 
the new Sultan trusted in the construction of railways. The Sultan held the opinion 
that "the only country that [he] can safely trust in the construction of railways is 
Germany" 97 In the Sultan's view, the aims of Germany were only financial and eco- 
nomic, whereas Britain, France and Russia had political and military desires over the 
Ottoman dominion. The Ottoman railway building was shaped within the political 
and military environments of the time. Turkey was facing great financial and military 
problems, which were exploited by European powers. The Sultan, and his Viziers 
and most ministers at Porte often were anxious about foreign occupations by way of 
railways. They were cautious, and often refused to grant concessions for strategically 
sensitive regions. The Sultan, therefore, was opposed to constructing railways near 
the borders and coastlines. For instance, Dr. P. Pohrbach of the Baghdad Railway 
observed that: 
The Sultan insists in a most decided manner that the railway shall nowhere 
approach to within less than half a day's march from the coast, for fear of 
its being attacked from the sea. The company (Anatolian Railways) never 
have maintained their demand to touch Adana, where an English railway 
leads to the port of Mersina. 98 
This policy delayed the construction of most commercially oriented short lines pro- 
jected before and after the 1860s. Nevertheless, the Ottoman government granted the 
concessions for several new lines. With new concessions, the Smyrna to Aidin Rail- 
way Company managed to connect other towns in the interior with Smyrna by 
97 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, Ankara, 1988, vol. 8, pp. 465-471. 
98 The Summary of a Pamphlet on the Baghdad Railway by Dr. Paul Pohrbach, 18th January, 
1902, F07815249 Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways, 1901 to 1902, vol. 2. 
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building a railway network. By the early twentieth century, the Smyrna to Aidin Rail- 
way, including branches, was brought to the total mileage of up to 318.5 miles. The 
company competed with the others for the Ottoman railway concessions. Its stan- 
dards were improved. The railway represented about a third of the money invested in 
Turkey by the British public 99 The British were opposed to the Ottoman government 
granting any concessions to other companies, and wanted to remain as a monopoly. 
However, with the decline of British influence on the Ottoman Empire, the company 
often lacked the Ottoman Imperial sanction for expanding its railway network in Asia 
Minor. Sir Nicholas R. O'Conor, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, after his inter- 
view with the Sultan regarding the subject in 1902, stated that: 
I had never been able to understand why his Imperial Majesty had in past 
years so strenuously opposed the prolongation of the Smyrna-Aidin Rail- 
way. This line was, as his Imperial Majesty knew, almost the only railway 
in Turkey which had been constructed without a kilometric guarantee and 
without expense of any kind to the Imperial government. It had mar- 
velously developed the economic conditions of the districts it traversed, it 
had almost doubled the public revenues in those parts, and it had given 
valuable factor for the conveyance of troops when occasion required. 100 
The Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, which was operated under British management and 
engineers, received many additional concessions. The government itself built several 
lines on its own account. They were subsequently operated by the Smyrna Cassaba 
Railway. In 1887 the company began to build a branch from Manisa to Soma. The 
government provided the finance and also granted the concession to operate the line 
after it was completed in 1890. In 1893 the Belgian engineer Nagelmackers, the 
99 See Leon Dominian, "Railroads in Turkey", Bulletin of the American Geographical Society, 
(1915), vo. 47, p. 935. 
100 N. R. O'Conor to Landsowne K. G., 10th February, 1902, F07815450 Extensions of Smyr- 
na-Aidin Railway, 1902-1905. 
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founder of the International Sleeping-Car Company, obtained from the government a 
contract for the operating rights on all sections of the Smyrna Cassaba Railway. 101 
Already owning some sections of the railway, it repurchased the remainder, for which 
Nagelmackers advanced the money. Then the original company was dissolved and in 
1893 was replaced by a French company founded in Paris, the Societe Ottomane du 
Chemin defer de Smyrne-Cassaba et Prolongements. 102 
Although the early initiatives to construct and operate small railway systems in 
Turkey began in Britain, they were soon followed by France, and later joined by Aus- 
tria, Belgium, Germany and other European countries, including Italy. Even Russia, 
the traditional enemy of the Ottomans, was involved in Turkish railway business, 
especially in the late nineteenth century when railway building in Turkey ceased to 
be a pure financial or business matter and became a political one. Russia wanted the 
concessions for railway building for purely military reasons. In addition, it tried to 
prevent European powers from building railways in the Ottoman Empire, especially 
in eastern Turkey and on the Black Sea coasts. Despite their extreme displeasure and 
unwillingness, the Sultan and his government, under Russian intense political pres- 
sure, had to grant the Russians railway concessions on the Black Sea coasts and in 
the eastern province of Erzurum. When the Russians obtained an Irade from the Sul- 
tan to build a railway from Kars to Erzurum, people of the region reacted with anger 
that "they will have become like Persia and given away their country without a strug- 
gle to Russia". 103 However, it was never built. 
101 E. Talbot, Steam in Turkey, pp. 10-11. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Major Maunsell to N. R. O'Conor, 17th March 1900, Van, F07815102 Asia Minor and 
Baghdad Railways, 1898-1900, vol. 1. 
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By the late 1880's the Germans began to dominate railway building in Turkey. Their 
political will was accompanied by their financial power, while other European capi- 
talists were becoming more reluctant to finance railways in Turkey. The German 
monopoly was consolidated when the concession for the most important part of the 
Anatolian Railways, the line from Istanbul to Konia, was granted to German and 
Austrian builders in 1888. Although French and British capital was represented, it 
was predominantly German owned. In addition, the Haydarpasha-Ismid Railway's 
operations, which the government had started to build as a strategically important 
railway, being originally operated by British builders, was given to Germany, 
together with a major railway concession from Ismid to Ankara. When the German 
Emperor, Kaisser Wilhelm II, visited Istanbul and Jerusalem in 1898, the proposal to 
construct a line from Constantinople to Baghdad was given a great impetus. Through 
lavish expenditure the Germans gained special favours from the Sultan and obtained 
an Irade, or Imperial Consent. In December, 1899 an agreement between the Turkish 
Minister of Commerce and Dr. Siemens, the President of the Deutsche Bank, was 
signed on railway building, including the Baghdad Railway. Though there was no 
objection from the Germans and the Sultan, the British did not participate. 
104 As 
originally a British co-operation had been preferred, Dr. Siemens made overtures to 
the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Co., but these were subsequently rejected. He then 
applied to the French Cassaba Railway Co, and made an undertaking with the 
French. 105 
104 "A Memorandum, containing a brief account of the Negotiations relating to the Baghdad 
Railway, 1898-1905" by Mark Sykes, enclosed in N. R. O'Conor's letter to Foreign Office, 20th 
August, 1905, F07815449 Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways, 1904-1905, vol. 4. 
105 Ibid. 
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Railways in Turkey before the First World War. [From L. Dominian, Bull. 
Amer. Geogr. Soc., 1915] 
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By the end of the century the British builders were no longer able to win any signifi- 
cant concessions, and as a result they lost interest to a large extent in railway enter- 
prise in Turkey. 106 
The British ambassadors and political and commercial agents in Istanbul made great 
effort to maintain their strong position in the Ottoman railway enterprise. However, 
this was not supported in practice by the British capitalists and financial institutions. 
At the time, even the French were investing far more than the British in the Ottoman 
railway enterprise. In 1903 the British political agents petitioned the Sultan to sup- 
port the proposal of the Smyrna to Aidin Railway to extend to Egridir Lake, Isparta, 
Burdur and other towns deep inside Asia Minor. 107 However, no concession was 
granted. On the contrary, the Haidar Pasha to Ismid Railway was handed over to the 
Germans against all the objections of the British. 108 From the late 1880's onwards 
almost every important railway concession was won by the Germans. They held the 
absolute majority shares in most undertakings. Thus, by the end of the century, the 
Smyrna-Aidin was the only British owned and operated railway system in Turkey. 109 
The other British share in railway building was minor in comparison to the German 
or the French. 
106 See Major Law, Report by Major Law on Railways in Asiatic Turkey, London, 1896. The re- 
port was presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of her Majesty in May 1896. 
107 Lord Rathmore to Lord Landsowne, 17th September, 1903, F07815450 Extensions of Smyr- 
na-Aidin Railway, 1902-1905; Sir P. Currie to Lord Salisbury, 14th January, 1898, Constantinople, 
F07814264 Asia Minor and Baghdad Railways, 1898-1900, vol. 1. 
108 F07814264,4265,4681,5449, Haidar Pasha to Ismid Railway, 1885-1905, vols. 1-4. 
109 See Major Law, Report, 1896. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The introduction of railway systems to the non-Western world began with the private 
or state initiatives of Europeans to build railways overseas for economic, military and 
political purposes. The style and pattern of this transfer were largely shaped by geo- 
graphical, economic and political conditions of the country in question. One classic 
example is colonial India, where the British had a monopoly in railway building. The 
other examples are mainly Japan, the Ottoman Empire, China and Africa, where sev- 
eral European companies competed to build railways. The Ottoman Empire, though 
it was not a colony, saw its strong position largely weakened after the mid-nineteenth 
century and became subject to indirect colonial attempts by European powers. Espe- 
cially through the European financial and political morasses, the principle of inde- 
pendence was to some extent lost. This marked all the relations of the Ottomans with 
foreigners in the late nineteenth century. Although at the outset railway enterprise in 
Asia Minor was entirely in British hands, soon other powers became involved in rail- 
way concessions and enterprises. Accordingly Ottoman railway building presents a 
mirror of the struggling of powers for a bigger share in the Ottoman Empire itself. 
Thus, the Ottoman case represents neither a colonial pattern nor a completely inde- 
pendent one, but perhaps a unique combination of them. 110 
European competition to build railways was not often purely a matter of commercial 
enterprise or economic concern in Turkey. It was, in this decaying empire, largely a 
110 N. Faith ascribes the German's monopoly of the railways in the Ottoman Empire to direct 
colonialism, and suggests that only a direct colonialism could provide the empire with an efficient 
network. See Nicholas Faith, The World The Railways Made, pp. 152-153. 
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political matter, particularly by the end of the century. It involved political privileges 
for the winner. Each power carefully calculated the advantages and disadvantages of 
every railway construction for itself and for its rivals. 111 As a result, most conces- 
sions were obtained through diplomatic channels. This created enormous difficulties 
for the Ottoman railway enterprise as a commercial undertaking. The severe rivalry 
among Europeans delayed construction of railways for several years, and their 
intrigues caused failure of most plans, as in the case of many other projects. Perhaps 
one common concern of the European powers was to avoid any type of investment 
that would contribute too much to the economic and military strengthening of the 
empire. 112 Although the Sultan and his officials were aware of the political impor- 
tance of railway communication, they had to depend on Europeans for railway con- 
struction. The Sultan made efforts to build the strategically important lines, which 
served as political designs for his extension of power. Especially by the Hedjaz Rail- 
way project to build a pilgrim-railway to Mecca, 1900-1908, the Sultan aimed to 
bring Muslims together, and prevent political disturbances and revolts in the eastern 
provinces. 113 This was the major line that was built under Ottoman management, and 
indigenous engineers were also employed. 
On the whole, the Ottomans could not adopt the railway technological system and 
establish its infrastructure, as in the case of electric telegraphy. Indeed, within the 
111 On the conflicting interests of the European powers involved in railway construction, see L. 
Dominian, 'Railroads in Turkey", pp. 934-40. 
112 Jacob M. Landau, The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Polit- 
ical Propaganda, Detroit, 1971, pp. 7-9. 
113 F. R. Maunsell, "The Hejaz Railway", Geographical Journal, (1908), vol. 32, pp. 570-585; 
FO78-5186: 1896-1901 Haiffa-Damascus Railway, vol. 1; FO78-5451: 1902-1905 Haiffa- 
Damascus Railway, vol. 2; F078-5452: 1900-1905 Damascus-Mecca Railway (Hedjaz Railway). 
An important part of this railway was destroyed Arab nationalists during WWI, led by the British 
agent T. E. Lawrence. 
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non-Western world Japan was the only case that adopted the Western railway tech- 
nologies with success. Japan reached a level of high self-sufficiency by the end of 
the nineteenth century, particularly in locomotive construction, the most sophisti- 
cated component of this large technological system. 114 Turkey, on the other hand, 
remained almost entirely dependent on European hardware, knowledge and technical 
skills. The railway as a large technological system entailed far higher cost, heavy 
industrial structures and more difficult engineering skills in comparison with the 
electric telegraphy, which was established countrywide within about a decade. The 
Ottoman financial state presented a major obstacle to the construction of railways. 
Therefore, unlike the telegraph, railways were from the beginning financed, con- 
trolled and operated by the foreign capitalists, and remained largely a foreign enter- 
prise until the early twentieth century. 
114 For a short account of the transfer of railway technology to Japan, see Takeshi Yuzawa, 
"The Transfer of Railway Technologies from Britain to Japan, with Special Reference to Locomo- 
tive Manufacture", in D. J. Jeremy (ed. ), International Technology Transfer: Europe, Japan and 
the USA, 1700-1914, Hants & Vermont, 199, pp. 199-219. 
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Chapter Five 
THE BRITISH NAVAL MISSION and PASHAS 
5.1 Introduction 
The British naval link to Turkey began as a semi-official mission by the British gov- 
ernment as a part of its wider imperial policy to increase its influence in the Ottoman 
Empire from the 1830s. The British government and admiralty allowed or often 
appointed a certain number of officers of the British navy to serve in the Ottoman 
navy. From about the 1840's to the First World War there was almost a ceaseless 
succession of British Naval Advisers and officers to the Ottoman navy. Many of them 
became pasha, a title of high official rank in the Ottoman Empire. Most of them 
established close contacts and friendship with the Sultan, his senior officials and 
naval authorities; a process which helped to develop good will among the Ottoman 
administrative elite for British engineering and technologies. This played an impor- 
tant part in Britain's becoming more and more influential in Ottoman naval matters. 
In this chapter I will examine the "official" British naval mission and major naval 
advisors to the Ottoman Empire. 11 will argue that the British naval mission served to 
cultivate the grounds for the introduction of British naval technologies to the 
Ottoman Empire as a part of a wider imperial expansion. It originally aimed at 
increasing British political and military influence in Ottoman affairs in the general 
power struggle of European military and industrial competition. 
I By an "official" mission, I mean one largely controlled by the British government, and its 
members (advisers, officers and engineers) generally belonged to the British Admiralty and were 
subjected to the approval of the British government. 
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The development of the whole Ottoman naval programme since the 1830's can be 
interpreted as a large technological system building programme, based on British 
model. This is analogous to what Hughes calls "the evolution of large technological 
systems" .2I will avoid applying such a programme in a strong sense, for the reason 
that the technological system approach presupposes a deterministic, or implicitly 
teleological, interrelationship among the components of a system. I will employ this 
approach simply as a didactically useful theoretical tool. Besides, the building of a 
large technological system in the Ottoman Empire, a non-Western environment, 
would be different than in the West, on which Hughes's system approach is based. 
Within the framework of such an analysis, the British naval mission was a part of the 
preliminary step for building political and institutional environments for British naval 
technological systems in Ottoman society. British advisors and officers represented 
and pursued British military and commercial goals while helping the Ottomans with 
the reorganisation of their navy on a British model. They were not only agents 
between the Ottoman navy and the British Admiralty and government, but they also 
provided a channel of communication and mediation between the Ottoman navy and 
British shipbuilders and armament companies, which were to supply the Ottoman 
navy with new naval machinery, armament, and technical instruction for operating 
the new system. 
2 T. H. Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems" in Bijker, Hughes & Pinch 
(eds. ), The Social Construction of Technological Systems, Cambridge, Man: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 
51-52. 
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5.2 The "Imperial Policy" and The British Naval Mission 
The British naval mission to and supervision of the Ottoman navy, from the British 
perspective, was a part of the general foreign policy in the East. It therefore needs to 
be examined within the contexts of the British "imperial policy" and "the balance of 
power" struggle in Europe in the nineteenth century. When Russia became a real 
threat to the status quo of the Ottoman Empire, particularly after the Ottoman- 
Russian war of 1828-29, British interests were also at stake, for the British feared a 
future Russian expansion to Asia Minor and the Mediterranean, which would form a 
danger to the British dominions and markets in the East. The British government 
under Canning and Palmerston used seapower to maintain and expand British over- 
seas interests. This included defending the Ottoman Empire from its predators. 3 
Britain therefore committed herself to establish strong naval and military ties with 
the Ottoman Empire. The preservation of the Empire was seen, especially by Lord 
Palmerston (as the Foreign Secretary and, later, Prime Minister) and his friends, as a 
necessary element in the general balance of power in Europe and the guarantee to 
check Russian expansion .4 These objectives formed the basis of the Palmerstonian 
framework in the British approach to the Eastern Question, which were to be pursued 
in the formation of a military and political alliance in the Crimean War. 
3 Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary, to the Earl of Minto, First Lord of the Admiralty, 13th 
November, 1838, in J. B. Hattendorf, R. J. B. Knight, A. W. H. Pearsall, N. A. M. Rodger, and G. 
Till (eds. ), British Naval Documents 1204-1960, London: Scolar Press, 1993, pp. 577-578. 
4 For a good reference source on the subject, see Stanley Lane-Pole, The Life of Stratford Can- 
ning: From His Memoirs and Private and Official Papers, 2 vols., London: Longmans, Green & 
Co., 1888; See also M. E. Chamberlain, 'Pax Britannica"?: British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914, 
London: Longman, 1988, p. 80. 
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From about the early 1830's Britain began to show serious concern over the present 
and future states of the Ottoman Empire with respect to their long term commercial 
and political interests in the East. Furthermore, alliance and friendship with the Sul- 
tanate would help the British increase their power and prestige in the Islamic world. 
The British utilised the Sultan's authority and position in favour of their economic 
and political expansion in the Ottoman Empire and the rest of the Islamic world. The 
new British imperial policy was reflected in their willingness to initiate a programme 
of certain military and naval reforms in the Ottoman Empire to strengthen its defen- 
sive power. To serve the British objectives, it had to remain a relatively strong power, 
for example, at least powerful enough to prevent Russian expansion. This entailed the 
improvement and modernisation of the Ottoman military structure on Western Euro- 
pean models. Britain was ready to play an active role in this reconstruction pro- 
gramme for her future interests in the region. As early as the mid 1830s, the British 
government sent several military and naval missions to the Ottoman Empire to assist 
with its military and naval reorganisation. 5 Later, there was also a number of officers 
and men of the Royal Artillery and Engineers, who were dispatched to Turkey for the 
purpose of reforming the artillery and engineering departments of the Ottoman army. 
This led to the establishment of an "artillery laboratory" for the casting of guns, how- 
itzers, and mortars. 6 
At first, the Sultan and his officials had been suspicious of the British naval and mili- 
tary missions for their invisible military objectives over their Empire, and therefore 
5 See Frederic Stanley Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-1841, 
Part I, 1830-1839", The Journal of Modern History, vol. 1, No. 1, (1929), pp. 570-593, (578-584). 
6 Frederic Stanley Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-1841, Part 
II, 1839-1841", The Journal of Modern History, vol. 2, No. 2, (1930), pp. 193-225, (199). 
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they had been rather reluctant to accept British assistance and grant permission for 
British naval officers and engineers to enter the Ottoman navy.? The Ottoman naval 
failures against European navies provided a major motivation and force for the 
review of the navy in the light of European naval structures and technological power. 
The Sultan and his government by the early nineteenth century had already become 
aware of European naval and military power, which was greatly increased by the 
applications of new technological innovations to the armament and transport systems. 
Among the Sultan's officials there were Europe-oriented reformists: for instance, 
men like Reshid Pasha, who had been in Paris and London for some years, and who 
later became an important figure in the reform movement in the Empire. Later, there 
were Ali and Fuad Pashas, who served as Foreign Ministers and Grand Viziers. They 
set up most of the plans and programmes for the Ottoman naval reconstruction with 
British naval advisers. 8 
There was also traditional Ottoman pride and reluctance to change the established 
system of naval defence and machinery. However, when the decline of Ottoman naval 
power, relative to Europeans, was no longer a secret to the ordinary man, the accep- 
tance and search for further Western supervision and instruction became simply a 
practical necessity for maintaining a strong navy. The Ottoman Sultans, particularly 
Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), invited European naval artisans and engineers to 
7 S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, History Of the Ottoman and Modern Turkey, Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1977, vol. II, p. 59. 
8 Woods Pasha's spunyarn provides us with invaluable information about Ali and Fuad Pashas 
and their role in the reorganisation of the Ottoman navy and in the making of the British Naval 
Mission to the Ottoman Empire. See Sir Henry Woods Felix Pasha, Spunyarn... Forty Seven Years 
Under the Ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey, London: Hutchinson & Co. Paternoster Row, 
1924, (2 vols), especially, vol. II. 
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introduce European naval shipbuilding technologies. They were largely British. At 
the time, the French were not trusted because of their ambition over Egypt, then an 
Ottoman province. However, there was still a considerable French military and naval 
mission in the Empire. Furthermore, there was also a number of Prussian officers, 
who were seeking employment in the Ottoman army and navy. 9 Prussian officers 
were mainly involved with the Ottoman land defence and artillery. The involvement 
of French and Prussians with the Ottoman military structure made Britain act quickly 
to get involved with the Ottoman navy to increase her influence in the Ottoman gov- 
ernment. Particularly cautious of a strong French military influence on the Empire in 
the future through the naval and military missions, Lord Palmerston had been anx- 
ious to send British naval and military officers to instruct the Ottoman army and 
navy. 10 Furthermore, Palmerston believed that the support for the Sultan and his gov- 
ernment in adoption of liberal reforms in the long term would result in their becom- 
ing congenial commercial clients and political allies. I l 
9 For example, the famous Prussian, Helmuth von Moltke, one of the earliest and most presti- 
gious Western military experts, had been already in its employ since 1835. His mission became the 
foundation of a strong Prussian military mission to the Ottoman Empire. See H. K. B. Moltke, 
Moltke: His Life and Character, Sketched in Journals, Letters, Memoirs, a Novel and Autobio- 
graphical Notes, Osgood, 1892. 
10 For instance, in 1838, he sent to Turkey four British officers; Captain Walker, Commanders 
Legard and Massie, and Lieutenant Foote. Walker was employed as naval adviser, and later made 
propositions to the Porte for the improvement of naval training. See Stanley Rodkey, "Lord 
Palmerston ..., I", p. 590. 11 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914, 
London: Longman, 1993, p. 398. 
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5.3 Expansion of the British Naval Mission 
The British naval mission to the Empire began with the officers simply providing the 
Ottoman navy with supervision and advice on the structuring and reorganisation of 
the navy, but soon it was expanded to the flow of naval vessels, arms and other com- 
plementary machinery. In other words, the British naval mission and the introduction 
of her industrial and military machinery to the Ottoman Empire went hand in hand. 
For example, as early as the early 1840s, Cyrus Hamlin acknowledged the existence 
of a general "English store where good English articles could be obtained", and the 
place also operated as "the rendezvous for English engineers from steamers and gov- 
ernment works. " 12 Inspecting the newly established Ottoman industries in Istanbul in 
1839, Sir William Fairbairn reported that: 
The Imperial dockyards, small-arm manufacture, cannon foundries, pow- 
der mills, and roperies, were in a very primitive state. Some additions and 
new machinery had been introduced a year or two before my arrival, but 
they were far from perfect, and the native workmen appeared to be at loss 
how to work and manage machinery of such a complicated character. 13 
In the Imperial Dockyards he found: 
a powerful steam engine and a new set of pumps were required to empty 
the docks when repairs were wanted, instead of having to wait three or 
four days for the slow action of mules and horses, the only motive power 
then for driving the imperfect machinery. In the roperies the spinning, 
stranding, and laying of cables were entirely done by hand. Since that time 
good and improved machinery have been introduced in both establish- 
ments, greatly to the benefit of the government. 14 
12 Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks, New York: Carter and Brothers, 1878, p. 210. 
13 W. Fairbairn, The Life of Sir William Fairbairn, Bart, (Partly written by himself, edited and 
completed by William Pole), London: Longmans Green & Company, 1877, pp. 168-169. 
14 ibid, p. 169. 
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Although the importation of Western industrial hardware technically presented no 
difficulties, the Ottoman Empire lacked an infrastructure for the operation of this 
machinery. Therefore the British government, besides sending technical experts, also 
agreed to accept a certain number of Ottoman students to the military academies, 
including Woolwich, Portsmouth and Sandhurst. Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century 
there was a considerable number of Ottoman naval and military students in 
England. 15 On the other hand, the influential British ambassadors at Istanbul, such as 
John Ponsonby and Stratford de Redcliffe, constantly encouraged the Porte to pur- 
chase iron steamers to strengthen its fleet, and torpedo boats, especially for the 
defence of Istanbul. 
At the same time a considerable number of British engineers and experts were 
employed by the Ottoman government. They particularly instructed naval shipping 
and naval training. 16 By the mid-1830s there had been some steamers in the service 
of the Sultan. They were mostly purchased from Britain. The Sultan had employed 
British naval artisans, and, indeed, most of the earliest Ottoman steamers were oper- 
ated by British engineers and captains. 17 At the time, Britain had the largest fleet in 
the Mediterranean and was becoming the major world naval power. The Ottoman 
Empire, as its naval capacity was diminishing, had no option but to establish close 
15 "Egitim gormek uzere Londra'ya gonderilen 18 ogrenci", Turkish Naval Archives at Istanbul 
(TNA), Muhasebe Bolumu, 11/77,10 November 1851; Also, "Egitim icin Londra'ya gonderilen 
Bahriye Mektebi talebesi", TNA, Sura-i Bahri Bolumu, 1215A, 6 November 1851. 
16 See "Ingiltere'den gelen yabanci ogretmenlerin istihdami", TNA, Muhasebe Bolumu, 2/5,14 
June 1849; "Ingiliz Albay Elestin'in donanma emrine ogretmen olarak verilmesi", TNA, Muhasebe 
Bolumu, 7/20,19 June 1850; "Cekic fabrikasinda calistiralacak Ingiliz uzman", TNA, Muhasebe 
Bolumu, 16/90,27 August 1852. 
17 For some details about the British engineers employed by the Ottoman government at the 
dockyards and in the operation of similar works during this early period, see Turkish Naval 
Archives at Istanbul, Muhasebe Bolumu, 93/73,27th March, 1838; TNA, Muhasebe Bolumu, 
93/75,27th March, 1838. 
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relations with the British, particularly regarding naval matters. Furthermore, the Sul- 
tan's reliance on Britain as an ally against the Russian threat was an important factor 
for the Ottoman Empire's naval connections with Britain. However, the Ottoman 
authorities were not naively unaware of the political and military ambitions of Britain 
and other European great powers, mainly France and later Germany. Therefore, the 
Ottoman general policy was not to allow the domination of a single European power 
in their affairs, but rather to keep them in some balance. That is, as in the cases of 
telegraphy and railways, all great European powers and their private firms were 
involved in the exportation of European naval and military machinery and expertise 
to the Empire. For example, while Germany was becoming the major influential 
power on military issues towards the end of nineteenth century, Britain remained the 
most influential on naval matters until WWI. 
However, its weak financial and military state did not allow the Ottoman government 
to exercise any effective role in making the balance or the Concert of Europe in a 
Palmerstonian term. European financiers who were involved in the Ottoman Empire 
helped to expand the sphere of political influence of their countries. Indeed, the inter- 
ests of European financiers and concession holders operating overseas very often 
coincided with the political policies of their governments. 18 For the most part, the 
Ottoman government had no real control over the flow of European naval ships and 
arms. Most ship and arms orders to Britain, France and Germany were made under 
foreign loans. The first international loan was made in Europe, mainly in Britain and 
France, for reconstruction of the Ottoman Empire's defence and public works after 
18 D. McLean, "British Finance and Foreign Policy in Turkey: The Smyrna-Aidin Railway Set- 
tlement 1913-14", The Historical Journal, vol. 19,2 (1976), pp. 521-530. 
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the Crimean War. 
Initially, the Ottoman loans were popular in Europe. Woods Pasha, the naval adviser, 
stated that "it was the era of foreign loans, Turkish credit stood very high in the world 
of finance, and money seemed to be flowing everywhere". 19 However, foreign capital 
and funds were soon linked to increasingly unfavourable terms, for example, with 
very high interest rates. Between 1869 and 1875, the Ottoman government borrowed 
more than its estimated revenues. 20 The failure of the Ottoman government to repay 
its debt stopped its capital imports and led to an economic crisis. To deal with this, in 
1881 the Ottoman Public Debt Commission or Administration was set up under the 
supervision of foreign bond holders, mainly from Britain and France. The organisa- 
tion guaranteed that the state would accept its obligations as a debtor nation in the 
world financial system. 21 In practice, this was a separate administrative body, which 
controlled a large proportion of Ottoman revenues. Thus, Britain and France, and 
later, Germany, through their financial power were in a position to check the flow of 
ships and arms to the Ottoman Empire. This opened the way for their pursuit of 
imperialism. In the wider context, the British naval mission to the Ottoman Empire 
was a part of her imperial ambitions in the East, which was accelerated by the new 
political and military balance or imbalance brought about by the Crimean War. 
There were also officers educated in Europe, who were familiar with Western mili- 
tary technology. In Post-Crimean Turkey Britain became the most popular 
19 Sir Henry Woods Felix Pasha, Forty Seven Years... vol. II, p. 94. 
20 Donald Quataert, "Part IV: The Age of Reforms" in Halil Inalcik (ed), An Economic and So- 
cial History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 
pp. 759-934, (773). 
21 Ibid. 
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destination for the Ottoman's naval training by the mid-nineteenth century. 22 The 
Ottoman officers who were trained in Britain formed the largest Europe oriented 
Ottoman naval group. British engineers and experts, who were employed by the 
Ottoman government gave instruction with respect to naval shipping and naval 
training. 23 Following the Crimean War, which greatly improved the relations 
between the two countries, the British naval advisers to the Ottoman navy were 
appointed to key positions and were able to contact the Ottoman officials. They were 
also given authority to act on behalf of the Ottoman navy, especially regarding the 
connections with the British government and private companies. The British naval 
mission continued throughout the century. When the Young Turks took power in 
1908, the Ottoman government employed higher ranking British officers as naval 
advisers, with a large number of staff under them. The British naval mission became 
a large scale and very influential factor in the reorganisation and actual command of 
the Ottoman fleet. 
22 For instance, see "Egitim gormek uzere Londra'ya gonderilen 18 ogrenci", TNA, Muhasebe 
Bolumu, 11/77,10 November 1851; "Egitim icin Londra'ya gonderilen Bahriye Mektebi talebesi", 
TNA, Sura-i Bahri Bolumu, 12/5A, 6 November 1851; "Londra'ya gonderilen ve adet eden alti 
Bahriye Mektebi ogrencisi", TNA, Sura-i Bahri Bolumu, 14/233A, 24 Mart 1853. 
23 See "Ingiltere'den gelen yabanci ogretmenlerin istihdami", TNA, Muhasebe Bolumu, 2/5,14 
June 1849; "Ingiliz Albay Elestin'in donanma emrine ogretmen olarak verilmesi", TNA, Muhasebe 
Bolumu, 7/20,19 June 1850; "Cekic fabrikasinda calistiralacak Ingiliz uzman", TNA, Muhasebe 
Bolumu, 16/90,27 August 1852. 
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5.4 British Pashas of the Ottoman Navy 
In this section I will attempt to examine major British Naval Pashas serving as the 
head of the British naval mission and advisers to the Ottoman government and Min- 
istry of Marine, and their role in forming a medium and agency between the Ottoman 
Empire and British industrial enterprises. They were also political agents of Britain. 
They were sometimes subsidised by the British government. Our knowledge of 
British Pashas and their activities in the Ottoman navy and army is far from being 
comprehensive. Their names were usually adapted to the Turkish language in order 
to make them pronounceable for the locals. Sometimes they were even given a new 
Turkish-Ottoman name, such as Mushaver Pasha for Adolphus Slade. Most senior 
British naval advisers gained the title "pasha", such as Hobart Pasha, Frost Pasha, 
Woods Pasha and Gamble Pasha. The title simply meant high rank official, one of the 
most respectable and powerful titles in Ottoman society. They were also made admi- 
rals in the Ottoman navy. Hobart Pasha was even appointed as the marshal of the 
Ottoman Empire by the Sultan. 
All British pashas and officers were highly esteemed by the Ottoman officials, navy 
officers and public. They presented mostly an adventurous image. Their service in 
the Ottoman navy won them fame and reputation particularly at home. They were 
keen on wearing Ottoman naval uniforms, and even when they were back in Britain 
they were proud of being seen in those uniforms, in addition to their medals and 
titles. Indeed, most of them made a great effort to adapt to a life style similar to that 
of an Ottoman gentleman or pasha. This improved and created a mutual environment 
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of communication and influence with indigenous pashas and officers. British naval 
pashas usually accompanied by a group of British naval engineers, skilled men and 
officers, who usually dealt with the navy's machinery, technical instruction and 
organisation. They played a crucial role in Westernising the Ottoman navy by intro- 
ducing European machinery, education and skills. In what follows I illustrate the 
most senior British naval pashas and their services as the Naval Advisors and the 
Heads of the British naval missions to the Ottoman navy. 
Mushaver Pasha 
Sir Adolphus Slade (1804-1877), K. C. B., was one of the earliest high-ranking British 
officers to serve as a naval advisor to the Ottoman navy after the retirement of Cap- 
tain Walker. 24 Slade was a knowledgeable officer on naval construction and 
promotion. 25 He was allowed to serve in the Ottoman fleet in 1849, without losing 
his rank in the British navy. He became known as Mushaver Pasha by the Ottomans. 
Mushaver Pasha lived much like an Ottoman. 
He was with the Ottoman fleet at the bombardment of Sebastopol by the Allies in the 
Crimean War. Until the late 1860s, Mushaver Pasha remained as the administrative 
head of the Ottoman navy. He became involved in the reorganisation of the navy, and 
was claimed to have brought it to "a point of relative efficiency". 26 He had a consid- 
erable knowledge on military navies of maritime states?? His period of service 
24 For biographical information, see The Times, 21st July 1890, p. 9; DNB, vol. 18, p. 362; and 
also F. Boase, Modern English Biography, vol. 3, p. 599. 
25 See Adolphus Slade, A Few Words on Naval Construction and Naval Promotion, London: 
Sounder and Otley, 1846. 
26 O'Byrne, Naval Biographical Dictionary, p. 525. 
27 While in Istanbul in the service of the Ottoman navy, Sir Adolphus Slade wrote his book, 
Maritime States and Military Navies, London: James Ridgway, 1859. 
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included the Crimean War. 28 His services were acknowledged by the Ottoman gov- 
ernment with Medjidie and Osmanieh medals. When he obtained the rank of rear- 
admiral in the British navy he retired from the Ottoman service. 29 
Hobart Pasha 
After the retirement of Admiral Adolphus Slade, another British naval officer, 
Augustus Charles Hobart-Hampden (1822-1886) entered the service of the Sultan. 
He was the son of the Earl of Buckingham. 30 Upon the recommendations of his 
brother, Lord Hobart, then the Director General of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, he 
was invited by Ali Pasha, then the Grand Vizier, to superintend and assist the re- 
organisation the Ottoman navy in 1867.31 Hobart had become a well-known officer 
through his services and adventures during the Crimean War and American Civil War 
while he was still in the British navy. 32 At first, he obtained no definite position in 
Turkey and acted as an unofficial adviser to the Ottoman government and Ali Pasha 
in particular. In 1868 he was nominated "member of the Board of Admiralty, and 
Director General of Naval Schools" in the Ottoman Empire. 
Shortly before his arrival the Ottoman fleet had suffered several disasters in Crete 
during revolt. Following these disasters a new Ministry of the Navy had been 
28 His book, Turkey and the Crimean War, was published in 1867. 
29 DNB, vol. 18, p. 362. 
30 For a biographical sketch of Hobart Pasha, see Biographical Magazine, No: 1, (June), 1877, 
pp. 35-45; see also Sir Henry Woods Felix Pasha, Forty Seven Years... vol. II, pp. 150-160. 
31 Ali Pasha had known him while he was Ottoman ambassador in London, See Biographical 
Magazine, p. 41; Woods Felix Pasha, Forty Seven Years.., vol. II, p. 151. 
32 He published some his adventures during the American Civil War in his book: Never 
Caught, 1867, which he wrote under the pseudonym of "Captain Roberts". He wrote his adven- 
tures during his service for the Ottoman Empire in the: The Torpedo Scare: Experiences During 
the Turco-Russian War, Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1885. See also, Augustus 
Charles Hobart-Hampden, Sketches From My Life, London: Longmans, Green 1887. 
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established, with the minister and his undersecretary responsible for administration 
and finance with the grand admiral left only to command the fleet. 33 An advisory 
council consisting of retired naval officers was also set up to help with construction 
of a more efficient and powerful fleet. During the visit of the Sultan Abdul Aziz to 
Queen Victoria in the summer of 1867, the British government agreed to send to 
Turkey a British naval mission headed by an Admiral. 34 
However, due to the Cretan Rebellion, the House of Commons delayed the mission 
in question. When the project was brought up for consideration again, the Ottoman 
government had changed their minds about the nature of the mission. They simply 
applied for two naval instructors for teaching navigation, two gunners and an officer 
of Lieutenant's rank to act as commandant of the naval cadets. 
35 Later, a British 
naval mission led by Hobart Pasha was invited to provide advice and technical 
assistance. 36 Hobart's service in the suppression of the Cretan Rebellion, 1866-1869, 
brought him the rank of full admiral, with the title of pasha. 37 Thereafter, he became 
commonly known as Hobart Pasha. During his long service in the Ottoman navy, he 
continued to reorganise the Ottoman navy. He led committees for revising naval 
rules, regulations and signals. He helped the Ottoman Ministry of Marine set up 
naval schools and training ships. He wrote: 
33 S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, History Of the Ottoman and Modern Turkey, vol. II, p. 75. 
34 Sir Henry Woods Felix Pasha, Forty Seven Years.., vol. II, p. 11. 
35 Sir Henry Woods Felix Pasha, Forty Seven Years.., vol. II, p. 11. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Hobart's action against Greece during the Cretan rebellion was seen as a breach of the For- 
eign Enlistment Act, and was accordingly struck off the British navy list. However, he was re- 
stored to his naval rank in 1874, with the support of Lord Derby. See DNB., vol. 9, p. 931. 
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Hobart Pasha: Admiral, Advisor and Commander of the Ottoman Fleet. 
He was made marshal of the Ottoman Empire by the Sultan in 1881. 
[From the Illustrated London News, 1877.1 
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I have organised the Turkish navy in a way which has led to high encomi- 
ums as to its state from all the Commanders-in-Chief of the English fleet 
who have lately visited Constantinople. I have established naval schools, 
training and gunnery ships (and here I have been assisted by English naval 
officers). 38 
Hobart Pasha also provided an important medium between British agents for arma- 
ment and naval machinery and the Ottoman Ministry of Marine. On several occa- 
sions he offered help and advice to Armstrongs' representatives and agents and 
arranged their meeting with the other Ottoman naval authorities. 
39 
During the Turco-Russian war of 1877, Hobart Pasha was placed in command of the 
Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea. He kept the sea clear of Russian raiders with his flag- 
ship, the Arsari-Tevik, whilst the smaller vessels of his squadron held Russians at 
bay. 40 He especially displayed considerable skill in out-witting the Russian torpe- 
does, mainly consisting of Whitehead torpedos. 
41 Fish or Whitehead torpedos, the 
Harvey, the Pole, the fixed or mine torpedo, the Ley or Nordenfeldt, the cigar-boat 
and the Berdan were becoming important in naval warfare. In particular, fish-torpedo 
warfare was designated as the "naval scare of the day" 
42 
He was highly esteemed by the Sultan. In 1881, the Sultan appointed him mushir or 
marshal of the Ottoman Empire 
43 He lived in a commodious mansion in the "Rue 
des Postes" at Pera, and led a pleasant life, spending much of his time shooting in the 
Sultan's farms 44 He was receiving a salary of 200 Turkish Liras from the Ottoman 
38 Illustrated London News, vol. 70,12th May 1877, p. 435. 
39 Noble to Armstrong, 29-30th June, 1873, Constantinople, 31/2116, Rendel Papers, Newcas- 
tle. 
40 Sir Henry Woods Felix Pasha, Forty Seven Years.., vol. II, pp. 154-157. 
41 Hobart Pasha, The Torpedo Scare, London, 1885. 
42 Ibid, pp. 746-747. 
43 Modern English Biography, vol. 1, pp. 1426-1427. 
44 He was also known to have been studying the details of management of the big iron mon- 
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government when he died in August 1886 45 
Woods Pasha: Forty-five Years in the Ottoman Navy 
Sir Henry Felix Woods (1843-1929), (K. C. V. O., 1902), served as the Adviser to the 
Imperial Ottoman Navy from 1869 until he retired after the Young Turk Revolution. 
Woods lived in Istanbul for forty-seven years. He became admiral and pasha and in 
later years, served as Aide-de-Camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. He first went to 
Turkey as young officer when being appointed a Second-in-Command of the dispatch 
vessel, the Caradoc, in attendance upon the British ambassador at Istanbul 46 While 
in Istanbul, Woods was selected as a British delegate to the International Commission 
for the Improvement of Navigation in the Black Sea and Bosphorus, which was set 
up in 1867. He led a project involved with placing a lightship at the entrance of the 
Bosphorus for the safety of vessels entering or leaving the Black Sea. After complet- 
ing his work for the commission, Woods was allowed to enter the Ottoman navy as 
an instructor, by the special request of the Ottoman government to the British 
government 47 First, he joined the Naval College at Halki. Four years later, he took 
command of the cadets on the board the school frigate Hundevendighar, and later, 
the Mukbir Soroor, where he gave instruction on various naval subjects 48 
Woods assisted Hobart Pasha with the reorganisation of the Ottoman fleet. He organ- 
ised the torpedo and coast-defence services, and commanded them for several years. 
sters, and lying for years as useless toys under the windows of the Sultan's palace. See Biographi- 
cal Magazine, No. 1, (June), 1877, pp. 44-45. 
45 TNA, MKT-506/62,26th August 1886. 
46 Sir Henry Woods Felix Pasha, Spunyarn... Forty Seven Years Under the Ensigns of Great 
Britain and Turkey, London: Hutchinson & Co. Paternoster Row, 1924, (2 vols), vol. I, p. 250. 
47 Ibid, vol. II, pp. 11-12. 
48 Ibid, pp. 12,25; See also "Yabanci uzman olarak celbedilen Woods and Moris Beyler", 3rd 
March, 1877, TNA, 82/141A. 
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Woods Pasha encouraged and planned for the Ottoman Navy to order torpedoes from 
Britain 49 He devoted much of his attention to torpedo instruction. However, he 
thought it was like "making bricks without straw": 
The old naval Chiefs did not believe in torpedoes at all before the war with 
Russia, and the Council would not sanction [his] special expenditure. 50 
However, before the Russo-Turkish War he received instruction to prepare a torpedo 
and launch it in the Bosphorus for explosion. He managed to display to the Ottoman 
naval officials the destructive power of torpedoes. Later he destroyed an old wooden 
frigate by a torpedo as part of a demonstration in the presence of the Sultan. The 
Imperial Yacht, though being about two miles away from from the frigate, was 
affected by the explosion and the Sultan was terrified. According to Woods Pasha's 
account, cautious of such an attack by his enemies, the Sultan did not venture afloat 
again even in a steam launch, except once or twice a year. 
51 After his torpedo 
demonstration, Woods Pasha was called upon to draw up plans for coastal defence. 
He surveyed and buoyed the Dardanelles and its approaches. 
During the Russo-Turkish War, he undertook torpedo work and the improvement of 
sea-mines with two highly distinguished British Woolwich gunnery experts, Frost 
Pasha52 and Vinicombe Pasha, both of whom later attained the rank of general, 
49 "Miralay Woods Bey'in alt adet musadameli torpitonun Ingiltere'ye siparis edilmesi teklifi", 
1st December 1877, TNA, 6/66. 
50 Woods, Forty Seven Years.., vol. II, p. 30. 
51 Ibid., pp. 31-35. 
52 Frost Pasha (1838-1902), an Aberdonian, held an influential position in service of the Sultan. 
After his appointment in the gunnery department of Woolwich Arsenal, through Sir John Ander- 
son he was offered a position of responsibility in Tophane, the Turkish Arsenal in Istanbul, the Ot- 
toman counterpart of Woolwich Arsenal. He actively engaged in the production of guns for the 
Imperial Ottoman government for 34 years. He is said to have invented a new type of gun and im- 
proved torpedoboat. People's Journal referred to him as the "Aberdeen Engineering Genius". Un- 
fortunately, I have so far been unable to find more information about him. See a newspaper cutting 








AUM iizni_ ý1I HENRY \\'()(U--z PASHA. 
Admiral and Pasha in the Imperial Ottoman Naval Service 
Grand Cordon of the Medijeh and Osmaniek. 
K. C. of the Saxe-Coburg Order. 
Aide-de-Camp for some years to the 
Sultan Abdul Hamid. 
[From Sir Henry Woods Felix Pasha, Spunyarn ... Forty Seven Years 
Under the Ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey, 1924. ] 
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in Tophane, the Ordnance Department under the Grand Master of Artillery. 53 Woods, 
with the assistance of Warren, the Engineer-Instructor of the cadets, was able to 
examine the mechanism of the Whitehead torpedo, when three Whitehead torpedoes, 
launched by the Russians, were captured unexploded. They discovered the secret of 
its structure, and therefore the Ottomans were able to posses the Whitehead torpe- 
does, with a special deal, without payment of the heavy premium exacted by the 
inventor for the first one which he supplied to any government. 54 For his services in 
the war he was promoted to Colonel, and was placed on the Staff of the Admiralty 
under Hobart Pasha. He organised a torpedo school on board the Hundevendighar. 
When Hobart Pasha retired, Woods replaced him as the Naval Advisor and gained 
full title of Pasha in 1883. Thereafter, he became responsible for reforming the navy. 
He introduced some modern European machinery, including some British electrical 
machinery, to the Empire. 55 While reforming the Ottoman navy, Woods Pasha con- 
tinued his work as an instructor in the modern Naval Engineering School by lecturing 
on torpedoes. 56 Woods Pasha contacted several British naval and armament compa- 
nies on behalf of the Ottoman navy and played an agent role between the two. 57 He 
managed to arrange many European social and commercial contacts with the 
Ottoman government and officials. 58 Woods Pasha often met the Sultan, his ministers 
53 Woods, Forty Seven Years.., vo. II, pp. 36-37. 
54 Ibid., pp. 42-46. 
55 "Woods Pasha'nin Ingiltere'den getirdigi elektrik makineleri fiatinin gizli olarak tahkiki", 
16th August 1885, TNA, 476/32. 
56 "Bahriye Mektebin'de okutulacak torpido dersleri hocaligina tayin edilen Woods Pasha", 
26th August, 1886, TNA, Mektubi, 506/62. 
57 "Woods Pasha tarafindan Londra'dan satin alinan Ingiltere Ticaret Gemileri Katalogu... ", 
18th September 1886, TNA, Muhasebe, 985/58. 
58 See letters to Sir C. Dilke, BL, Add. MSS. 43874, f. 163, (1890); BL, Add. MSS. 43916, f. 10, 
(1897); also letters to Sir A. H. Layard, BL, Add. MSS. 39021, f. 61, (1878); BI, Add. MSS. 39033, 
f. 290. 
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and the Grand Vizier to discuss the state of the navy. He even spoke some Turkish. 59 
For his services to the Ottoman navy, he was awarded Grand Cordons of Osmanieh 
and Medjidie (brilliants), and the Gold Medal of the Imtiaz. When the Sultan Abdul 
Hamid was deposed in 1908, he was retired from the Ottoman naval service with his 
pay as a Turkish officer as a pension. He lived in Istanbul until WWI. 
Gamble Pasha 
Woods Pasha was followed by another high ranking British Naval Adviser, Sir 
Austin Douglas Gamble (1856-1934) in December 1908, when the Young Turk gov- 
ernment asked for a new naval mission. He was made a Vice-Admiral in the Ottoman 
navy. Thereafter, he was commonly called "Gamble Pasha" among the Ottoman offi- 
cers. The local paper, the Sabah, stated that: 
Admiral Gamble was called practically to command the Fleet in the time 
of H. Hilmi Pasha. He was after a short time loved by the navy. So long as 
difficulties were not put in the way of Gamble Pasha we profited by his 
services. 60 
The main objective of the Ottoman government for employing British naval experts 
was the modernisation of the Navy on the British model. All naval advisers were 
therefore expected to help to improve both the material and managerial or organisa- 
tional structures of the navy. When he was appointed as Naval Adviser, Gamble 
Pasha, like other advisers before him, made efforts to restructure or rebuild the navy 
with the help of British engineers attached to his mission. 
59 Herbert Chernsic to General Bruckenbury, 10th May 1890, (Secret and Personal), PRO, 
HD3/77. 
60 From the leading article in the Sabah, 13th June 1912. Gamble Pasha had leave because of 
his poor health. 
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He was in the Ottoman naval service for 45 years. 
[From Sir Henry Woods Felix Pasha, Spunyarn ..., 1924. 
] 
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'WOODS PASHA LANDING FROM AN IMPERIAL CALQUE AT SERAGLIO 
POINT. 
One of his first steps was his proposal to the government to send the future local 
instructors in navigation, gunnery, torpedo and mechanical engineering to Britain, 
where they could get the best training on the subjects. 61 Furthermore, he made rec- 
ommendations to modernise the navy: primarily, buying modern naval vessels and 
arms from Britain. 62 Gamble Pasha and his staff persuaded the Ottoman government 
to purchase "a set of most perfect and beautiful astronomical instruments", such as 
were fitted in the observatories in Britain to regulate chronometers. There had been 
intentions by the foreign advisers, since the time of Hobart Pasha, to build a Time- 
Ball on the tower of Galata. 63 Gamble's plans included building a Time-Ball, but it 
was never built as his mission did not last very long. 
Williams Pasha 
When his health deteriorated, Admiral Gamble left the mission and was succeeded 
by Rear-Admiral Hugh Pigot Williams (1858-1934) in April 1910.64 After he 
became a captain in the British navy in 1898, H. P Williams served as the British 
Naval Attache to Russia, Turkey, Norway and Sweden until 1900.65 He became 
Rear-Admiral in the British navy in 1908. His service for the Ottoman Empire as the 
head of the British naval mission lasted about two years. In the Ottoman navy, Admi- 
ral Williams was granted extensive authority to reorganise the navy and its 
61 "Ferik Gamble Pasha tarafindan yapilan teklif geregince, navigasyon, top, torpido ve makine 
okullarinda muhendislik ve ogretmenlik ile gorevlendirilecek subaylarin ihtisas yapmak uzere In- 
giltere'ye gonderilmesi", TNA, Gemiler, Erkani Harbiye, Tersane etc., 941/200A, 30th May 1908. 
62 "Donanmanin modern hale konulmasi ve programlastirilmasi konusunda Gamble Pasha'nin 
teklifleri", TNA, Mek., 20/20A, 9th August 1909. 
63 This had been a long ambition of Woods Pasha, too. But he could not get the necessary sanc- 
tions to carry out his plans. See Woods, Forty Seven Years.., vo. II, p. 278. 
64 "Gamble Pasha'nin istifasi and yerine getirilen Wilyams Pasha'ya verilen yetki", TNA, 
Gemiler, Erkani Harbiye, Tersane etc., 1025/65,4th May, 1910. 
65 Who Was Who, 1929-1940, vol. III, p. 1461. 
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infrastructure. 66 
He was an influential high ranking British officer. During his mission as the Naval 
Adviser, substantial orders for naval vessels and armament were secured for 
Britain. 67 During the Tripolitanian War, which began in September 1911 with Italy 
over the control of Tripoli, the British naval mission continued as normal, as Britain 
had declared its neutrality. Admiral Williams communicated to the Ottoman govern- 
ment that the British naval engineers and men attached to his mission would continue 
their work uninterrupted but without joining the war. 68 Admiral Williams served as 
the adviser until the appointment of the new Naval Adviser in 1912. 
Admiral Limpus: The "Scientific Adviser" 
In the years before WWI, the British naval mission to the Ottoman Empire reached 
its peak both in terms of its far-reaching political influence and the number of British 
officers and engineers attached to it. The last British Pasha of the Ottoman navy, Sir 
Arthur Henry Limpus (1863-193 1), was the highest ranking British naval officer to 
serve in the Ottoman navy since the beginning of the British mission. Limpus was 
serving as a distinguished rear-admiral and Captain of H. M. S Terrible, in the British 
home fleet, when he was appointed as the naval adviser to the Ottoman navy in April, 
1912.69 
66 Ibid. 
67 Sir Edward Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople, London: Herbert Jenkins, 1916, pp. 
324-325. 
68 "Admiral Williams'in deniz kuvetlerinde calisan Ingiliz uzmanlarinin harbe istirak etmek- 
sizin gorevlerine devam etmeleri hakkindaki 6 Tesrinevvel, 1911 tarihli mektubu", TNA, 
MKT 2352/88,12th October, 1911. 
69 NMAG, Limpus Papers, MS79/018, box. 6. 
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He was made vice-admiral in the Turkish navy and served for two and half years, 
between 1912 and 1914, until the Ottoman Empire joined the war alongside 
Germany. 70 His mission continued throughout the two Balkan Wars (1912-1913) in 
which the Ottoman navy and armies were actively involved. However, the British 
naval mission remained uninterrupted. Men of the mission even engaged the enemy's 
warships several times on the Ottoman side. 71 He was invested with: 
the duties of bringing about the necessary nautical and scientific progress 
in the fleet, the central administration, and the schools in order to secure 
the progress and improvement of the fleet and Scientific Adviser 72 
He was made responsible for modernisation and reorganisation of the entire Ottoman 
fleet. Limpus was granted great powers, and with these powers his position became 
one of the most influential among the British or other foreign advisers who had been 
employed by the Ottoman government up to that time. The contract, which was 
signed by the Sultan Resad, stated that: 
The Admiral is to organise the navy and is to take executive command of 
the Fleet as an Instructor. He will train the senior officers, officers and 
men. He is given, generally speaking, the duty of reforming and improv- 
ing the efficiency of the personnel and material of the Ottoman navy, and 
of preparing it in all aspects for war. 73 
During his service for the Ottoman Navy as the head of the British naval mission, 
70 See Limpus Papers in the National Maritime Archives at Greenwich. There is also an official 
out-letter-book, 1912 to 1913; a diary kept by Limpus's wife during their stay in Turkey and letters 
from Limpus to his wife, 1912 to 1916. 
71 A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnoughts to Scapa Flow: The Road to War, 1900-1914, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1961, vol. I, p. 302. 
72 See the draft contract in the British Admiralty to Limpus, NMAG, box. 26,72/116,23rd 
April 1912. 
73 See the article 2 of the later contract which was signed by the Sultan Mehmet Resad, 24th 
May 1328(1912) in Admiral Limpus to Sir Lewis Mallet, the British Ambassador, Pera, Istanbul, 
NMAG, Limpus Papers, MS79/018, box. 23,10th September 1914. 
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Admiral Limpus made efforts to improve the conditions of the Ottoman navy, with 
help of the British expertise, shipbuilding technologies and technical naval instruc- 
tion. He encouraged contacts between the British firms and the Ottoman government 
for naval trade and armament connections. In a way, he played a double role, by rep- 
resenting both the British firms and the Ottoman government on naval matters. 
Therefore, it was a very important position for the British, though he had nothing to 
do with Britain officially. 
Germany and Britain were not only military rivals but they were also in dangerous 
competition and rivalry in heavy industries and the world markets. Accordingly, the 
British influence on the Ottoman navy was not merely of military benefit for them, 
but most importantly it would maintain and create wider markets for the British naval 
industries. Apart from commercial interests, the main motive behind the British 
naval mission before the war was political. They were anxious to see the Ottoman 
navy under British control. Limpus's position in the Ottoman navy, and the 
monopoly given to Vickers and Armstrong to build arsenals and dockyards, were 
measures to balance the German military mission, headed by Liman von Sanders. 74 
On one hand Limpus was reforming the Ottoman navy, and on the other hand he was 
a British political agent working to build good relations with the Ottoman govern- 
ment. 
Limpus was also to form his staff and a group of British specialist officers for 
instruction and technical education in the fleet. When Limpus took the position, there 
were an important number of senior British officer-engineers in the Ottoman navy, 
74 J. Heller, British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914, London: Frank Cass, 
1983, pp. 113-116. 
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including Lieutenant Faughtwas, navigator, who also acted as the Chief of the staff 
afloat, Lieutenant Mackinnen, gunnery instructor, Engineer Lieutenant Reed who 
acted as Engineer captain afloat, Engineer Captain Blake, Engineer-in-Chief of the 
Imperial Dockyard and Arsenal, Engineer Lieutenant Le Rage and Naval Instructor 
Holland who were the directors of studies at the Naval College. 75 The Ottoman navy 
lacked, to an important degree, technical expertise, material supplies and trained men 
to run and repair vessels and heavy arms. A. V. Blake, Engineer in Chief of the Impe- 
rial Arsenal, observed that the weakness of the navy was a question of supplies both 
for maintenance of and repairs to vessels. 76 
Limpus was soon writing to the British Admiralty for the Turkish naval students, 
engineers and artificers to be permitted to serve for some time on British ships, such 
as the Orion and Monarch, to gain experience?? Though the response of the Admi- 
ralty was not always positive in regard to the applications for training onboard seago- 
ing ships, as the admiralty refused foreign officers and men on such ships, they could 
arrange courses of instruction at Whale Island and other establishments for such stu- 
dents and engineers. 78 Admiral Limpus remained in the service until October, 1914. 
He was trusted and liked by the Turkish sailors. 79 The Messudieh was the flagship of 
Limpus until he left Istanbul. 
75 H. P. William (Rear-Admiral) to Limpus, NMAG, Limpus Papers, 72/116, box. 26,30th 
March 1912. 
76 A. V. Blake to Limpus, NMAG, Admiral Limpus Letterbook 1912,21st July 1912. 
77 See for example, Limpus to the British Admiralty, NMAG, Admiral Limpus Letterbook 1912, 
3rd August 1912. 
78 The British Admiralty to Limpus, NMAG, Admiral Limpus Letterbook 1912,15th August 
1912. 
79 Sir Edward Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople, London: Herbert Jenkins, 1916, p. 173. 
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5.5 The British Naval Mission Versus the German Military Mission 
By the late nineteenth century, a pattern became more obvious in the Ottoman West- 
ernisation programme: Britain and Germany came to dominate and shape two dis- 
tinct systems in the Ottoman defence structure: Britain established itself as a leader 
of naval technology, training and organisation, whereas Germany influenced military, 
or land defence structures. Though France had several military missions and men in 
Turkey, their system building was not as distinctive as the two former. The area 
where the French were dominating was the Ottoman internal defence, mainly Gen- 
darmerie. The Ottoman-Turkish gendarmerie traditionally adapted the French sys- 
tem both in its organisation and machinery and remained close to a French model 
throughout its history. 80 
The situation is analogous to the system building model. While Britain shaped the 
Ottoman naval technological system by providing instruction and naval machinery 
and armament, Germany controlled the Ottoman land defence technological system. 
As the Ottoman Empire became more and more dependent on these technological 
systems, particularly after the end of the century, Britain and Germany were in a bet- 
ter position to expand their political sphere of influence. 
The Prussian army had a reputation for efficiency after the Napoleonic wars and 
some of its non-commissioned officers and subalterns assisted in training the Sultan's 
soldiers. Since the time of the famous Prussian officer, Helmuth von Moltke, who 
80 There were also some British officers attached to the gendarmerie, including Mahir Pasha 
(General Borthwick) who rose to the command of the Gendarmerie in the autonomous province of 
Eastern Roumelia with Sultan's firman as a general and pasha. Blunt Pasha, who served in the 
Turkish Gendarmerie Department after the Crimean War until 1880's, and Baker Pasha, a staff of 
retired British army officer, came to Turkey to reorganise the the gendarmerie in 1870's and but 
later organised the Egyptian gendarmerie. See Woods, Forty Seven Years.., vol. II, pp. 13-138. 
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served as the military adviser to the Ottoman government from 1835, Germany was 
able to maintain a military link to the Ottoman Empire. 
81 After the Franco-Prussian 
War in 1870 Germany had become a major military power in Europe. This was 
accompanied by her increasing industrial and economic power. As a result, Ger- 
many's international influence both in Europe and overseas began to be felt. Prussian 
military reformers and the German armament industry were becoming an influential 
power in the Ottoman military system. Particularly in the 1880's Germany began to 
pursue a policy that would make her a new imperial power. 
Within this context, the German military mission to the Ottoman Empire, to which 
Germany now attached a special importance for her imperialistic objectives in the 
East, became influential and more political. It was no longer a mere industrial and 
economic concern. On the other hand, partly as a result of Gladstonian "bag and bag- 
gage" policies against Turkey, the traditional relations between Britain and the 
Ottoman Empire were changing for the worse. The vacuum created by Britain's 
dwindling interest in playing the role of Turkey's "protector" in Europe was now 
filled by Germany. 82 When the Sultan Abdul Hamid sent a small private mission to 
Berlin in the early 1880's for a number of German officers, the German Chancellor, 
Bismarck, responded most favourably. Soon a strong German military mission 
arrived in Turkey to reorganise the army. The mission included Von der Goltz, a very 
able Major of the Staff of Corps, Baron von Hobe for the cavalry, Kamphoevener for 
the infantry, and von Ristoff for the artillery. They were rapidly advanced to Generals 
' gI See H. K. B. Moltke, Moltke: His Life and Character, Sketched in Journals, Letters, Mem- 
oirs, a Novel and Autobiographical Notes, Osgood, 1892. 
82 Dan Van der Vat, The Ship that Changed the World, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985, 
p. 22. 
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of division, and subsequently appointed to Aides-de-camp of [he Sultan. 
83 All 
became Pashas. With new missions the German military influence inevitably 
increased and new high ranking officers were sent to reorganise the Ottoman army 
and defence system. This was followed by the Kaiser's new and friendly approach to 
the Sultan and his Empire in the financial and political world. 
The new Ottoman naval system, however, was established and developed on a British 
naval model in most of its aspects, including training, instruction, organisation and 
machinery. Most able Ottoman naval officers were either trained in Britain or trained 
in Turkey under the British instructors and engineers. As a result of the long British 
tradition in the Ottoman naval system, the Ottoman navy developed a tendency to 
follow the British. Woods Pasha during his long service found most Ottoman officers 
particularly friendly to the British. For example, Admiral Said Pasha, the governor of 
the modern Naval College at Halki had a "blind admiration for the English character" 
and he referred to the "English" as the "salt of the earth". 
84 Throughout the century 
the British influence in the Ottoman naval matters remained dominant. Visiting Istan- 
bul in 1904, as the agent of Armstrongs, D'Eyncourt observed that: 
It was noticeable that the officers of the Turkish Navy were particularly 
polite to the English, for they had a system whereby their own naval offi- 
cers trained under English ones. It was a very different matter when it 
came to the Army officers, who had been trained by German military per- 
sonnel and reserved their best courtesies for them. Obviously the Germans 
had done everything in their power to cultivate the goodwill of the Turks, 
chiefly with a view to obtaining orders for armaments. The Krupp family 
had a most palatial residence near Constantinople, where they dispensed 
lavish hospitality. 85 
83 Woods, Forty Seven Years.., vol. II, pp. 145-147. 
84 Woods, Forty Seven Years.., vol. II, pp. 12-14. 
85 Sir E. H. W. Tennyson D'Eyncourt, A Shipbuilders Yarn: The Record of A Naval Construc- 
tor, London, Hutchinson & Co., 1948, p. 49. 
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The Germans went far and expanded their mission to the Ottoman navy, too. The 
British strove to keep out the Germans at least in the Ottoman navy. However after 
the death of Hobart Pasha in 1886, the Germans managed to place their naval officers 
among the Sultan's naval advisers and instructors. The German Lieut-Commander 
Starkie, and later Kaula von Hofe, also a Commander in the German navy, entered 
the service of the Sultan as Instructors and Advisers. 
A primary objective of the whole British naval mission in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was to maintain or regain a more influential position in the 
Ottoman Empire at a time when German influence was at its peak in the military, 
economic and political life of the country. Limpus's position and mission were 
secured by the intensive efforts of the British Foreign Office to counteract the 
increasing German military influence in the Ottoman Empire. However, in 1913 a 
new German military mission, being the largest ever, headed by Liman von Sanders 
was dispatched to Turkey-86 This mission resulted in a substantial increase of general 
German influence in the Ottoman Empire, which was becoming a "helpless satellite" 
of Germany. 87 
The establishment of this new military mission under Liman von Sanders in Turkey 
was an important factor in the formation of the German-Ottoman alliance in WWI. 
The German mission's anti-Russian feature especially encouraged many Ottoman 
officials to side with Germany. 88 Anti-Russian feelings had always been strong 
86 See for new objectives of the German military mission with von Sanders, his own account, 
Otto Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, Annapolis, Md., 1927. 
87 See Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968, p. 13. 
88 See R. J. Kerner, "The Mission of Liman von Sanders, IV", Slavonic Review, (1928), vol. 
VII, pp. 90-112. 
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among the Ottomans, and were running very high at the time. The British reacted 
most strongly to the new position gained by the Germans. They were extremely 
wary of the mission and position of Liman von Sanders in Turkey. There was no 
doubt that Liman von Sanders' mission would serve as an important means for fur- 
thering expansion of the German sphere of influence in Ottoman military affairs. The 
British Foreign Minister, Edward Grey, wrote to their ambassador in Istanbul: 
We have heard that a German general has been given a very effective and 
far-reaching command in Constantinople; we hear that this command 
would create for him a position which hitherto has been occupied by no 
foreign officer in Turkey. 89 
This meant, in practice, the end of the delicate balance among the European powers 
in Turkey in favour of Germany. Britain, with France and Russia, opposed the 
increasing size and position of the present German military mission, as they saw it a 
major threat to their ambitions in Turkey and in the East in general. As a result, 
Britain gained new industrial and military concessions from the Turkish government 
to maintain the balance with her rival, Germany. Britain's naval link to the Ottoman 
Empire was still an important industrial and political task, though her share in other 
industrial enterprises, such as railways, had diminished steadily. Therefore, the naval 
mission, Britain's major link to Turkey, became an important political issue. Limpus 
stated that: 
It was and it is the hope and intention of the British government to main- 
tain British influence in at least a small part of Turkish affairs. For exam- 
ple, in the Turkish Navy, and in the shipbuilding and repairing and supply 
industries upon which a Navy must depend. Until quite recently the 
British Naval Mission has been very successful in this part of its work 90 
89 Grey to the British Ambassador in Istanbul, 9th December, 1913, quoted in R. J. Kerner, 
"The Mission of Liman von Sanders, III", Slavonic Review, (1927-1928), vol. V, p. 545. 
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Britain increased the size and quality of her mission under Limpus. By 1914, the new 
mission involved about 72 British officers and engineers, forming the largest British 
naval mission since it has begun 91 This was almost as many as in the German mili- 
tary mission 92 It was not merely the increase in numbers, but also the position and 
quality of the mission underwent important changes. The British naval advisers and 
officers gained wider rights and authority to reorganise and control the Ottoman 
navy. Although Admiral Limpus was called an instructor, he was certainly more than 
a mere instructor. He had the authority to exercise "an effective control over all war- 
ships and naval establishments" 93 The Sabah stated that: 
The admiral is not only the Adviser to the Minister of Marine on naval 
subjects but is also given the actual command of the fleet and his duty is 
laid down as being the reorganisation of our navy. 94 
Although Britain made an important attempt before WWI to change the situation in 
her favour, mainly through Limpus' mission and through naval machinery and arma- 
ment industries, this only had a limited effect on the final outcome. Traditionally, the 
land defence system was the crucial Ottoman military defence system. As this was in 
the hands of the German instructors and officers, the increase of general German 
influence was inevitable. The Ottoman dependence on German military instructors 
and armament industries was an important factor in the shaping of the German- 
Ottoman alliance in WWI. 
90 Admiral Limpus to Sir Lewis Mallet, the British Ambassador, Pera, Istanbul, NMAG, Limpus 
Papers, MS79/018, box. 23,10th September 1914, (Emphasis added). 
91 A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnoughts to Scapa Flow, vol. I, p. 302. 
92 U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918, p. 13. 
93 R. J. Kerner, "The Mission of Liman von Sanders, IP", Slavonic Review, (1927-1928), vol. 
VI, p. 343. 
94 See the leading article in the Sabah, 13th June, 1912. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The British naval mission to the Ottoman Empire was not merely aimed at maintain- 
ing the Ottoman Empire as the status quo for the sake of the balance of power in 
Europe. It was an essential part of the British imperial policies in the East. It was the 
prelude to the establishment of British naval monopoly and industrial expansion, and 
therefore constituted political and institutional environments as a part of large British 
naval technological systems in Turkey. British Pashas and their naval engineers, 
instructors and men provided the Ottoman navy with supervision and technical 
expertise, which helped to change the traditional Ottoman ignorance of the West and 
reluctance to adopt their technologies, especially among the Ottoman naval and mili- 
tary elites. In the Ottoman navy many indigenous officers and pashas, under the 
British instructors, developed interest and admiration for British ways. They became 
more friendly with the British in general. They later formed the core of the Ottoman- 
Turkish reformist elite. The British naval mission played an important role in estab- 
lishing an institutional and infrastructural reconstruction of the Ottoman naval 
defence, and resulted in eagerness for Western instruction and knowledge. This new 
outlook was reflected, for instance, in the Sabah: 
We wish to progress, and in order to do so we must profit by the experi- 
ence of the more advanced nations: and until we have reached their level 
we should not hesitate to ask for and accept the advice of the foreigners. 95 
However, the competition with Germany brought new dimensions to the nature of the 
British naval mission. From the end of the nineteenth century to WWI the main 
95 Ibid. 
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objective of the British involvement in the Ottoman naval affairs was to prevent Ger- 
man naval and military expansion. To ensure its position in the Ottoman navy, Britain 
went further than just providing supervision, technical instruction and training, but 
moved to control the whole navy, its arsenals and dockyards. 
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Chapter Six 
NAVAL SHIPBUILDING and ARMAMENT TECHNOLOGIES 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will examine the introduction of British naval shipping and arma- 
ment technologies to the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century through the 
British shipbuilding and armament companies. To increase the defensive power of its 
navy and army, the Ottoman Empire steadily imported naval ships and arms from 
Western Europe from the early nineteenth century. Britain, the biggest naval power at 
the time, was the main trading partner. In the previous chapter, I have shown that 
British naval enterprise to the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by a naval mission 
of officers, often appointed by the British Admiralty, and experts advising the 
Ottoman government on how to restructure the navy along Western lines. 
I will argue that British shipbuilders and gun makers, who provided modern ships 
and guns and technical expertise on how to operate and repair them, were important 
agents for the transfer and building of an infrastructure for contemporary European 
military technologies in the Ottoman Empire. I will also argue that this process was 
shaped by the social and economic conditions of the Ottoman Empire within the 
wider context of the nineteenth century European political and military structures. 
The flow of British naval and military machinery was checked by the Ottoman eco- 
nomic difficulties, and the British and other foreign firms gained a great degree of 
financial control. 
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6.2 European Shipbuilding in the Nineteenth Century 
Ottoman shipbuilding was originally military oriented. Merchant shipbuilding was 
never given equal attention as in Europe, mainly due to the lack of an indigenous 
merchant class. Ottoman shipbuilders always included European naval artisans and 
experts, most of whom were renegades. 1 The Ottoman Empire had built and retained 
a strong fleet, which had brought her numerous military victories at sea, especially in 
the Mediterranean, until the late eighteenth century. The Turkish navy at one time 
had been the terror of the Mediterranean. However, by the early nineteenth century, 
Ottoman shipbuilding and naval power were in drastic decline in comparison to 
European shipbuilding. The Ottomans were no longer able to follow the technical 
improvements made in shipbuilding, particularly in the nineteenth century, when 
shipbuilding in Europe became relatively more sophisticated and involved a complex 
organisation and machinery. 
In particular, two major technological innovations in engineering and metallurgical 
sectors transformed European shipping industries and enterprises. First was the appli- 
cation of steam technology to shipping, with the development of the marine engine 
and its complementary boilers. This became effective after the early nineteenth cen- 
tury. The second was the introduction of iron in shipbuilding, particularly after the 
mid-nineteenth century, and steel in the late nineteenth century. Thus, the wooden 
ships were gradually replaced by iron ones, which were in return replaced with steel, 
1 The Ottomans had been able to keep up with European shipbuilding for centuries. See 
Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1982, pp. 
223-227. 
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principally after the 1880's. These changes resulted in a dramatic increase in vessels' 
size and power, which made shipping relatively more efficient. As a result, ocean- 
going transportation became a practical and economical system. 
Britain, as the first industrial nation, led the world in this transformation by develop- 
ing new technologies for pig and wrought iron and steel. New production of iron and 
steel was the basis of new shipping enterprise. 2 By the 1860s Britain was becoming 
"the workshop of the world" both as the shipowning and shipbuilding center, and 
monopolised world shipbuilding. 3 British shipbuilding technology was transferred to 
Europe, the USA, and Japan and other non-Western countries throughout the nine- 
teenth and early twentieth centuries, primarily through the movement of shipbuilding 
engineers and importation of ships and marine machinery. Europeans were quick to 
adopt the new steam and iron and, later, steel technologies to naval shipbuilding and 
machinery. As a result, the whole of naval warfare began to change. Their introduc- 
tion had a "revolutionary" effect on warship building and design .4 The power and 
efficiency of naval warfare increased dramatically. European technological 
improvements in naval shipbuilding paralleled its technological innovation in the 
production of more effective armaments. Civilian engineers and entrepreneurs, such 
as William Armstrong, Joseph Whitworth and Alfred Vickers in Britain and Alfred 
Krupp in Germany established large firms, which became centers of major 
2 C. K. Hyde, "Iron and Steel Technologies Moving Between Europe and the United States, be- 
fore 1914", in D. J. Jeremy (ed. ), International Technology Transfer: Europe, Japan and the USA, 
1700-1914, Edward Elgar, 1991, pp. 51-73. 
3 S. Pollard & P. Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 1870-1914, Harvard University, 
1979, pp. 1,11,14,37; C. W. Smith, "Britain's Shipbuilders: 1840-1914", The Transport History, 
vol. 11/3,1980, pp. 259-272; A. M. Robb, "Shipbuilding", in Singer, vol. 5., pp. 350-390. 
4 For a brief discussion on the influence of steam and iron technologies on warship design, see 
A. W. H. Pearsall, "Ports and Shipping" in Ian McNeil (ed. ) An Encyclopaedia of the History of 
Science, London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 532-38. 
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innovation in military and naval technologies. These private companies initially pro- 
vided vessels and arms to their governments, but soon after their establishment they 
expanded their trade to other countries and overseas, for which they often competed. 
The Ottoman Empire, though a declining power, was one of the major overseas mar- 
kets to be exploited. 
The Ottomans were very far from introducing new European shipping technologies 
to their shipbuilding enterprises in the same period, not only because of the financial 
difficulties, but most importantly because they lacked the European industrial culture. 
They did not have technology and infrastructure for the production of iron and steel. 
As a result they could not adopt new iron and steel technologies into their shipping 
industry. Ottoman seapower, particularly after the battle of Navarino in the early 
nineteenth century, when most of the Ottoman fleet was destroyed by the European 
alliance, and later, the Egyptian breakaway with a large portion of the remaining fleet 
and Ottoman naval engineers in the late 1830s, had been diminished dramatically. 
The Ottoman shipyards, lacking contemporary European shipping technologies, were 
unable to build naval vessels and machinery for an effective coastal defence against a 
European or Russian naval assault. Therefore, the Ottoman government began to 
order marine machinery from Britain and France before the mid nineteenth century. 
As early as the mid-1830s there were some steamers, mostly purchased from Britain, 
in the service of the Sultan, which were initially commanded by British captains and 
engineers. 5 
s The Ottoman-Turkish Naval Archives (TNA), Muhasebe, 93173,27th March, 1838; TNA, 
Muhasebe, 93175,27th March, 1838. 
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Robert Napier, the leading Scottish marine engine builder in Glasgow, was one of the 
early British engineer-entrepreneurs to build marine steam engines for the Ottoman 
Empire. According to the known records, in 1837 he supplied the Ottoman govern- 
ment with three sets of steam engines of 300 N. H. P. 6 Another four sets of steam 
engines of the same kind were built and delivered in 1845.7 They were some of the 
earliest such engines imported by the Ottoman government from Britain. How those 
contracts and orders were made is not fully known. It is very likely that this contact 
was made through the British government and officers of the British naval mission to 
the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government had put itself in the hands of the 
British government for its naval vessels and arms importation. Stuart Rendel, Arm- 
strongs' powerful overseas agent in the 1860's, wrote that "Turkey had placed herself 
much in the hands of the British government in respect of the building of an ironclad 
fleet in England". 8 As the British Admiralty was the principal buyer of Napiers' 
machinery, the Ottoman authorities would order similar machinery from Napiers. 
Even before the Crimean War some modest attempts were made to increase the effi- 
ciency of naval power, for instance, by adapting steam engines to the existing 
wooden naval vessels. Apart from its importance for the new naval power in battles, 
the application of steam engines to shipping made the transportation of military hard- 
ware and soldiers overseas much quicker, safer and more effective. Captain Sir Adol- 
phus Slade, while a British naval adviser to the Ottoman navy, reported in 1859 in 
Constantinople that: 
6 James Napier, Life of Robert Napier of West Shandon, Edinburgh and London: William 
Blackwood & Sons, 1904, p. 259. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Stuart Rendel, Personal Papers of Lord Rendel, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1931, p. 279. 
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In the spring of 1858 a Turkish screw line battleship conveyed in one 
voyage, from Constantinople to an Adriatic port, six days' steaming, 2400 
soldiers, with their arms, accoutrements, and tents, and ten days' provi- 
sions to land with; and in the spring of 1859 a Turkish screw frigate con- 
veyed in one voyage from Tripoli to a port in the Archipelago 2200 
soldiers. 9 
By the end of the Crimean War, the whole Ottoman fleet had been reduced to a rela- 
tively small one for an empire with a very long coastal lane. The Ottoman Empire 
had ceased to maintain a first class navy. In particular, the complete destruction of a 
large Turkish squadron at Sinope on the Black Sea in 1853 by Russia was a major 
blow to Ottoman naval power. To regain its naval power and increase the efficiency 
of its coastal defence, the post-Crimean war Ottoman naval authorities set out to 
reconstruct their navy on European models and machinery. Ottoman officials had 
noticed the effectiveness of British and French naval and military machinery. Further- 
more, the Ottoman military alliance with Britain and France stimulated closer rela- 
tions, and furthered political, military and economic contacts with them. As a result, 
British and French shipping and armament companies used the advantages of being 
allies to exploit the Ottoman markets. The Ottoman government employed an impor- 
tant number of Western military experts, such as gunners and arsenal engineers for 
establishing arsenal and artillery of a European kind. Its military industries, however, 
were not able to meet the need of the whole army and navy, and it had to import most 
arms and the latest military equipment. From the mid-1850s onwards, Europeans 
began to build iron naval ships, to which the Crimean War gave a considerable impe- 
tus. France and England in particular acquired more iron naval vessels to replace the 
9 Sir Adolphus Slade, Maritime States and Military Navies, London: James Ridgway, 1859, p. 
53 
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wooden ones. European shipbuilders gradually ceased to build wooden ships. After 
the war, the Ottoman Sultan and government initiated a programme to rebuild and 
strengthen its navy by ironclad warships and vessels, mainly from Britain and 
France. During the reign of Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-76), who was keen on acquiring 
European military and naval hardware, the navy was developed into one of the largest 
in Europe. 10 
6.3 The Ottoman Ironclad Programme 
Robert Napier's connection with the Ottoman government continued after the 
Crimean War. In 1856 Napier provided three steamers of 650 N. H. P, named Gaywan 
Bahi, Fethia, and Peiki Zafir, and another one of the same kind in 1857, named 
Shadia. 11 Napier & Sons' most important business with the Ottoman government 
was yet to come. In the 1860s the Ottoman government began a programme of recon- 
struction of its navy by ironclads, ocean-going medium size ships, built in Britain by 
Robert Napier & Sons Co. in Glasgow and the Thames Iron Works in London, and in 
France by La Seyne. 
The new ironclad programme of the 1860s with Napier & Sons Co. and the Thames 
Shipbuilding Co. for the reconstruction of the Ottoman navy formed the largest naval 
order from Britain. Robert Napier was by then one of the most prominent 
10 Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modem History, London & New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 
1993, p. 60. 
11 James Napier, Life of Robert Napier, p. 269-61. Not much documentation to the details and 
contracts of these transactions between Napiers and the Ottoman government exists. 
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shipbuilders on the River Clyde in Glasgow, which is often described as "the Ship- 
yard of the Empire" in the post 1870s British shipbuilding. 12 
Napier had designed and built steam engines for merchant and naval ships since the 
1830s. The British Admiralty was the principal buyer of naval engines, and later 
other nations, such as the Ottoman Empire and Russia became major customers. In 
the early 1840s Napier began to build iron steamers, and was commissioned to build 
the British Navy's paddle-driven iron steamers, an important contract which brought 
him fame and prestige. 13 By the late 1850s, Napiers were ready to build large iron 
and armoured war vessels. With the Black Prince, one of the earliest ocean-going, 
armoured fighting ships, for the British government in 1861, Napiers began to receive 
orders for similar iron fighting ships from the foreign governments, such as Denmark 
and the Ottoman Empire. 14 The Ottoman government had already purchased many 
engines and other machinery for their naval ships. 
Napier's earliest contact with the Ottoman government most probably came through 
British government and naval advisers. The Ottoman government was then striving to 
own the same quality war machinery as the British navy, and Napier & Sons Co. was 
a supplier of the British naval war machinery. The Ottoman government's order for 
three large iron-hulled broadside ironclads came in 1862, and in 1863 all three ships 
were laid down on the Clyde. 15 They were all broadside ironclads, each with 
12 See, for instance, C. W. Smith & M. N. Wise, Energy and Empire: A Biographical Study of 
Lord Kelvin, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989, p. 727. 
13 Hugh B. Peebles, Warshipbuilding on the Clyde: Naval Orders and the Prosperity of the 
Clyde Shipbuilding Industry, 1889-1939, Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1987, p. 11. 
14 J. Napier, Life of Napier, p. 215. 
15 See "Ingiltere'de insa edilmekte olan firkateynler", TNA, Sura-i Bahri Bolumu, 36A/52A, 1 
Mart 1862; "Donanmanin takviyesi icin Ingiltere'ye siparis edilen sac gemiler", TNA, Sura-i Bahri 
Bolumu, 43/63A, 10th November 1863. 
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dimensions of 293 x 58 feet, 6400 tons hull, 3735 H. P engine and 900 N. H. S, and 
named the Osman Ghazy, Abdulaziz (the name of the sultan of the time) and 
Orkhan. 16 The Osman Ghazy was built in the same style as the Hector, constructed 
by Napier for the British navy and was able to carry 600 men on board. 17 The three 
ironclad ships were built under the supervision of George Tucker, official inspector, 
who was employed by the Ottoman government for the purpose. 18 Referring to the 
orders by the Ottoman government, the North British Daily Mail wrote that: 
No better proof could be cited of the high estimation in which our Clyde 
shipbuilders are held by foreign governments than the fact one foreign 
power should have employed one of our shipbuilding firms to construct so 
many war vessels for it in little more than two years. 19 
Around the same time another ironclad of the same type, the Mahmudieh, was laid 
down in London by the Thames Iron Works Co. for the Ottoman government. All 
four were launched and completed between 1864-66.20 They were rigged as three- 
masted barques and had a single telescopic funnel. The Mahmudieh was intended to 
"surpass in offensive and defensive power, as well as in speed, all other ironclad 
ships". 21 It embodied a similar structure to the British ironclad squadron. At the 
request of the Sultan, it was designed by the Chief Constructor of the the British 
navy, Sir Edward James Reed (1830-1906). Sir Edward James Reed was responsible 
16 Glasgow University Archives, Napier Collection, DC90/4/25 1843-1925: "List of vessels 
built by Robert Napier, Robert Napier & Sons, Napier Shanks & Bell, Napier & Muter, and Napier 
& Miller"; J. Napier, Life of Napier, pp. 259-161; Peebles, Warship building, p. 195. 
17 The North British Daily Mail, 27th June, 1865. 
18 The Morning Herald, 29tn June, 1865; Glasgow Herald, 29th June, 1865; Morning Journal, 
29th June, 1865. 
19 The North British Daily Mail, 27th June, 1865. 
20 The Illustrated London News, (20th January, 1866), p. 54. 
21 The Times, 1st November, 1865, p. 9. 
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for designing many warships for Turkey, Japan, Germany, Chile and Brazil. Many 
Imperial Ottoman ships were designed by him. For these services he was awarded the 
Ottoman Order of the Medjidie. 22 
Rebuilding and strengthening the navy was an important priority of the Sultan, 
Abdulaziz II, and his government in the 1860s. Besides buying new armoured ves- 
sels, new machinery was bought from Britain and fitted to the existing Ottoman 
wooden naval ships. 23 Warships were provided with steam engines and additional 
steamboats, mostly purchased from Britain. The Ottoman Imperial Dockyard, too, 
began to produce some of the new machinery with the help of British naval 
engineers. 24 When the Sultan visited Paris and London in 1867, the Ottoman connec- 
tion with major British naval shipbuilders was already well established. The newly 
built ironclad steam frigate, the Osmanieh, by the Napier & Sons Co., was in atten- 
dance to his party to Western Europe25 
The Sultan's visit resulted in the enlargement of this naval trade, besides increasing 
more investments in railways and other works in the Ottoman Empire. The British 
and the French were in competition to impress the Sultan. The British particularly 
used the occasion to impress the Sultan about their naval power. For instance, Lord 
Lyons, the British ambassador at Constantinople urged the Foreign Office that: 
22 Sir E. J. Reed, Japan: Its History, Traditions, and Religions with the Narrative of a Visit in 
1879, London: John Murray, 1880,2 vols., vol. I, p. i. 
23 "Bes adet gemi icin Londra'ya siparis olunan makina", Naval Archives, MKT 61/11,9th 
June, 1864. 
24 "Harb gemilerine makinali sandal (steamboat) konmasi", Naval Archives, MKT 75/1,3,68, 
22nd July, 1868. 
25 Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley, 22nd May 1867, Constantinople, PRO, F078/2010, Visit of the 
Sultan and Viceroy of Egypt to Paris and London, 1867 (May-September). 
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The Ottoman iron-clad frigate AbdulAziz built at Glasgow by Napier 
& Sons. [From the Illustrated London News. ] 
We should confirm his impression that we are the first Naval Power and 
richest Power. If we can give him a great Naval Show, in a place where pri- 
vate vessels, steamers etc., would add to the effect of the display of the 
military navy, we should do much to convince him of our wealth as well as 
of our strength on the sea. 26 
Lord Lyons thought that the Sultan, having no knowledge of the languages of the 
countries he visited, could not be expected to gain some knowledge in depth from a 
month tour. However, "the effect on his mind of what he sees can hardly be otherwise 
than good". 27 Thus the British authorities arranged for the Sultan a naval review on a 
large scale at Portsmouth in mid-July, when the Sultan was expected in Britain 28 
The Sultan and his diplomatic party, and the Viceroy of Egypt watched this major 
British naval show at the Royal Clarence Yard in Portsmouth Dockyard. 29 
Following the visit of the Sultan, Turkey desired to order more naval and merchant 
ships from Britain and France. However, this was checked by its weakening financial 
state. Nevertheless, the Ottomans ordered more ships and ironclads. The Thames Iron 
Works and Shipbuilding Co. in 1868 built for Turkey the Fatih, a large ironclad of 
9800 tons, which was designed at Blackwall by Sir E. J. Reed. 30 However, it could 
not pay for it, so it was first offered to the British Admiralty, and then was sold to the 
Prussian Navy. 31 A year later three smaller ironclads, two being 2400 tons and the 
26 Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley, 4th June 1867, Constantinople, (confidential), PRO, 
F078/2010, Visit of the Sultan and Viceroy of Egypt to Paris and London, 1867 (May-September). 
27 Ibid. 
28 The Foreign Office to Lord Lyons, 12th June 1867, Constantinople, PRO, F07812010, Visit 
of the Sultan and Viceroy of Egypt to Paris and London, 1867 (May-September). 
29 See London Illustrated News, 27th July 1867, pp. 87-88, see also pp. 90-92 on the the em- 
barkation of the Sultan at Clarence-Yard, Portsmouth, for the naval review. 
30 A. G. Credland, Iron and Steel Shipbuilding on the Humber of Earles of Hull, (City of 
Kingston upon Hull Museums and Art Galleries Bulletin, No: 15,1982), p. 14. 
31 R. Chesneau & E. M. Kolesnik (eds. ), Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, 
London: Conway Maritime Press, 1979, p. 389. 
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other 2800 tons, were launched on the Thames by the Thames Iron Works Co. and 
Samudas & Sons respectively. All three ironclads were completed and delivered to 
the Ottoman navy in 1870.32 In the 1860s Napiers on the Clyde, the Thames Iron 
Works and Samudas & Sons were major British naval shipbuilders both for home and 
foreign navies. Some iron tugs and barges, particularly for the Euphrates, and some 
other iron vessels were also built by Earles Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd. 
for the Ottoman government from the late 1860s onwards. 33 British naval ship- 
builders also provided the Ottoman Navy with a large number of wooden sloops until 
about 1863, and afterwards, iron-hulled paddle dispatch vessels. Some Ottoman ship- 
yards, such as Istanbul, Izmit and Gemlik, were able to build wooden sloops. How- 
ever, almost all iron-hulled dispatch vessels came from Britain until the end of the 
century. 
Seeing the expansion of the British naval shipping trade to the Ottoman Empire, 
France was also making great efforts to win concessions from the Ottoman govern- 
ment for building iron ships. In the late 1860s the Ottoman government ordered an 
important number of ironclads from France, namely, from Chant. & Atl. de la Medit- 
eranee, La Seyne, and Chant. & Atl. de la Gironde, Bordeaux, the two major ship- 
builders. In 1868 they launched three central battery ironclads and two iron coast 
defence turret ships, respectively, for Turkey. 34 
32 They were named, respectively, Avni Illah, Muln-i Zafer and Fatih Bulend. See an unpub- 
lished list of "Battleships-Battlecruisers- Ironclads" by Captain Saim Selek at the Turkish Naval 
Archives Library in Istanbul. (Undated); see also R. Chesneau & E. M. Kolesnik (eds. ), Conway's 
All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, p. 390. 
33 A. G. Credland, Iron and Steel Shipbuilding on the Humber of Earles of Hull, (City of 
Kingston upon Hull Museums and Art Galleries Bulletin, No: 15,1982), p. 49. 
34 Conway's Fighting Ships, pp. 388-394; Also see, Captain Saim Selek, TNA Library, Istan- 
bul. 
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Embarkation of the Sultan Abdul Aziz at Clarence-Yard, Portsmouth, for 
the naval review, July 1867. [From the Illustrated London News. ] 
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One of the three central battery ironclads, the Assari Tewfik, was 4700 tons and was a 
reduced version of the French Trident. 35 The other two were small iron-hulled iron- 
clads, just more than 2000 tons. The two coast defence turret ships, being about 2550 
tons iron hulled, were originally ordered by Egypt, but were sold to Turkey. All of 
the ships of this first French order were completed and delivered to Turkey in late 
1869. 
In the 1870s the Ottoman government continued to modernise its naval ships. How- 
ever, this was again checked by the financial weakness of the Ottoman Empire. It 
ordered a number of larger ships from Britain, particularly from the Thames Iron 
Works Co., and Samudas & Sons in London, but it could not pay for all the ships that 
it had ordered. In the early 1870s, the Thames Iron Works laid down two large iron- 
hulled vessels for the Ottoman government, the Messudieh and Mahmudieh, (Mah- 
mudiye) and launched them in 1874 and 1875, respectively. They were again 
designed by Sir E. J. Reed. They had a ram bow, a raised forecastle and poop, two 
funnels and three masts, and were rigged as barques. Upon their completion, the 
Ottoman government could pay for only one of them, the Messudieh. The other, the 
Hamidieh (Hamidiye), after the new Sultan, Abdul Hamid, was completed but not 
delivered to the Ottoman navy. Perhaps due to the negative attitude of the new Sultan 
towards the navy, and also money problems, the Ottoman government could not ful- 
fill the requirements for the purchase of the vessel. In 1878 it was purchased by 
Britain and renamed Superb for the Royal Navy. 
35 Conway's Fighting Ships, pp. 388-394. 
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The Ottoman government had also ordered two armoured rams from the Samudas & 
Sons Co. in London. But they could not pay for them. They were again purchased by 
the British government for the Royal Navy. There are also some records that Robert 
Napier & Sons Co. projected several other war vessels in the 1870s for the Ottoman 
government. One of them is the specification for an armour-clad vessel of 3024 tons 
for the Ottoman government. 36 There are no records that this armour-clad frigate and 
others were ever built or at least delivered to the Ottoman government. 
At the time of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 the Ottoman fleet had been still a 
major force, as it had commanded the Black Sea. 
37 However, after the war, the 
Ottoman naval power began to diminish steadily. The new Sultan, Abdul Hamid, 
played a negative role in the improvement and Westernisation of the navy since his 
accession to power in 1876. He saw the navy as the centre of hostile and a potentially 
revolutionary power against his autocratic rule. He moved his imperial residency 
from the Dolmabahce Palace on the Bosphorus to the Yildiz Palace in the interior as 
he feared potential conspiracies and sudden attacks from his and foreign navies. Dur- 
ing his long reign just a few modern warships were built. Indeed, new warship build- 
ing practically ceased after the mid-1880s. 
38 Although the Sultan intended to 
increase the efficiency of all his armed forces, he compelled himself to emphasise the 
traditional Ottoman reliance on land power. 39 The Ottoman navy, therefore, fell into 
a state of relative decline. 
36 DC90/4/151874 Specification for an Armour-clad Vessel for the Turkish government, August 
1874, Napier Papers, Glasgow University Archives. 
37 A. J. Marder, British Naval Policy, London, Putnam & Company, 1940, p. 153. 
38 Ibid. 
39 S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977, vol. II, p. 245. 
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Most of the ships launched were never completed. However, this was not simply 
because of the Sultan's neglect of the navy alone, but largely due to the difficulties of 
establishing new shipbuilding technologies and the related problems. All these did 
not stop overseas suppliers but encouraged them. 
Nevertheless, the Ottoman government, besides buying completed ironclads from 
Britain, made ambitious attempts to build their own iron ships at home. Particularly, 
the Taskizak Shipyard in Istanbul became a centre for the Ottoman home shipbuild- 
ing on European models, with help from British and other Western experts and ship- 
builders. Such a move gained considerable impetus in the 1870s, as iron ships from 
Britain absorbed a large amount of money. In 1873 at the Taskizak Shipyard one of 
the first Ottoman built iron ships was launched. It was a central battery ironclad, and 
weighed 2800 tons. A relatively large central battery ironclad, the Hamidieh, was 
laid down in 1874, but was only completed 18 years later, in 1892. It was 6600 tons 
and modelled on the Messudieh, (Mesudiye), built by the Thames Iron Works. Sev- 
eral others were planned to be built but they were not completed. The Ottoman ship- 
yards at Istanbul and Izmit, on the other hand, were able to build wooden frigates and 
wooden sloops. Until about the 1880s they built several small and medium size 
wooden frigates and sloops on British models and designs. 
6.4 Ottoman Shipbuilding in the Late Nineteenth Century 
In the late nineteenth century Ottoman shipbuilding became more dependent on 
European shipbuilders and their technologies. Even with the help of European naval 
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engineers, the Ottoman shipyards were not able to construct any significant number 
of war vessels of European type. When Europeans were building steel war vessels 
particularly in the 1880s and onwards, Ottoman shipbuilding had not yet recovered 
from the difficulties of iron shipbuilding. The new steel technology and its applica- 
tion to shipping led to the subsequent changes in size, strength and power of naval 
vessels. In particular, the destructive power of warships was dramatically increased. 
To keep up with other naval powers, the Ottoman government, too, initiated a pro- 
gramme to own steel war vessels and guns. 
In the early 1890s the Ottoman shipyards at Istanbul and Izmit were keen to build 
steel-hulled cruisers and sloops, as well as torpedo boats. They had already com- 
pleted some composite-hulled third class cruisers. The two shipyards laid down a 
number of steel-hulled cruisers. But they were never completed. By 1904 they were 
still in frame and partly plated, and were finally abandoned. Mark Kerr, who visited 
Constantinople in 1904 to inspect and report on the Ottoman fleet, dockyards and 
defences, observed that: 
Along the north bank of the Golden Horn lies a line of ships -wooden and 
composite, ironclads and torpedo-boats- all in various stages of decay. 
40 
Apart from technical skills and infrastructure, the Ottoman dockyards suffered from 
inefficient organisation and administration problems. Kerr's report acknowledged the 
number of workmen in the Imperial Dockyards as 1200, but less than half of them 
did any work. 41 The situation in the Ismid (Izmit) Dockyard was even worse. It was 
40 Mark Kerr, Land, Sea, and Air; Reminiscences of Mark Kerr, London, Longmans, Green & 
Co. Ltd, 1927, p. 123. 
41 Ibid. 
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described as a "wilderness" by Kerr: 
Ismid (Izmit) Dockyard in 1904 is a wilderness. The ribs and trucks of two 
partially built cruisers appear to be lying in a neglected field allowed to 
decay. 42 
The Imperial Shipyards in Istanbul, nevertheless, were able to lay down and complete 
a limited number of steel-hulled sloops, torpedo gunboats and destroyers. During the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 Russian torpedo boats constantly attacked the 
Ottoman iron clads and other vessels. Russian torpedo boats were armed with Pole 
and Harwey, as well as with the new type of the Whitehead torpedoes then 
invented 43 The torpedoes caused anxiety and a major threat for the Ottoman naval 
defence. The Ottoman naval authorities were worried about unexpected torpedo 
attacks 44 Thereafter, torpedoes ' and destroyers became an important part of the 
Ottoman naval defence programme. A further Russian torpedo threat seemed very 
likely to the Ottomans. The capital city, Istanbul, could easily become a target for 
Russian invasion by sea. In the late 1880's the Ottoman government began to set up 
its torpedo fleet especially for the defence of Istanbul. The earliest contract for such a 
programme was made with Le Seyne in 1883. At the time France was not as popular 
a naval shipbuilding center as Britain. The concession was won by France because it 
had substantially subsidised the contract 45 In 1886 Le Seyne completed six small 
42 Ibid., p. 124 
43 Hobart Pasha, who was the British naval adviser to the Ottoman navy at the time, wrote an 
interesting account of Russian torpedo assault on the Ottoman vessels in the Black Sea. See Ho- 
bart Pasha (Hon. Augustus Charles Hobart), The Torpedo Scare: Experiences During the Turco- 
Russian War, Reprinted from: Blackwood's Magazine, with additional matter, Edinburgh & Lon- 
don, W. Blackwood & Sons, 1885. 
44 Ibid. 
45 A. Guleryuz & B. Langensrepen, Die Osmanische Marine/The Ottoman Navy, 1839-1923, 
Hamburg: Kaumpmeier Druck & Verlag, 1988, pp. 11-12. 
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torpedo boats for the Ottoman Navy. These torpedo boats were followed by German 
made ones. By the end of the 1880s the German military impact on the Ottoman 
Empire's internal and external affairs was becoming tangible. The exportation of 
German goods and expertise to Turkey increased accordingly. Germany, on the other 
hand, was trying to reach British industrial and naval arts standards. However, it fur- 
ther began to challenge the British worldwide monopoly, particularly in shipping, 
engineering and armament industries. 
By the late nineteenth century Germany's industrial goods and expertise were 
becoming as popular as the British ones in international markets. In late 1887, the 
Ottoman government ordered a large number of torpedo boats from the Germenia 
shipyard (Schiffts & Maschinenbau Germenia, AG, Kiel), and subsequently, from the 
Schichau shipyard (Friedric Schichau AG, Elbing). The two firms supplied the 
Ottoman Navy with a substantial number of torpedo boats, which helped the 
Ottoman navy to form a powerful torpedo boat fleet for a coastal defence 46 In the 
early twentieth century the other two important supplier companies for torpedo boats 
and destroyers were the Italian Ansaldo in Genoa, and the French Atl. & Contr. de 
Loire in Canet. Ansaldo, originally a subsidiary of Armstrong & Co., had a more 
important connection with the Ottoman navy than just building some torpedo boats. 
Since the 1880s, the modernisation and repair of most Ottoman naval ships was car- 
ried out by Ansaldo. When visiting Istanbul in 1904 as an engineer of the Arm- 
strong's Elswick Works, D'Eyncourt stated that "Ansaldo seems to be getting on 
pretty well with their [Ottoman] ships and the Turks under them" 47 
46 Ibid., p. 21. 
47 D'Eyncourt to Armstrong Whitworth Co., NMAG, DEY/88,16th May 1904. 
206 
Germany's entry into the Ottoman naval shipping and armament markets did not stop 
the flow of British naval and armament goods, though there was a sharp decrease in 
the number of naval vessels and their armaments bought by the Ottoman government, 
especially in the 1890s. This was not solely due to the expansion of Germany to the 
Ottoman markets, but was mostly due to the political climate of the period, the lack 
of Ottoman finance and the Sultan and his officials' neglect of naval power. However, 
in the early 1900s there was a drastic increase in Ottoman orders for naval ships and 
armament to British companies, mainly Armstrong-Whitworth and Vickers. This was 
even extended to the U. S. shipbuilding companies. In 1901 a protected cruiser of 
3330 tons, Mecidiye, was laid down by the Cramp company in America, and it was 
completed in three years. The following year, a protected cruiser of 3830 tons, 
Hamidiye, was laid down by Armstrongs and completed 1904. It closely resembled 
the Cramp built Mecidiye. This was followed by other important orders for larger 
battleships. Before the First World War, the Ottoman government, particularly when 
the Young Turks took power in 1908, began an ambitious programme to form a mod- 
ern battleship fleet. Naval shipbuilders did not only provide the Ottoman government 
with naval vessels and machinery, but also naval arms and guns for the vessels. Naval 
armament formed a vital part of the British-Ottoman naval link. Armstrongs were the 
largest suppliers of the Ottoman naval guns since shortly after the Crimean War. 
Most Ottoman warships were armoured by Armstrongs at their Elswick Naval Yard, 
which became a centre for the Ottoman naval engineering and armament for the 
navy. In the next section I will look at Armstrongs' naval armament trade to the 
Ottoman Empire. 
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6.5 Armstrong Guns 
W. G. Armstrong and J. Whitworth's firms became the two most prominent names in 
the British armament industry after the Crimean War. Armstrong maintained very 
close contact with official patronage. He was admitted to Woolwich and there he 
examined the latest improvements in military machinery. 
48 Starting during the war, 
Armstrong designed new long range guns, which were more destructive and bigger in 
size 49 These guns were also applied to the naval ships. After establishing his busi- 
ness at home, his firm expanded its trade abroad, and soon began to receive foreign 
orders for guns and military machinery . 
In the 1860s Armstrongs, now a rapidly expanding company, were anxious to estab- 
lish permanent connections with foreign governments, such as the Ottoman Empire, 
Russia and Egypt. Armstrong himself met many representatives from foreign coun- 
tries, and sent off his agents to deal with the foreign governments personally and 
directly on the armament trade. These agents won Armstrongs big overseas deals. 
One of the earliest agents was Stuart Rendel, who later became one of the company's 
leading men. 50 Between 1864 and 1876, Rendel travelled to many foreign countries, 
including Turkey, Egypt and Russia, for the purpose of making contacts for arm 
trades. He played a key role in winning overseas orders for the Armstrongs Elswick 
Works. 51 Turkey was one of the overseas countries to which Rendel travelled in the 
48 S. Pollard & P. Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, p. 269. 
49 A. R. Fairbairn, "Elswick: Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Company Limited", (unpub- 
lished), Vickers Archives (VA), Cambridge, file: 593. 
50 See VA, Rendel Papers, 546, Cambridge. 
51 Kennet Warren, Armstrongs of Elswick: Growth in Engineering and Armaments to Merger 
with Vickers, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 19. 
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mid-1860s, and where he was able to get important orders for guns. 52 This was the 
beginning of a long term connection with the Ottoman Empire, which became a 
major trade partner in armament with Armstrongs until World War I. The Ottoman 
government decided to have the guns made upon the British government pattern at 
Armstrong's Elswick works. 53 
In the early years, Stuart Rendel and Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in 
London, prepared most contracts for Armstrongs armament trade to Turkey. 54 At the 
same time there were large orders for guns and armament from Egypt, now an inde- 
pendent Ottoman province with its own army and navy. Most Egyptian orders were 
made through the mediation of Efflatun Bey, representing the Egyptian government 
in London. 55 Rendel resided in London to deal with foreign orders through their 
embassies there. The biggest deal with the Ottoman government in the 1860s was 
arming the vessels of the new Ottoman ironclad programme. Rendel referred to "the 
very numerous interviews between Musurus Pasha and [himself] during the several 
years occupied by the building and arming of the vessels". 56 The Ottoman ambas- 
sador and Rendel were offered five percent of every order by the Ottoman govern- 
ment as commission. 57 Besides meeting with Armstrongs' agents in London, the 
Ottoman ambassador and military authorities, sometimes including an Ottoman 
52 Stuart Rendel, Personal Papers of Lord Rendel, p. 280. 
53 Ibid., p. 279. 
54 Ibid., p. 279. 
55 In Armstrong's correspondence, early Ottoman and Egyptian orders are mostly dealt with to- 
gether. See for example, W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 15th January, 1866, Rendel Papers, 
31/132, Newcastle; Efflatun Bey to W. G. Armstrong, 3rd November, 1865,31/362; W. G. Arm- 
strong to S. Rendel, 24th November, 1865, Rendel Papers, 31/390, Newcastle. 
56 Ibid. 
57 W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 5th October, 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/348, Newcastle. 
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admiral, often personally visited W. G. Armstrong and Elswick Works in Newcastle 
from the early 1860s for guns and armament deals. 58 
Armstrong's military trade with the Ottoman Empire began in the form of supplying 
armament and guns to the naval vessels. The ironclad frigates bought from Napier & 
Sons and Thames Iron Works & Shipbuilding Co. in the early 1860s were all 
equipped with the Armstrong guns and military hardware. 59 Armstrong guns almost 
become integral parts for these ironclad vessels. The guns of all the frigates were 
provided and fitted by Armstrongs. The Osman Ghazy, Sultan Mahmud, Abdulaziz, 
and Ethem Pasha, a wooden battleship, were equipped with Armstrong guns and 
machinery by early 1866.60 Soon another frigate, Orkhan, was ready for its guns 
aboard by Armstrongs. 61 Thus, as early as 1867, Rendel observed that: 
Turkey ... has adopted our guns so 
far as she can pay for them. We have 
supplied very heavy armaments to four ironclad frigates and a few guns for 
wooden ships. 62 
Indeed, from this date onwards almost all major Ottoman naval ships, whether they 
were bought from Britain or built at home, were equipped with Armstrong 
armament. 63 Furthermore, this armament trade did not only consist of supplying 
armament to the naval ships. It was also expanded to the artillery for the army and 
navy. From the mid 1860s, the Ottomans ordered large numbers of guns and artillery 
58 W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 7th September, 1864, Rendel Papers, 31/50, Newcastle. 
59 W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 18th October, 1864, Rendel Papers, 31/56, Newcastle. 
60 "Abdulaziz zirhli firkateyni icin yirmi adet Armstrong topu", TNA, Sura-i Bahri Bolumu, 
65/80,19th December 1865. 
61 W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 28th May, 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/148, Newcastle. 
62 Stuart Rendel to John Hay, VA, Rendel Papers, 546,3rd June 1867. 
63 "Zirhli gemiler icin Armstrong'dan getirelecek muhimat ve top edevati", TNA, Mektubi, 
94/5,2nd June 1870. 
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and military machinery from Armstrong & Co. M In early 1866, the Ottoman govern- 
ment signed an important contract with Armstrongs for guns and armaments for the 
navy and army. 65 British and Ottoman proof officers were appointed to certify that 
guns were made in accordance with the contract. 
The Ottomans were also trying to improve their guns and to build Armstrong guns at 
home. For this purpose, naval officers were sent off to England to master Armstrong 
guns. In 1869 a group of six naval colonels left for London to receive technical train- 
ing for the newly invented gun and its usage in the navy. 66 They were trained in the 
naval dockyards and in the armoured vessels in Britain. Furthermore, some British 
gunnery experts were employed as the instructors to teach the new guns to the 
Ottoman naval students. 67 The Ottoman authorities also held meetings with Arm- 
strong and the firm for employment of Elswick engineers in the service of the 
Ottoman Empire, and also about the possibilities of the establishment of a "gun fac- 
tory" in Turkey where Armstrong guns could be produced. 68 However, Armstrongs 
were reluctant to establish a factory in Turkey for this purpose. At the time Arm- 
strongs were very busy with European orders for guns. They, instead, promised the 
trial of guns would be made in Istanbul. 69 
64 "Armstrong Sirketine siparis edilen kulliyatli cephane", TNA, Mektubi, 82/72,17th July 
1870; Also see "Tersane-i Amire'de imal ve ayrica Ingiltere'ye siparis edilen cephane", TNA, Mek- 
tubi, 141/24,20th November 1871. 
65 W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 23th January, 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/133; see also, "Turkish 
Contract" in W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 14th January, 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/132. 
66 "Armstrong toplari uzerine egitim gorecek alti deniz subayinin Ingiltere'ye gonderilmesi", 
TNA, MKT-87/34,16th August 1869. 
67 "Bahriye mektebi ogrencilerine topculuk egitimi icin Ingiliz yabanci uzman celbi", TNA, 
MKT-90/69,12th September 1869. 
68 "Yeni icat Armstrong toplarini ogrenmek uzere Ingiltere'ye subay gonderilmesi", 13th Au- 
gust, 18.., TNA, MKT-563/1; See also, W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 18th October, 1864, Rendel 
Papers, 31/56, Newcastle. 
69 Ibid. 
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Finance was the most important issue for the Ottomans' armament deals. Payments 
were often delayed. In early 1866, W. G. Armstrong stated that "the Turks are notori- 
ously slow payers" 70 He complained to the Ottoman Embassy personally for the 
large sum of money that was overdue in connection with armament works, of which 
he claimed that only left a small profit. 71 By then the account of the Elswick Works 
for the armament of four Ottoman frigates, Osman Ghazy, Sultan Mahmud, Abdu- 
laziz, Ethem Pasha, had amounted to more than ten million pounds 72 The payments 
for some naval frigates were long overdue. Being aware of the Ottoman financial 
state, Armstrongs were most sensitive about the payments by the Ottoman govern- 
ment for arms 73 The Armstrongs increased their military machinery deals with the 
Ottomans, although Ottoman finance was in a chronic condition. They often offered 
credits, loans and a good payment system. For instance, in 1866 they made available 
for the Ottoman government two million pounds as a loan for arms. 74 Armstrongs 
even had earlier settled an account of Napier & Sons with the Ottoman 
government. 75 Armstrongs used the weak Ottoman financial state for their advan- 
tage. They, as a result, established firm connections with the Ottomans for arma- 
ment. The Ottoman Tophane Arsenal, the biggest Ottoman gun-maker, was unable to 
produce more sophisticated European guns. Though for some time it made some 
7 W. G. Armstrong to Rendel, 26th January, 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/134-135. 
71 W. G. Armstrong to Turkish Embassy, 28th February, 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/463. 
72 Elswick Works to S. Rendel, 7th February, 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/437. 
73 A large number of correspondence over the Ottoman orders between W. G. Armstrong and 
S. Rendel deal with financial matters. See, for instance, W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 7th Febru- 
ary, 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/438; W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 10th June, 1866, Rendel Papers, 
31/154; W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 10th July, 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/163. 
74 W. G. Armstrong to S. Rendel, 31st July 1866, Rendel Papers, 31/163. 
75 Ottoman Consulate General to W. G. Armstrong Co., 11th December, 1865, Rendel Papers, 
31/402. 
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2-barrel 1-inch Nordenfelts, their manufacture ceased by 1890.76 
The Ottomans were heavily dependent on European gun-makers. Armstrongs were 
the largest supplier. The firm had almost monopolised the military machinery sup- 
plies for Ottoman naval ships and large guns. It was only by the late 1870s that Arm- 
strongs saw Krupp, a fast expanding German industrial firm, as a rival in the Ottoman 
markets?? However, as early as the early 1870s, Krupp guns were becoming popular 
with many European and non-European governments, like China, Egypt and Japan 78 
When in 1873 the Ottoman government decided to order large amounts of armaments 
for the coastal defences, particularly the coast guns and torpedoes, Krupps formed a 
real treat to Armstrongs. Seeing the danger for a market which they had monopolised 
since the Crimean War, Armstrongs sent Noble to Constantinople to compete against 
Krupps for armaments orders. 79 There he held numerous meetings with the Ottoman 
Commission for armament orders, the Minister of Marine and many other high rank 
Ottoman officials and tried to persuade them in favour of Armstrongs. 
The commission for Ottoman armament consisted of nine officers. It included a few, 
such as Husnu Bey, trained in Germany. British agents were wary of these German 
oriented officers that they might influence the decision-making in favour of 
Germany. 80 Noble also consulted the British Consulate in Constantinople and Hobart 
Pasha, the Naval Adviser to the Ottoman navy at the time, and requested their help. 81 
76 The Admiralty, Turkey, Greece and Roumania War Vessels and Torpedo boats, Intelligence 
Department, No: 278, London, 1891, p. 8. 
77 A. Noble to Stuart Rendel, VA, Rendel Papers, 546,9th December 1877, Cambridge. 
78 On his visit to Japan in 1879 as a guest of the Japanese Minister of Marine, Sir E. J. Reed, 
famous British naval architect, reported that the latest European type Japanese naval ships were 
armed with Krupp guns of "the best pattern". See Sir E. J. Reed, Japan vol. I, p. 322. 
79 Noble to Armstrong, 22nd June, 1873, Constantinople, Rendel Papers, 3112114, Newcastle. 
80 Ibid. 
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Armstrongs were ready to offer between 7.5% and 4.5% commission to those officers 
and agents for any armament orders by the Ottoman government. Armstrongs' 
authorities, Rendel, Noble and Armstrong, had been discussing the matter for some 
time. 82 In Constantinople Noble proposed to give them a commission not exceeding 
5%, 83 
The Commission delayed to announce the winning firm as they were trying to get a 
better deal, seeing the competition between the two firms as an opportunity. Noble 
wrote to Armstrongs that "they [the Commission] have decided to put us in competi- 
Lion with Krupps and they begged us to give our prices for steel guns we make". 84 
Noble also appointed a prestigious Ottoman-Christian court in Istanbul as agents for 
the financial arrangements connected with the Ottoman coastal defence programme if 
any contract should be signed with the Imperial Ottoman government. 85 He was also 
put in charge of secretly obtaining the prices of Krupp for the coastal guns and 
machinery. 86 In return, he was allowed 4.5% commission. In Constantinople, Noble 
spent months of intensive consultations and negotiations, as he extended his efforts to 
persuade other Ottoman ministers. He was becoming anxious as he observed the 
gradually increasing "Prussian influence on the Ottoman Sultan and the Egyptian 
Viceroy". 87 In his interviews with the Commission and the British Consulate, Noble 
81 Noble to Armstrongs, 29th-30th June, 1873, Rendel Papers, 31/2116, Newcastle. 
82 Noble to Rendel, 12th June, 1872, Rendel Papers, 31/1057, Newcastle; Noble to Rendel, 
24th June, 1872, Rendel Papers, 31/2063, Newcastle; Noble to Armstrong, 22nd June, 1873, Con- 
stantinople, Rendel Papers, 3112114, Newcastle. 
83 Noble to Armstrongs, 29th-30th June, 1873, Rendel Papers, 31/2116, Newcastle. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Noble to Zorando Brothers, 2nd July, 1873, Rendel Papers, 3112120, Newcastle. 
86 Noble to Armstrong, 27-30th July, 1873, Constantinople, Rendel Papers, 3112128, Newcas- 
tle. 
87 Noble to Armstrong, 6th July, 1873, Rendel Papers, 31/2122, Newcastle. 
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emphasised that a good system of stationary torpedoes was essential for the defence 
of the Bosphorus. 88 He thought that his plans for the defence of Constantinople 
would attract the attentions of the Commission and the government. 
Noble's mission in Constantinople was not only involved with competing for a good 
share of armament as an Armstrongs' agent, but was also involved with providing the 
Ottoman navy some technical help, particularly with armament of the ironclad fleet. 
He was invited and instructed by the Ottoman Minister of Marine to check and report 
on the conditions and armament requirements of the Ottoman war vessels. 89 Noble 
checked all major Ottoman warships in Constantinople and reported on their arma- 
ment and guns. For most of the vessels he recommended 9" guns from Armstrongs. 90 
The Ottoman Ministry of Marine approved Noble's report on the Ottoman fleet and 
recommendations for its improvement and efficiency. 91 In addition, they wanted to 
enter an immediate arrangement and contract with Armstrongs for the Danube gun- 
boats and their large sum of guns. However, the Ottoman Council of Ministers and 
the Commission for the Armament were determined to order the coast defence guns 
exclusively from Krupp 92 In early August, 1873, Noble reported to Armstrong that 
"the whole order for coast guns is placed with Krupp's hands" 93 But he assured 
94 Armstrong that "any order for torpedoes would be first in our hands" 
88 Noble to Armstrong, 15th July, 1873, Constantinople, Rendel Papers, 31/2124, Newcastle. 
89 Noble to Ottoman Minister of Marine, 3rd July, 1873, Constantinople, Rendel Papers, 
311'2121, Newcastle. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Noble to Armstrong, 27-30th July, 1873, Constantinople, Rendel Papers, 31/2128, Newcas- 
tle. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Noble to Armstrong, 5th August, 1873, Constantinople, Rendel Papers, 3112129, Newcastle. 
94 Ibid. 
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Krupp was making a great effort to increase its share in the Ottoman market by offer- 
ing high quality arms at cheaper prices. The German officers in the service of the 
Sultan's army and Germany's new industrial and military position in Europe acted as 
positive factors in German expansion to the Ottoman markets. By the mid 1880s the 
Ottoman Empire came to rely primarily on German industry for cannons and coast 
defence guns. The government ordered huge cannons manufactured by Krupp for the 
defence of the Straits as well as for other coastal defences 95 Moreover, in the 1890s 
the Ottoman military authorities began to replace Armstrong muzzle-loading arma- 
ment by Krupp B. L guns 96 New contracts with Krupp, including a large sum for 
Naval Ordnance, were underway. By the early twentieth century Germany became 
very influential and largely dominated world armament and naval shipping industries 
and markets. In Turkey, Krupp was absorbing increasing numbers of military and 
naval armament orders, as the German banks, particularly the Deutsche Bank, were 
financing Ottoman industrial and military reconstruction upon European models. 
Germany, thus, began to present one of the greatest treats to British overseas indus- 
trial expansion and markets. As a result the British competition with Germany, espe- 
cially in Turkey, became most serious and dangerous. 
95 S. J. Shaw & E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II, p. 245. 
96 The Admiralty, Turkey, Greece and Roumania War Vessels and Torpedo boats, Intelligence 
Department, No: 278, London, 1891, p. 8; FO 195/2053,22nd May, 1890. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
By the Crimean War the Ottoman naval authorities had long been aware of the 
importance of adopting European naval technologies and structures for the construc- 
tion of an effective naval force. The navy had been receiving British naval instruction 
and advice, and machinery, such as steam engines and later warships and their arma- 
ment, as early as the 1830's. The military and political climate which developed after 
the Crimean War allowed a large scale Ottoman naval reconstruction with the help of 
Europeans, mainly British, at the start. British naval shipbuilders first provided the 
Ottoman navy with hardware, such as steam engines which were installed in the 
Ottoman built wooden ships. However, steam engines would entail a new type of 
naval ship, which the Ottoman industrial capacity was unable to construct. Then 
British shipbuilders provided more than partial machinery; whole packages, for 
example, warships with their armament and later fully armoured and equipped naval 
vessels with their technical instruction. This is a good example of how European 
naval technology came to dominate the entire Ottoman naval system. 
Partial adoption of European machinery was not sufficient for the Ottoman navy to 
rebuild a naval power on a European model. It entailed the change of the entire 
Ottoman naval system; not only naval machinery but also its institutional and educa- 
tional structures. This opened the way for a total dependence on European technol- 
ogy and hence formed the base for their imperial pursuits over the Ottoman Empire. 
Napier & Sons Co. in Glasgow, which began to provide the Ottoman navy with steam 
engines as early as 1830s, expanded their business to steamers, and in 1860 to 
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building an Ottoman ironclad programme. They were soon joined by other British 
prominent naval shipbuilders, the Thames Iron Works and Samudas & Sons Co. in 
London 97 Armstrongs armoured all Ottoman ironclad frigates, as well some wooden 
frigates, from 1863 onwards. Armstrong guns became an essential part of naval 
armament. Later, Armstrongs expanded their trade to other military equipment, and 
warships designed and completely armoured by their Elswick naval shipyard. 
Elswick became a center not only for the construction of naval vessels and armament 
but also a centre for technical instruction and training of the Ottoman navy. 
The flow of naval shipping and armament technologies to the Ottoman Empire was 
checked by its declining state of finance, and the international competition between 
Britain, France and Prussia. The rise of Prussia changed the power balance in 
Europe. By the 1870's Krupp was an influential armament firm in Turkey, especially 
when it won the armament deals and reconstruction projects for the Ottoman coastal 
defence programme. Only to some extent did the Ottoman Empire benefit from the 
competition between European industrial powers to reconstruct its navy and military, 
as shipbuilders and armament dealers offered competitive payment systems and 
loans. However, the Ottoman Empire could not escape from their imperial expansion 
and the domination of its military, political and economic power structures through 
industrial activities and financing. The modest ambitions and attempts of the 
Ottoman naval authorities to build their own vessels and guns failed. Many vessels 
that were launched were never completed and left to decay. Apart from the Sultan 
97 There were also other British shipbuilders, including Gourlay Bros. & Co. of Dundee, 
which built iron and steel passenger steamers and barges at Camperdown Shipyard, see, "Ship- 
building in Dundee in 1894", Dundee Year Book, Dundee, 1894, p. 41-42. 
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Abdul Hamid's neglect of the navy, Turkey had no industrial, managerial and eco- 
nomic structures as such to construct their own naval vessels and guns. Furthermore, 
European industrial expansion, which brought in cheaper naval vessels and arms, 
made the establishment of a genuine Ottoman naval industry all the more difficult. 
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Chapter Seven 
TURKISH NAVAL PROGRAMME and ARMSTRONGS & VICKERS 
The contracts entered into with the Turkish government, [were] part of an 
important arrangement we successfully negotiated shortly before the war, 
and as a result of which we obtained, on the one hand, the concession of 
the constitution of a "Societe Imperiale Ottomane Co-Interessee des 
Docks, Arsenaux at Constructions Navales", entrusted with the reorganisa- 
tion and management of the naval docks and yards of Turkey, and on the 
other hand, an order for the execution of the Turkish naval programme, 
thus securing for the Great Britain the practical control of all the docks, 
yards and naval constructions of the Ottoman Empire. 1 
7.1 Introduction 
While forming an important channel for the transmission of technical knowledge and 
expertise to the importer countries of their technologies, British armament and naval 
firms prepared the conditions for British naval and military expansion to those coun- 
tries. In the Ottoman Empire, where particularly before WWI there was severe com- 
petition for armaments and naval vessels among the industrially advanced Western 
companies, British, German, French and American, the companies of each Western 
power formed an industrial and political cooperation. British military and naval 
alliance led by Armstrongs and Vickers in Turkey reached its zenith in the years 
before the war. This alliance helped to further British naval and military expansion to 
the Ottoman Empire. As a result, British military and naval influence in the Ottoman 
Empire increased in spite of the strong German presence. British firms were part of a 
t Vickers to the Admiralty, 5th October, 1917, Ostrorog Opinions- Turkey (2), VA/53, Cam- 
bridge. 
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more general British foreign policy. Though they were independent, British firms 
trading with Turkey were providing the British Admiralty with technical and military 
information of the vessels and armament supplied whenever needed. 2 In return, they 
were protected and politically assisted by the British government internationally 
against non-British firms competing for the Ottoman markets. This was the same for 
the Germans and the French; their embassies in Istanbul made every effort to win 
Ottoman arm and naval concessions for their home companies. 
By the turn of the century, the Ottoman navy had become even more dependent on 
primarily British naval technology and expertise. The British had provided the 
Ottoman navy with most of its hardware and technical instruction and supervision 
since the Crimean War. Apart from an increasing number of British naval instructors 
on the naval vessels, more engineers were employed especially in the Imperial Dock 
Yards to improve shipbuilding and the production of arsenals. 3 Besides, the Ottoman 
naval authorities endeavoured ambitiously to modernise the old vessels and equip 
them with new technologies, such as new guns. Most of, the help came from Arm- 
strongs, Vickers and Ansaldo. From the 1890s onwards, they even brought in com- 
pass experts from Britain and adapted the Kelvin or Thomson compasses for their 
battleships .4 By the end of the century, most of the principal fighting ships had 
Kelvin compasses. 5 The Ottoman naval authorities initiated a plan to produce 
2 See, for example, C. Ottley to D'Eyncourt, 31st December, 1912, Rendel Papers, 3117393, 
Newcastle. 
3 Turkish-Ottoman Naval Archives (TNA), MKT-881/71,23rd October, 1894; MKT-874/43,17th 
October, 1894; MKT-773/10A, 14th June, 1896. 
4 TNA, MKT-1138/3,29th April, 1898. 
S For detailed information on Kelvin compasses and their trade, see C. Smith & M. N. Wise, 
Energy and Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 754-798. 
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Thomson's patent compasses in the Imperial Dock Yards. To pursue this they invited 
a compass expert from Thomson Co. to take employment in the dock yards in 
Turkey. 6 
The Sultan Abdul Hamid was known to have shown a mistrust of his navy since his 
accession in 1876. This was attributed to the fact that the navy was prepared to sup- 
port Mithat Pasha, a reformist, and the Constitutional party, which the Sultan had 
dismissed? It was reported that even the propellers were always removed by the 
Imperial authorities to lessen the risk of a naval revolt against the Sultan. 8 As a 
result, Ottoman naval power steadily deteriorated after the Russo-Turkish War of 
1877-78. In the meantime, Russia had created a strong Black Sea fleet, thus threaten- 
ing the Ottoman coastal defence. When the power of the despotic Sultan was dimin- 
ished in early 1900, the Ottoman naval authorities began an ambitious programme of 
modernisation of the naval structures. 
This chapter discusses the British industrial alliance in Turkey in the decade before 
the First World War, the new Ottoman Naval Programme and the transmission of 
engineering and technical expertise from Britain to the Ottoman navy through British 
engineers, agents and instructors, and printed material and guides for the functions 
and running of the imported naval machinery. 
6 "Tersanede pusula imal etmek uzere Thomson fabrikasindan bir yabanci uzman celbi", TNA, 
MKT-1374/5-46,18th June, 1901. 
7 A. J. Marder, British Naval Policy, 1880-1905, London: Putnam & Company, 1940, p. 153. 
8 Ibid. 
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7.2 Elswick Naval Construction and Technical Instruction 
Armstrongs' Elswick Naval Shipyard, one of the most important naval shipyards of 
the world from the late nineteenth century, was a main supplier of naval ships and 
armament to the Ottoman Empire from Britain, at least until the coming of Vickers as 
a strong rival. As an indigenous infrastructure to operate and maintain their naval 
vessels and guns hardly existed in the Ottoman navy, they also had to supply engi- 
neers, consultants and experts to teach and train local naval officers and engineers, 
and thus created a new local technical community with a minimum knowledge of the 
relatively complicated machinery. This was the core of the transmission of technical 
knowledge to the new environment. For the exporter company, this was not just "mis- 
sionary" or optional, but an obligation for the export of naval vessels and also a guar- 
antee for the continuation of the flow of naval vessels and guns to this environment. 
Every trained indigenous naval man either in Britain or at home meant a new agent 
for the supplier, and in return, this resulted in expansion of their industrial market. 
For the Ottoman government, it meant the possession of a strong fleet and trained 
local naval men to operate and maintain the machinery. This helped the formation of 
an infrastructure to accommodate the new technology. It also raised the hope for the 
establishment of its own naval and industrial structures, such as shipyards and arse- 
nals. 
The Ottoman government itself often employed a large number of British engineers 
and advisors, either through the agents of the companies concerned, or through their 
embassy in London. When their naval vessels were built, the Ottoman government 
sent some naval officers to attend the construction of the vessels. For instance, when 
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the Ottoman battleships, the Medjidieh in America and Hamidieh in Elswick, were 
being built two Ottoman naval officers joined the construction of each ship .9 On the 
other hand, the Ottoman government employed naval gun experts to train the local 
naval men when the vessels-were delivered. When Armstrongs delivered the Hami- 
dieh cruiser and Erthougrul yacht, Elswick naval engineers accompanied the vessels 
and were employed by the navy. The agreements for such engineers were made 
between the Ottoman government and H. Vere, Armstrong's agent. Mr Stanberg and 
Mr Nelson, and Mr King and Mr Alderson were employed as the Engineer in Chief 
and Assistant Engineer for nine months in the Hamidieh and the Erthougrul 
respectively. 10 Their contracts were renewed several times. The engineers Mr King 
and Mr Alderson were in the Ottoman employment in the Erthougrul as chief 
instructors at least until 1908.11 The Ottoman government also recruited one of the 
Mecidiye's experts from the William Cramp Co., in America to work as Chief 
Instructor on the said ship in Turkey, and he was given the status of the "honorary 
aide-de-camp to the Sultan". 12 The Erthougrul was in the service of the Sultan only. 
Apart from providing engineers, the companies also prepared and delivered to the 
navy with the naval vessels instruction books or booklets of how to use and maintain 
guns and engines. These included the technical details and functions of the vessels 
and their parts. 13 
To illustrate the points here I will look at the mission of an Elswick engineer, 
9 TNA, MKT-1434/41,12th April 1902. 
10 TNA, MKT-1520/16-17,51-87,20th June, 1904. '
11 TNA, Muhasebe-2154/89,18th May, 1908. 
12 TNA, MKT-1528199-131,31st August, 1904. 
13 TNA, MKT-1520/16,20th June, 1904. 
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D'Eyncourt, to Istanbul. Sir Eustace Tennyson D'Eyncourt (1868-1951), who later 
became the director of British Naval Construction, was a leading naval architect of 
his day. He was trained at Armstrong's yard at Elswick and at the Royal Naval Col- 
lege, Greenwich. After his apprenticeship he remained with Armstrong until 1898 
when he became a naval architect to Fairfields on the Clyde. He returned to Arm- 
strongs in 1902, where he made a reputation for both technical competence and skill 
in securing foreign orders-14 In 1904 D'Eyncourt was sent to Turkey by the Arm- 
strong & Whitworth Co. primarily to hand over three ships which had been com- 
pleted for the Turkish government at Elswick. 15 They were an armoured cruiser of 
about 3,500 tons, the Hamidieh, an Imperial yacht, the Erthougrul, which was "most 
lavishly and luxuriously fitted up for the Sultan's personal use", and a well designed 
state barge for the Sultan's use on ceremonial occasions. 16 Secondly, upon the 
demand of the Ottoman government, he was to inspect and complete ships which 
were under construction at the Ottoman shipyards in Turkey, mainly four vessels: one 
armour clad and one large cruiser at the shipyard on the Golden Horn and two small 
cruisers at the shipyard in Izmit. 17 Furthermore, an important part of this more or 
less diplomatic mission was to try to get further orders for warships and guns from 
the Sultan and his government. 18 
14 In 1912 D'Eyncourt was appointed Director of Naval Construction and thus became respon- 
sible for the British wartime shipbuilding programme, and also the development of tanks and air- 
ships. See his own autobiography, Sir Eustace Tennyson D'Eyncourt, A Shipbuilder's Yarn; the 
Record of a Naval Constructor, London: Hutchison & Co., 1948. 
15 Ibid., p. 48. 
16 Ibid. 
17 There is a letter book in the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich, which contains dupli- 
cates of letters written between Elswick and Constantinople relating to D'Eyncourt's visit to 
Turkey. See National Maritime Museum Archives at Greenwich (NMAG), Letter Book, DEY/88. 
See, for instance, D'Eyncourt to Faulkner, NMAG, DEY/88,20th May 1904 and 24th May 1904. 
18 D'Eyncourt, Shipbuilder's Yarn, p. 48. 
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In Turkey he was joined by an Armstrong agent, Mr. Vere, and later, by Mr. 
Faulkner, the secretary of the firm. D'Eyncourt inspected all the ships that the 
Ottoman authorities wished to be completed at the Izmit shipyard and at the arsenal 
on the Golden Horn, the Halic Shipyard. In Izmit he observed that nothing at all had 
been done at the shipyard for years and that the ships were "completely rotten". 19 
Therefore, he thought it would be very difficult and expensive to complete the ships. 
In his inspections at Golden Horn or Halic, he saw that the Abdulkadir, an armour 
clad of 8,000 tons, was in a very bad state, and concluded that it could not be 
completed. 20 However, he observed that the other vessel, a cruiser called the Hudav- 
endighar, was in a relatively better condition than all the others he had inspected 21 
But the Turkish authorities were anxious to see the four ships completed 22 
Although, the completion of the four ships at the shipyards in Turkey did not seem 
totally impossible, he estimated that it would be much more expensive, difficult and 
more time-consuming: 
It is quite clear that our prices for building these ships out there must be 
greater than for building the same ships at home, and we should I think 
impress on the Turks that for the same money we could give four better 
ships, up to date and in a shorter period 23 
D'Eyncourt was also trying to secure some new orders from the Ottoman govern- 
ment for naval vessels and armament. 
19 D'Eyncourt to W. Armstrong and Whitworth Co., (Elswick Shipyard), NMAG, DEY/88,16th 
May 1904. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.; See also D'Eyncourt to Mr. Perrett, NMAG, DEY/88,16th May 1904. 
22 D'Eyncourt to W. Armstrong & Withworth, NMAG, DEY/88,19th May 1904. 
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He was granted an interview with the Sultan to discuss the Turkish Navy and possi- 
ble future orders for ships. 24 The results of the meeting with the Sultan and other 
high officials, who were anxious to acquire new warships and guns, were fruitful for 
new contracts for Armstrong's Elswick shipyard. 
Around the same time the Japanese were achieving military successes in the war 
against Russia, known as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The Japanese were vic- 
torious at sea. The Russians lost more than fourteen battleships, whereas, the 
Japanese lost only a few naval ships. Their triumph depended largely on the good 
quality naval vessels that she had in her navy. Most of these were built by the British, 
including all six principal battleships; three built by Armstrong & Whitworth's 
Elswick yard, two by the Thames Iron Works and Shipbuilding Co., and one by John 
Brown at the Clydebank. 25 The Russian ships lost in the war had been built in Rus- 
sia. This became the source of great optimism for the Ottoman authorities, who 
believed that with a good naval fleet they, too, could defeat the Russians, who were 
becoming a bigger threat to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, D'Eyncourt observed: 
There is no doubt they [the Ottoman authorities] are greatly excited over 
the Russo-Japanese war and think that, if. they get some battleships and 
cruisers soon they could emulate the success of the Japanese; in rein of the 
feeling I think we should urge them to order some ships from Elswick, 
where we could build these much more quickly and better. 26 
This was a very great advantage for the British shipbuilding industry, and also a great 
opportunity for British shipbuilders, to persuade the Ottoman and other foreign 
24 D'Eyncourt, A Shipbuilder's Yarn, p. 50. 
25 C. Smith & M. N. Wise, Energy and Empire, p. 796. ' 
26 D'Eyncourt to W. Armstrong and Whitworth Co., (Elswick Shipyard), NMAG, DEY/88,16th 
May 1904. 
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governments to order more battleships and other naval machinery. D'Eyncourt stated 
a similar view in a later letter: 
The Turks are deeply impressed by the war in the East and think that with 
good ships they could emulate the Japanese successes. This idea I am 
endeavouring to foster and to impress upon them that Elswick Ships and 
Guns are the weapons required?? 
It seems that the work for the completion of the four ships was never undertaken, in 
spite of the strong wish of the Ottoman authorities, but instead new orders were made 
to Armstrong & Whitworth Co. for naval vessels. The Sultan gave orders for some 
corvettes for coastal guard and general purposes, and also ordered the construction of 
two submarines. 28 
After the inspection of the four ships, D'Eyncourt was ordered by the Sultan and his 
government to inspect the entire Turkish Torpedo Boat flotilla, and also to look into 
the question of repairing them. 29 In the inspections he was helped by two British 
naval engineers, Mr. Stanger and Mr. Coller. Stanger inspected and reported on the 
machinery, engines and boilers. Coller assisted him with the inspection of the hulls. 30 
Some weeks later D'Eyncourt completed a preliminary survey of the Turkish Tor- 
pedo Boat flotilla, and prepared a "Report of Condition and Estimates of Repair of 
Imperial Ottoman Torpedo Boat Flotilla". 31 In addition, J. B. Hyde Parker, another 
naval engineer and agent of the company, reported on the torpedo tubes and guns on 
27 D'Eyncourt to Faulkner, NMAG, DEY/88,20th May 1904. 
28 D'Eyncourt to Armstrong & Withworth Co., NMAG, DEY/88, Ist June 1904; D'Eyncourt to 
Armstrong & Withworth Co., NMAG, DEY/88,4th June 1904. 
29 D'Eyncourt to Mr. Perrett, NMAG, DEY/88,15th June 1904. 
30 D'Eyncourt to Mr. Stanger, NMAG, DEY/88,13th June 1904; D'Eyncourt to J. M. Faulkner, 
NMAG, DEY188,20th June 1904. 
31 See a copy the "Report of Condition and Estimates of Repair of Imperial Ottoman Torpedo 
Boat Flotilla" by D'Eyncourt, NMAG, DEY188,25th June 1904. 
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board. 32 Parker saw and inspected some 24 tubes, and concluded that they needed to 
be repaired and that some parts needed to be renewed. D'Eyncourt's report revealed 
that many torpedo boats were in poor condition, and required numerous fittings both 
for the hull and the machinery. Many also needed new boilers. 33 At the end of his 
service he was ceremonially thanked and also awarded a Third Class Medjidieh, for 
his work for the Imperial Ottoman Navy. 34 Elswick shipyard continued to provide 
information and instruction for the vessels and arms that they provided to the 
Ottoman government. Many other Elswick engineers and instructors served in the 
Ottoman navy for various work, from mere instruction to the repair of the vessels and 
guns. This mission cannot be separated from the flow of hardware supplied by Arm- 
strongs; it was an integral part of it. 
7.3 The British Industrial Alliance in Turkey 
After the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the new Ottoman administration acceler- 
ated the Westernisation programme. The reconstruction of a strong naval fleet and 
armament industry were two important priorities of the Young Turks. Turkey, beside 
countries like Japan, Spain, Portugal, Brazil and Chile, endeavoured to restructure its 
naval and military power by buying expensive warships and artillery. Vickers and 
Armstrongs became the two major British suppliers, which dominated most of the 
world's armament industries. However,, by the end of the nineteenth century, the 
32 See "Preliminary Report of Condition of Torpedo Tubes & Guns on Board I. 0. Torpedo 
Boats" by J. B. Hyde Parker, NMAG, DEY/88,24th June 1904; see also D'Eyncourt to Armstrong 
& Withworth Co., and to Mr. Perrett, 27th June 1904. 
33 D'Eyncourt, "Report". 
34 D'Eyncourt, A Shipbuilder's Yarn, p. 50. 
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British monopoly in arsenals was weakened to a great extent by the Germans, and 
later by the French and the Americans. British industrial firms had to compete with 
Germans and other foreign rivals for armament deals. To increase their competitive 
power Vickers and Armstrongs, the two most eminent British armament companies, 
collaborated in many projects in Turkey. 
Armstrongs had enjoyed almost a monopoly in Turkey, as they had in many coun- 
tries, around the 1870s, and thereafter their connections with the Ottoman govern- 
ment had never ceased. Vickers, on the other, hand, had established strong ties with 
Turkey only since the late nineteenth century by providing armament and naval ships. 
By the turn of the century, the Ottoman navy rearmoured a considerable number of 
its battleship with Vickers-Maxim guns. 35 Due to the increasing number of Vickers- 
Maxim guns purchased, the Ottoman navy had to employ trained naval engineers to 
teach how to operate and maintain Vickers guns. Therefore, some local engineers 
were sent to Britain to improve their skills and knowledge of Vickers guns. 36 how- 
ever, by the early twentieth century, Vickers was gaining firmer ground in Turkey, 
and also in other countries partly through their free loans. The competition between 
the two companies for vessels and arms deals became harder. Armstrongs was trying 
to maintain its former position and esteem. S. W. Noble of Armstrongs stated that: 
I am confident that we are in a much stronger position and held in much 
higher esteem than Vickers, in these countries who are likely to spend 
money on warlike material. I refer especially to Italy, Chile, Japan and 
Brazil. ... Our chances of work 
from China and Turkey, are I should think 
35 "Gemilerden sekizinin Vickers-Maxim toplari He techizi", TNA, MKT-1305/31,22nd August 
1900. ._;.: '- 
36 "Zirhli Firkateyn Mesudiye'ye Monte edilecek serf atesli Vickers toplari ve bunlari ogretecek 
subaylar", TNA, 719, Gemiler, Erkani Harbiye, Tersane, Limanlar, Daireler Bolumu, p. 26A, 2nd 
May 1902. 
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s' as good as those of Vickers. 
37 
However, by 1911 Vickers had more orders in hand from the Ottoman government. 
Rendel accepted that Vickers had "stepped past" them. He reckoned this was primar- 
ily because Vickers worked in London while they remained at Elswick. 38 
Armstrongs and Vickers were not the only Western industrialists in Turkey. There 
were many others from Germany, France, America and Italy. The German Krupp was 
becoming a very influential supplier of military hardware. The competition for mili- 
tary and industrial deals in the Ottoman Empire was becoming harder. This consti- 
tuted a major impetus for the co-operation of Armstrongs and Vickers under a British 
industrial umbrella. The idea of an alliance between Armstrongs and Vickers was not 
new. However, now it was given serious consideration by Armstrongs, who were pre- 
viously reluctant to negotiate. When in late 1909, Faulkner, who had been to Istanbul 
frequently since the turn of the century to get work for the company, visited again to 
expand Armstrongs' market in the Ottoman Empire, he met "a keen struggle" for 
armament orders. 39 In early 1910, he reported that "the Germans brought their 
ambassador into play, and are using all the diplomatic pressure they can. "40 It was 
getting harder for Armstrongs to receive the Ottoman orders, as there were many 
other companies working for the same orders. He reported that "Nothing can be 
decided easily in Istanbul", before he left for Rome 41 
37 S. W. Noble to S. Rendel, 27th September, 1909, Rendel Papers, 3117338, Newcastle. 
38 Rendel to John, 31st August 1911, Rendel Papers, 3117668, Newcastle. 
39 S. Noble to Rendel, 26 December, 1909, Rendel Papers, 3117342, Newcastle. 
40 Saxton W. Noble to Lord Rendel, 6th April 1910, Letters from S. W. Noble, July 1903-De- 
cember 1912, Rendel Papers, 3117331-7368, Newcastle. 
41 Saxton W. Noble to Lord Rendel, 6th April 1910, Rendel Papers, 3117352, Newcastle. 
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The German Emperor had been working hard in the Balkans to get the orders given 
to Germany. 42 The Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, had himself already visited the Sul- 
tan and his government in Istanbul twice by the turn of the century. During the sec- 
and visit in 1898 especially he delivered pro-Ottoman and pro-Islamic speeches, 
which encouraged German nationalistic groups, particularly the. Pan-German League 
for action to expand German influence in the Ottoman Empire 43. Apart from the 
political sphere of influence, from a financial point of view, Krupp was offering very 
generous loans to the Ottoman Empire and China for arms, and gaining valuable 
markets as a result. 44 Armstrongs and Vickers reviewed their loan policy and began 
to offer better terms for payments than the Germans in order to win armament con- 
cessions from the Ottoman government. For instance, for the battleship deal in 1910, 
Vickers permitted the Ottoman government six months free credit and then payment 
by ten equal instalments 45 The following year, Vickers bankers guaranteed advances 
of 6,000,000 pounds to the Ottoman government for payment to Vickers on the war- 
ship. F. Barker, the representative of Vickers in Istanbul, reported that "the Germans 
were furious at our getting the order and Enver being German to the core might not 
be as favourable as otherwise" 46 Being a leader, of the young Turk Revolution, 
Enver Bey became a very influential official afterwards. He was strongly pro-German 
and therefore in favour of using German firms for military hardware. In early 
42 Saxton Noble to Lord Rendel, 27th September, 1909, Rendel Papers, 3117338, Newcastle. 
43 Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918, Princeton: Princeton Uni- 
versity Press, 1968, pp. 4-5. 
44 Jannon to Rendel, 25th September, 1912, Rendel Papers, 3117384, Newcastle. 
45 Vickers to Glyn Mills, 28th July 1911, Turkish Naval Programme 1908-1914 and Post-War 
Settlement, Vickers Archives (VA), Cambridge. 
46 F. Barker to Dawson, Ist of March 1910, Turkish Naval Programme 1908-1914 and Post- 
War Settlement, VA, Cambridge, 
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December he was made the Minister of War. He was watched by British agents 47 
There were demands for a larger British alliance, including major firms., Rendel, for 
instance, suggested that any serious engagement and negotiation with Albert Vickers 
for a Vickers-Beardmore-Armstrong-Whitworth combination should be explored 48 
In the meantime, particularly from 1910 onwards, Vickers and Armstrongs made a 
great effort to expand their trade further, and began to initiate large projects together, 
including running dockyards, arsenals and factories. The Ottoman navy ordered new 
armoured vessels from Armstrong and Vickers, including dreadnoughts and 
gunboats 49 This included a mining ship to be designed by the Elswick Shipyard, 
which was to be built with the latest arrangements adapted in the British service for 
laying and lifting mines. 50 Seeing the need for a technically advanced new shipbuild- 
ing industry for Turkey, a country with very long coastlines, Vickers even proposed 
to build a big shipyard in Istanbul. However, at the time the idea was not met with 
great sympathy. The Ottoman authorities did not want the establishment of such a 
shipyard in Istanbul, the centre of the Ottoman administration and Imperial 
residence. 51 Nevertheless, British export of military, and naval hardware to the 
Ottoman Empire increased dramatically. Thus, for example, in 1913 armament orders 
in hand for Turkey were equivalent to 84 percent of total British manufactured 
47 H. W. Stock to Vickers Sons & Maxim Ltd., 18th of February 1910, Turkish Naval Pro- 
gramme 1908-1914 and Post-War Settlement, VA, Cambridge. 
48 Rendel to Noble, 31st March, 1910, Rendel Papers, 31/7384, Cambridge. 
49 "Armstrong Fabrikasina siparis edilen Drednot tipi harp gemisi", 21st September, 1911, 
TNA, MKT-1683/1; "Gunboats for Turkey", Vickers to A. Vere, 30th December, 1910, NMAG, 
DEY/9; also John Brown & Co. Clydebank to D'Eyncourt, 31st December, 1910, NMAG, DEYI9. 
50 See "Proposed Mining Ship for Turkey, design no: 678", J. R. Perrett to D'Eyncourt, 18th 
December, 1910, NMAG, DEY/9. 
51 "Vickers and Danyo fabrikalari tarafindan Istanbul civarinda yapilmasi teklif olunan gemi in- 
sa tezgahlari", 10th December, 1911, TNA, 51, Daireler Bolumu, p. 2-3. 
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exports to the Ottoman Empire that year. 52 
Armament concessions were granted to Vickers and Armstrongs often with the help 
of British agents, and most importantly, naval advisers, such as Gamble Pasha and 
Admiral Limpus, the high-ranking naval advisors to the Ottoman navy53 and Captain 
Algernon Faught, "Chief of the Staff" of the Ottoman navy. 54 Captain Faught wrote 
to F. Barker about his contact with the Ottoman Minister of Marine and what his firm 
should do for the arms deals. An important condition was an official guarantee that 
certified "the ammunition is in every respect similar to that which the firm supplied 
to the British Admiralty". 55 Admiral Limpus wrote to Vickers and Armstrong & 
Whitworth Ltd. and their agents in Istanbul, such as Mr. Vere, that skilled British 
workmen were required to repair the Hamidieh and other vessels of the fleet. 
Because of the Balkan wars most skilled local engineers had left. Therefore, there 
was a greater need for skilled engineers from Europe. Captain Blake was already 
employed by the Ottoman government as an engineering officer who was made 
responsible for repair of naval ships. 56 
Though some kind of cooperation had existed between the two companies in Turkey, 
an official alliance became a particularly weighty issue in the administrative circles 
of Armstrongs and Vickers in 1912. Rendel stated that: 
52 C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise 1854-1914, London: Europa 
Publications Limited, 1977, p. 124. 
53 Ibid. 
54 F. Barker to Messrs Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Ltd., Ist of March 1910, Turkish Naval Pro- 
gramme 1908-1914 and Post-War Settlement, VA, Cambridge. 
55 Ibid. 
56 K. Bur to Armstrongs & Whitworth, 18th October 1913, Turkish Naval Programme 
1908-1914 and Post-War Settlement, VA126, Cambridge. 
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The whole question of the value of an alliance with Vickers should, I 
think, be gone into very carefully. There appears to be little doubt that if 
orders are to be obtained from the Balkan States, the British firms con- 
cerned must be generally if not closely in touch with financial houses who 
may be floating the loans necessary for the British naval and military 
expansion, and this presupposes that financial groups will enter the 
market?? 
An alliance between the firms was demanded particularly in the Ottoman Empire and 
the other Balkan States, where the great powers were engaged in a very hard compet- 
itive struggle. Rendel stated that: 
If we entered into an alliance with Vickers covering both the Balkan States 
and the Turkish Empire, it would appear to be in our best interests, if any 
orders are to be secured from the Balkan States, that the Head Office con- 
templated by Mr. Vere should be established in London. 58 
Mr Vere, the resident agent in Turkey, had earlier proposed the establishment of the 
Head office in Constantinople, under the management of his firm, with sub-agents in 
various Balkan countries. 59 By 1913 Armstrongs and Vickers were ready to carry out 
co-projects for the Ottoman government. Indeed, they even included several other 
British firms, such as Beardmores. Societe Imperiale Ottomane Co-Interessee Des 
Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions Navales, Imperial Ottoman Docks, Arsenal and 
Naval Construction Company was established in Istanbul in December 1913 by the 
two firms to exploit all the state docks and arsenals. A few months later they signed 
another contract with the Ottoman government for a considerable number of naval 
vessels and a large amount of armament, known as the New Turkish Naval Pro- 
gramme. 
57 S. Rendel, "Memoranda on Turkish and Balkan Business", 27th October, 1912, Rendel Pa- 




7.4 "The Imperial Ottoman Docks, Arsenal and Naval Construction Company" 
and the New Ottoman Naval Programme 
Shortly after the Young Turks took power, Armstrongs and Vickers intensified their 
efforts to create new markets in the Ottoman Empire for armament and naval vessels, 
in spite of the strong German, political and industrial presence there. W. Stock, the 
Vickers' agent, was in Constantinople for armament deals in late 1908, where he 
reported to Vickers about the armament prospects. 60 In early 1909, D. A. Gamble, 
Vice-Admiral and Naval Adviser to the Ottoman government handed a list to Vickers 
of various ammunition for the navy and for the cruiser, Mesudiye, which was built by 
Thames Iron Works in 1874 and rebuilt and rearmed by Ansaldo in Istanbul in 
1903.61 Later a contract for Mesudiye ammunition was signed by H. W. Stock, rep- 
resenting Vickers Sons & Maxim, and Ibrahim Bey, Director of the Ottoman Marine 
Contracts Department. 62 Captain Tottenham, artillery officer on Admiral Gamble's 
staff, supplied the details of the ammunition to Vickers through its agents in 
Istanbul. 63 
To carry out inspections of the ammunition the Ottoman Embassy in London 
appointed Admiral McGill to attend the inspection on behalf the Embassy. The other 
two officers were selected by the British Admiralty. M Stock mediated between 
60 W. Stock to Vickers, 24th September 1908 and 29th September 1908, VA/26, Cambridge 
University Archives. 
61 A. D. Gamble to H. W. Stock, 31st May, 1909, Constantinople, VA/26, Turkish Naval Pro- 
gramme 1908-1914, Cambridge University Archives. 
62 Ibrahim Bey to H. W. Stock, 28th November, 1909, Constantinople, VA/26, Turkish Naval 
Programme 1908-1914, Cambridge University Archives; see also H. W. Stock to Vickers, 16th De- 
cember 1909, VA126. 
63 H. W. Stock to Vickers, 13th January 1910, Constantinople, VA/26, Cambridge. 
64 Turkish Embassy (Mr M. Enad) to Vickers, 12th February, 19 10, VA126, Cambridge. 
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Vickers and the Ottoman Ministry of Marine. Mesudiye's ammunition boxes were 
provided by Vickers. Its 9.2 guns were relined. 65 Vickers expanded their work for the 
Mesudiye to other battleships and naval vessels. They ordered some of the ammuni- 
tion and instruments for the Ottoman navy from various armament firms, such as 
Barr and Stroud Limited of Glasgow which provided the Ottoman navy 9 "0" 
rangefinders F. T. 8 guns with turret mountings via Vickers Barrow-in-Furness. 66 The 
competition between Vickers and Armstrong in the Ottoman Empire before the war 
developed into a collaboration and unity against German and other industrial suppli- 
ers. Vickers and Armstrongs were ready to carry out major projects together. In 
December 1913, the Ottoman government signed with Vickers and Armstrong- 
Whitworth to establish in Turkey a company for the modernisation and management 
of the Docks and Arsenals of the Ottoman Empire, with a monopoly of Naval Con- 
struction work for a period of 30 years. 67 Earlier that year a British man named John- 
son had attempted to build a shipyard at Haydarpasha, a very central district of Istan- 
bul. However, he did not receive the necessary sanctions and the project failed to 
yield any positive result, partly because the Ottoman officials were not pleased with 
the establishment of such a shipyard in such a central place to Istanbul and so close 
to state buildings. 68 
65 H. W. Stock to Vickers, 25th August, 1913, VA/27, Cambridge; 3rd April, 1914, VA/27, 
Cambridge. 
66 A. Jackson for Barr & Stroud Ltd. to Vickers, 28th January, 1914, VA126, Turkish Naval Pro- 
gramme 1908-1914, Cambridge. 
67 Sir Mark Webster Jenkinson, Memoranda on "Turkish Accounts", 22nd June, 1928, 
VA/57-54, Cambridge. 
68 "Haydarpasa'da bir Ingiliz tarafindan tesis edilecek tersanenin muvafik olamayacagi hakkin- 
da", 13th June, 1908, TNA, MKT-1635/75. 
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The new enterprise involving joint participation of Armstrongs, and Vickers to mod- 
ernise and expand the yards on the Golden Horn was a large project. It was styled 
"Societe Imperiale Ottoman Co-Interessee des Arsenaux et Constructions Navales". 
Its headquarters was established in Istanbul. However, the effective control of the 
company was vested in the London Committee. 69 The Board of Directors was com- 
posed of four nominees of the Ottoman government and five nominees of Vickers 
and Armstrongs. The London Advisory Committee consisted of Vincent Caillard and 
Francis Barker for Vickers, and Charles Ottley and Percy Girouard for Armstrongs, 
with J. P. Davison as Secretary. 70 The concession was of great importance both polit- 
ically and industrially. It involved the Docks, Arsenals and all actual and future naval 
bases of the Ottoman Empire. In practice this meant a British monopoly on the Turk- 
ish fleet. The new company undertook to renovate entirely the arsenals at the Golden 
Horn and in Ismid and to build floating docks with a capacity to lift 32,000 tons. Sir 
Basil Zaharoff, "the arms king", the agent of Vickers, played the major role in sign- 
ing this agreement. His ways of winning concessions for armament and military 
machinery involved much bribery. 71 The revenues for the company were to be col- 
lected by the Administration of the Ottoman Debt. Sir Vincent H. P. Caillard, now a 
major figure on Vickers Board, had been president of the Commission for the 
Ottoman Public Debt and Britain's financial representative in Constantinople for fif- 
teen years before he was chosen as a director for Vickers in 1898.72 As a result he 
69 A. V. Lander, Memoranda on "Imperial Ottoman Docks, Arsenals and Naval Construction 
Company", 19th March, 1935, VA/57/54, Cambridge. 
7° Ibid. 
71 D. McCormic, Pedlar of Death: the Life of Sir Basil Zaharoff, London: MacDonald, 1965, p. 
105. 
72 K. Warren, Armstrongs of Elswick: Growth in Engineering and Armaments to the Merger 
with Vickers, London: Macmillan & University of London, 1989, p. 99. 
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was influential with the Ottoman orders through his important connections and his 
previous experience with financial matters. The Turkish Docks involvement carried 
with it the promise of 10 million pounds worth of orders for armaments 
73 
The company soon began to ship the equipment for the Docks and Arsenals and the 
general repairs to the fleet. 74 To facilitate the working of the Docks and Arsenals in 
Istanbul arrangements were made with the National Bank of Turkey for a Bank over- 
draft up to 300,000 pounds. This deal was soon followed by another one for naval 
vessels and armament. In April 1914 the Imperial Ottoman government signed a con- 
tract with Armstrong Whitworth Co. Ltd. and Vickers Ltd. for naval vessels and 
armament. The programme included a first class battleship, two scouts, two sub- 
marines, destroyers and the floating dock. The total value of the programme was 
about 4 million pounds, and this was to be followed by further contracts for other 
vessels to bring the total up to 10 million pounds. 75 Most of the vessels and their 
ammunition were ordered to be built by some other firms on behalf of the two firms; 
two fast protected scouts at Armstrong's Elswick, four destroyers by Hawthorn 
Leslie & Co., two submarines by William Beardmores, the floating dock at F. C. M. at 
Toulon, the battleship at Vickers' Naval Construction Works, Barrow-in-Furness. 76 
The two companies set up a body, the Eastern Construction Committee, to deal with 
the Turkish Naval Programme. Harry Vere, originally an Armstrong agent, became 
73 C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers p. 135. 
74 When the war broke out, their shipment of material was stopped by the British Customs and 
their work in Turkey was interrupted. See J. P. Davison, the secretary of the Financial & Technical 
Committee, to the Secretary General in Constantinople, 19th September, 1914, VA/27, Cambridge. 
75 Sir Mark Webster Jenkinson, Memoranda on "Turkish Accounts", 22nd June, 1928, 
VA/57-54, Cambridge. 
76 V. Caillard to J. McKechnie, 14th November 1914, VA/27, Cambridge. 
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the joint armament agent for both companies in Turkey and represented the Eastern 
Construction Committee in Istanbul. 
This was a major contract. It inevitably resulted in transmission of technical knowl- 
edge and expertise. The local engineers had to understand and operate the vessels and 
their equipment. The firms supplied the navy engineers to train local men to deal 
with complicated machinery. According to the contract, the contractors were obliged 
to deliver to the Ottoman Ministry of Marine a complete set of general plans on linen 
showing all the different parts of each vessel?? Besides, they had to supply the Min- 
istry with five complete sets of approval plans on linen of the construction of the hull, 
boilers, engines, auxiliary machinery, of the fittings of the vessels, the war fittings, 
the electric installations, wireless telegraphy, telephones and of all the other acces- 
sories and appurtenances as customary in the British Royal Navy. Furthermore, five 
complete sets of plans of the pumps and their accessories, of the bulkhead acces- 
sories, of the electric installations, the steam pipes, telephonic and telegraphic instal- 
lations and all the other installations were also to be delivered to the Ottoman navy. 78 
The Ottoman government was to nominate a Commission for Inspection at the works 
of the contractors for the whole of the duration of the contract. This Commission 
with such British Officers as were nominated by the British Admiralty to form part of 
such a Commission, had the same rights and could exercise the same mode of inspec- 
tion of the work as those enjoyed and exercised by the British officers and inspectors 
77 "Contract concluded at Constantinople between his excellency Ahmed Djemal Pasha, Minis- 
ter of Marine, acting on behalf of the Imperial Ottoman government of the one part and sir W. G. 
Armstrong Whitworth & Company Limited and Messrs. Vickers Limited of the other part", 29th 
April 1914, VA, 705, VA, 1914 VC R214, Cambridge. 
78 Ibid. 
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named by the British government. The contractors undertook to supply the Imperial 
Ottoman Commission with all information, plans and drawings necessary during the 
inspection. 79 The Ottoman Inspection Commission included local naval engineers, 
Captain Abdulrahim Bey, (the President), Safet and Aziz Beys, (Hull Inspectors), and 
electricians Irfan and Celal Beys, (Inspectors). 80 In addition to the local Ottoman 
inspectors, there were several British inspectors. 
The contractors were also to engage a Chief Engineer to serve on board each vessel 
during the twelve months of the period of guarantee. An inclusive salary of forty 
pounds per month was to be paid by the Ottoman government to each of the engi- 
neers. Furthermore, the contractors consented to procure for the Ottoman government 
the technical personnel which it might desire to employ upon the vessels. 8' Besides, 
the Ottoman government sent naval engineers and officers to the builders and the arm 
dealers to be trained how to use them. However, the political climate in Europe was 
changing for the worse in mid 1914. Threatened by political and military changes 
around the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman government was impatient to have their 
vessels and ammunition ready in hand. Therefore, they were looking for possibilities 
of the early delivery of the recent orders from Britain. The British government, on 
the other hand, was most anxious about increasing German military and financial 
involvement in the Ottoman Empire, which would force the Ottoman government 
into an inevitable alliance with Germany. When the war broke out, the British Admi- 
ralty asked the companies concerned with the Ottoman Naval Programme to provide 
79 Ibid., p. 5. 
80 Harry Vere to the Eastern Construction Committee, VA/27,31st August, 1914, Cambridge. 
81 Ibid., p. 13. 
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them with "the very earliest date that could be given for delivery of the ships includ- 
ing overtime, night-shifts, weekends, in fact on the strictest emergency conditions". 82 
7.5 The First World War and the Turkish Naval Programme 
On the 5th November, 1914, war was declared between Britain and the Ottoman 
Empire. By a decree of dissolution of the Turkish government, dated 24th November, 
1914, the British companies were abolished and their property confiscated. 83 With 
the outbreak of the war the case of "force majeure" arose, and due to this state of hos- 
tilities between Britain and Turkey, the Ottoman government thought fit to cancel the 
concessions by decree, and notified the cancellation to Armstrongs and Vickers. 84 As 
a result, the Ottoman Dock Company and the contracts in connection with the Turk- 
ish shipbuilding programme ran into difficulties. The Turkish members of the Impe- 
rial Ottoman Commission of Inspection were recalled to Istanbul and the Ottoman 
Ambassador and Naval Attache in London had been given no instructions up to 
date. 85 The Ottoman government was at the time signing a secret agreement with 
Germany. At the same time in Britain, Winston Churchill, who was then the First Sea 
Lord, stated that the Admiralty naturally determined upon increasing the British sea 
power to the utmost limit, appropriated by way of purchase or requisition all the 
82 V. Caillard to F. Dawson, F. Barker, Armstrong Whitworth & co. Ltd., 5th November, 1914, 
VA127, Cambridge; V. Caillard to J. McKechnie, 5th November, 1914, VA127, Cambridge. 
83 A. V. Lander, Memoranda on "Imperial Ottoman Docks, Arsenals and Naval Construction 
Company", 19th March, 1935, VA/57/54, Cambridge. 
84 Armstrongs & Vickers to Foreign Office, 22nd February, 1927, Ostrorog Opinions (5), 
VA/31, Cambridge. 
85 Armstrongs & Vickers to the Ottoman Minister of Marine, 18th September, 1914, VA/27, 
Cambridge; see also Eastern Construction Committee to Vickers, 19th September, 1914, Turkish 
Naval Programme 1908-1914 and Post-War Settlement, VA/27, Cambridge. 
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naval units that were then in course of construction for foreign powers. 86 In August, 
1914, he announced that the naval ships had been commandeered for use by the 
British navy. 
Indeed, the British Admiralty had, even some years before the war, enquired of Arm- 
strongs, Vickers and J. Brown & Co. about the possible acquisition by Britain of the 
battleships and vessels that were being constructed for the Ottoman navy. C. Ottley 
stated to the British admiralty: 
We shall hold ourselves entirely ready to place at the disposal of the 
British Admiralty all necessary data as the exact position in which this 
important contract with the Turkish government now stands. 87 
However, it had not attempted to keep any vessels that were being built for the 
Ottoman navy before the war. The war changed the situation. Now the British gov- 
ernment was trying to add all the vessels ordered by the Ottoman government to their 
navy. 
At the time there were several naval vessels in the process of construction and near to 
completion by the two firms for the Ottoman navy. Reshadieh, a battleship of 
27,000 tons, was being built and armoured by Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness. How- 
ever, in August 1914, it was commandeered by the British Admiralty with its 
ammunition. 88 It was renamed as the Erin for the Royal Navy. All the rights in the 
contract were then vested in the British government by virtue of naval and judicial 
86 Memoranda on the Ottoman Aeronautical League v. Vickers and Armstrongs, 2nd Novem- 
ber, 1928, VA30, Cambridge. 
87 C. Ottley to D'Eyncourt, 31st December, 1912, Rendel Papers, 3117393, Newcastle. 
88 W. F. Nicholson, the Secretary of the Admiralty, to Vickers, 5th August, 1914, Turkish Naval 
Programme 1908-1914 and Post-War Settlement, VA126, Cambridge; V. Caillard to L. Ostrorog, 
20th December, 1926, Ostrorog Opinions, VA/30, Cambridge. 
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decisions of an entirely binding and final character as regards the two British compa- 
nies. The second large battleship of 27,500 tons, the Osman I, was ready to be deliv- 
ered to its Ottoman captains just before the war. This battleship, built by Armstrong, 
Whitworth & Co. at Walker, had been originally ordered by the Brazilian govern- 
ment. However, it was later sold to the Ottoman government. When the war broke 
out, it was seized by the British government and was never delivered to the Ottoman 
navy. 89 It was renamed Agincourt for the Royal Navy. Furthermore, the work on the 
battleship, Fatih, which was in the process of construction by Vickers at Barrow was 
also stopped. The earliest possible delivery of the battleship was stated by Barrow at 
21 months 90 They would have been the largest and most modern battleships of the 
Ottoman navy. The cost of naval vessels and ammunition ordered from Britain was 
partly paid by the Ottoman government at the time when they were seized by the 
British government 91 The situation opened long discussions and claims between the 
two companies and the Turkish government. In 1916 L. Ostrorog stated that: 
From the Turks we do not claim simply the money which we have already 
spent. We claim something much more important: the execution of all the 
contracts of the whole scheme, in regard to which these preliminary 
expenses, or expenses incurred by us in the beginning of the performance 
of the contracts on our side, were made 92 
Armstrongs and Vickers hoped that a victory for the allies would definitely debar the 
Turkish government from their claim to an annulation of all legal ties between them. 
89 TNA, Muhasebe-2654/36,13th August, 1914. 
90 V. Caillard to J. McKechnie, 14th November, on the Ottoman Naval Programme, VA127, 
Cambridge. 
91 A. Killer to V. Caillard, 29th September, 1914, VA127, Cambridge. 
92 L. Ostrorog to J. P. Davison, 8th December, 1916, Ostrorog Opinions (1), May 1916-Febru- 
ary, 1917, VA/52/1-3, Cambridge. 
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The Turkish government would then not only be compelled to carry out all their pre- 
war undertakings, but moreover to bear the burden of all the consequences of the 
war. 93 For the companies, the victory of the allies would mean a "subsidiary hypoth- 
esis", that of some other government replacing Turkey in the new Ottoman domin- 
ions. In that case the liabilities would be taken by the succeeding power. 94 After the 
termination of the War in April 1920 Vickers and Armstrongs again took over the 
Ottoman Dock Company. When the new Turkish administration under Ataturk took 
power in 1923, the claims of both sides remained unchanged. 
After the war, although there were outstanding problems between them and the Turk- 
ish government due to the cancellations of pre-war agreements and restrictions aris- 
ing from the declaration of the war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, Vickers 
and Armstrongs were still eager to reenter the Turkish market. However, the two 
companies had been supportive of Greece, mainly through the personal ambitions of 
Zaharoff who openly sided with and provided Greece with military machinery and 
arms against Turkey for the occupation of Anatolia or Asia Minor after WWI. This 
harmed their image in the Turkish official circles and public eye. New agents were 
sent to Ankara, the new capital, to win concessions from the newly established 
republican government. The new administration cautiously welcomed Vickers and 
Armstrongs' demands for industrial enterprises to restructure industrial and military 
infrastructures in post-war Turkey, where the national government was striving to 
establish its own armament and naval industries. A. V. Lander, the agent for Vickers 
93 L. Ostrorog, "Opinion on the Turkish Programme", 16th February, 1917, Ostrorog Opinions 
(11), February 1917-November 1917, VA/53, Cambridge. 
94 Ibid. 
246 
and Armstrong, observed that: 
Industry in Turkey is in its infancy. Practically every sort of manufactured 
article from nails and rivets to agricultural and more elaborate machinery 
has to be imported. Any scheme which would foster and develop industry 
would find great favour in Angora to-day. 95 
Vickers and Armstrongs were ready to compete for a monopoly for the post-war 
armament programme in Turkey. Their local agent, A. Vahid, acknowledged that the 
Turkish army was at present at a "turning point as regards its future armament". A 
firm which would supply the arms was most likely to be able to supply for a long 
period. This was practically the case with Krupp guns and ammunition in Turkey 
before the war. 96 Seeing such an opportunity in advance, Vickers and Armstrongs, 
which merged as a single company in 1928, dispatched new agents and military engi- 
neers to Turkey to negotiate with the Ministry of National Defence. They declared 
their readiness to offer "extremely favourable terms" of payments for new arms deals 
with Turkey. 97 To solve the problems between Vickers-Armstrong Ltd. -and Turkey, 
an International Arbitural Tribunal, instituted by the treaty of Lausanne, was set up. 
Finally, in December 1929, an agreement, known as the "Turkish Settlement", was 
concluded between Vickers-Armstrong Ltd. and the Turkish government in Ankara. 
It embodied not only matters relating to the Ottoman Dock Company but also 
included all matters outstanding between the British companies and the Turkish 
government 98 Thereafter, Vickers-Armstrong Ltd. provided material and technical 
95 A. V. Lander to Eastern Construction Committee, 15th March, 1927, VA/57-54, Cambridge. 
96 A. Vahid Bey to Vickers-Armstrongs, 26th March, 1928, Sir Noel Birch, Turkey, October 
1927-February, 1931, VA/K617, Cambridge. 
97 Vickers-Armstrongs Armament Contract Department to Mr Leveson, 12th July, 1928, Sir 
Noel Birch, Turkey, October 1927-February, 1931, VA/K617, Cambridge. 
98 A. V. Lander, Memoranda on "Imperial Ottoman Docks, Arsenals and Naval Construction 
Company", 19th March, 1935, VA/57-54, Cambridge. 
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instruction particularly for air defence industries and artillery in Turkey. 99 
7.6 Conclusion 
The decade before WWI saw a relatively rapid transformation in naval shipping and 
armament in the Ottoman Empire primarily through Armstrongs and Vickers enter- 
prises. They provided the main bulk of naval vessels, guns and technical instruction 
and expertise to the Ottoman navy. As no infrastructure existed in the Ottoman 
Empire to run relatively sophisticated naval vessels and engines, the companies sent 
out their experts to instruct the local naval men and also trained some Ottoman naval 
engineers in their shipyards in Britain. This was the most effective channel for the 
transmission of limited naval shipping and armament technologies to the Ottoman 
Empire. However, the number of trained and knowledgeable local naval men 
remained limited. Unlike Japan, the Ottoman Empire was never able to establish its 
own industries for naval constructions and armaments. Instead it remained largely 
dependent on continuous Western technical expertise and machinery. 
When the industrial and military competition among Western powers deteriorated, 
particularly in the years before the war, the companies formed a British industrial 
alliance, primarily against rapidly rising German industrial and financial power in 
Turkey. The formation of an Armstrong-Vickers company to exploit all Ottoman 
naval construction and arsenals, and their major role in the new Turkish Naval Pro- 
gramme was opening the way for a British naval monopoly in the Ottoman Empire. 
99 Sir Noel Birch, Turkey, October 1927-February 1931, pp. 1-307, VA/K617, VA/K618, Cam- 
bridge. 
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Particularly, through their loans, leases and easy payment conditions Armstrongs and 
Vickers created a financial control on the Ottoman markets, besides the British 
monopoly of naval technology and technical expertise in the Ottoman Empire since 
the mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, the British naval mission was to a large extent 
supplementary to the flow of British naval machinery and also served to expand the 
sphere of the British influence in Turkey. 
The war interrupted the whole process and the new Turkish Naval Programme was 
largely abandoned by the end of 1914. The British Admiralty took over the vessels 
and guns that were being built for the Ottoman government in Britain, largely by the 
joint Armstrongs and Vickers enterprises. The Ottoman naval works were still in an 
inefficient state, and its naval power, according to Limpus, was even incapable of a 
major coastal defence. 100 Most Ottoman naval machinery was destroyed or lost dur- 
ing the war. 
100 "State of the Turkish Fleet at the end of the Balkan War" by Admiral Limpus, 24th August, 
1914, Limpus Papers, MS79/018, Letter box. 24, NMAG; see also an earlier report by Limpus, Ist 




Technological systems do not exist in isolation. They develop and operate in large 
cultural and spatial environments. They are expanding or evolving structures in time 
and space. The expansion is a process of controlling environment, which embodies a 
large number of interactive components: artifacts, institutional, educational, political, 
cultural and spatial structures. ' Hughes's large technological system is a useful 
metaphor for analysing the social construction and society shaping of technological 
systems in a wider environment of interactive components. Here I am not testing the 
validity of Hughes' technological systems. Besides, Hughes did not apply his theory 
to the establishment of a technological system in a non-Western environment. How- 
ever, the idea of large technological system encourages us to see the history of tech- 
nology in larger contexts. When combined with a local contextual approach, it can 
provide us with a bigger picture. 
The transfer of a large technological system from a Western environment, where it is 
originally created, to a non-Western environment is a complex process. It involves 
the establishment of a new environment where the technological system can be 
adopted, developed and expanded. This often means the destruction of the existing 
systems, which also affects the wider cultural and traditional order. In this thesis I 
have examined the introduction of technological systems, telegraphy, railways, naval 
shipbuilding and armament, from Britain to the Ottoman Empire in the post-Crimean 
1 T. P. Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems", in W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, 
& T. J. Pinch (eds. ), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the So- 
ciology and History of Technology, London: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 51-82. 
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period, which constituted an alien environment to the Western world. I have 
attempted to show how the process was contingent upon the unique political, eco- 
nomic, socio-cultural and geographical conditions of the two environments within 
the wider European power structure in the nineteenth century. The Ottoman-Turkish 
Westernisation can be defined as the expansion or evolution of technological systems 
adopted from the West. The systems brought together other components of Western 
culture, such as industrial, educational and legislative institutions. 
The introduction of British technological systems to Turkey was instrumental in 
British cultural and economic expansion into the Ottoman Empire and its dominions. 
This functioned as a most effective way of pursuing British political, economic and 
military objectives in the region. The pattern of technological transfer from Britain 
to the Ottoman Empire was shaped within the framework of British foreign policy 
and approach to the Ottoman Empire in general. Especially after the Crimean War, 
the flow to Turkey of British technologies and industrial enterprises, together with 
their wider cultural components, was on a large scale, which I have characterised as 
the technological crusade. The geographical setting and socio-political structure of 
the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century was crucial to British imperial expan- 
sion as well as to the security of her dominions and markets in the East. Imperial 
expansion was spatial. It involved the control of distant places. Communication sys- 
tems, such as telegraphy, railways and steamships, served their promoters as imperial 
tools, as described by Headrick. 2 In historical actors' terms, they formed the "scien- 
tific frontier" or "civilising" systems. 3 They eliminated or at least dramatically 
2 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nine- 
teenth century, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. 
3 W. P. Andrew, Our Scientific Frontier, London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1880. 
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reduced the importance of the dimension of distance from geographical space. This 
allowed reconstruction of indifferent or very often culturally hostile environments as 
new environments where European authority and technological systems could be 
established and developed. 
The primary objective of the British involvement in the establishment of the tele- 
graph system in the Ottoman Empire was to link Britain with India, which would 
result in the formation of a centrally controlled British Empire. Asia Minor was 
offering geographically the shortest distance for land telegraphic communication to 
the East. Britain had also long term objectives in the Ottoman Empire and its domin- 
ions. Establishing telegraphic communication meant that Britain would be in closer 
contact with the Ottoman Empire. It was not merely building a network of tele- 
graphic lines, but it was a matter of political, military and commercial advantages for 
British expansion as well as privileges over the other European powers intending to 
penetrate into the region. It involved a spatial control over the places to which the 
telegraph lines were extended. Although it was mainly an Ottoman state enterprise, 
British engineers and experts instructed and built the Istanbul to Basra Line, the 
major telegraph line in the Ottoman Empire and the largest part of Indian telegraphic 
communication with Europe. One of the two lines was designed for British-Indian 
communication. The telegraph system was not purely building a system of hardware. 
The system builders had to confront complex cultural and political problems that 
faced the establishment of the telegraph, as I have illustrated in Chapter Two. 
The construction of railways in the Ottoman Empire presented a different picture. As 
a large technological system, the railway entailed more complex industrial, technical, 
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financial and political environments, not comparable to the telegraphic system. The 
Ottoman Empire did not have industrial structures and financial power to construct 
its railway system. At the outset, therefore, railways were constructed and operated 
by foreign companies. Britain took a special interest in railway building in Turkey as 
a part of its foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, early railway enter- 
prise in Turkey was a purely British concern. Although a number of grand railways 
were projected in Britain for Turkey, similar to the trans-continental telegraph lines, 
such as the Istanbul to Basra Line, none was put into practice before the late 1890s. 
The Euphrates Valley Railway to link Europe with India, projected as early as the 
1840s, aroused serious reactions from the wider public, the commercial and official 
circles in Europe as well as from railway engineers and entrepreneurs. In Britain, it 
was presented as a rival project to the Suez Canal, which was promoted by France. It 
became a very important political matter within the British government, and among 
the political parties. It was often associated with the whole Eastern Question. France 
and Russia stood firmly against the undertaking by the British alone. The public and 
official debates over the project continued until the commencement of the Baghdad 
Railways by Germany in the early twentieth century. In Chapter Three I have demon- 
strated the extent of the involvement of politics in establishing railways in Turkey 
and the changing British power structure in the region that dominated the attitudes 
towards the Euphrates Railway project. 
Apart from intercontinental railway lines projected in Britain, British railway 
entrepreneurs attempted to construct short railway lines in Turkey, in particular to 
link the regions of rich agricultural products and raw materials in the interior with 
seaports allowing overseas transportation. In Chapter Four I have examined the wider 
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context of the construction of the first line of railway in Asiatic Turkey, the Smyrna 
to Aidin Railway, as an "experimental" line by the British. The Ottoman Empire was 
an alien environment not only for establishing a railway system but also for all Euro- 
pean enterprises of this kind. The Smyrna to Aidin Railway builders had to deal with 
various complicated problems: cultural, financial, political and geographical. The 
enterprise often ran into financial and managerial difficulties. It did not yield the 
exemplary image that its builders had hoped. The project was delayed for several 
years. For about a decade the company enjoyed all the privileges of absolute 
monopoly in railway building in Turkey. However, with encouragement of the 
Ottoman officials, new British and other European entrepreneurs began to take part in 
the construction of railways. This provoked competition among the builders. Until 
the twentieth century the Ottoman railway was entirely dependent on European engi- 
neering and finance. Due to the worsening state of the Ottoman military and financial 
weakness, railway building became a political undertaking. 
In addition to telegraphy and railways, I have examined in the last three chapters the 
efforts of the British government and entrepreneurs to introduce European naval 
shipping and armament technologies to the Ottoman Empire. The British naval mis- 
sion to Turkey began in the early nineteenth century originally as an important mea- 
sure against Russian expansion to the Mediterranean to strengthen Ottoman naval 
defences by offering skilled officers and machinery. The mission, which continued 
until WWI, became an essential part of the wider British imperial policy in the East 
and industrial expansion overseas. I have argued that the British naval mission in the 
long term helped the creation of a institutionally and politically more suitable envi- 
ronment which allowed the introduction of British naval and armament technologies. 
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British naval advisors, instructors and officers established good relations with 
Ottoman naval officers and staff. In particular British pashas were well respected, and 
their authority was as powerful as indigenous Ottoman pashas. They even had higher 
authority over the local pashas in technical matters, such as the navy's machinery. 
Most British pashas and officers developed friendly, and often personal, relations 
with the Sultan and his high official elite. Personal relations were very important in 
making contacts and influencing indigenous men in a highly traditional society. Con- 
tacts at personal level were usually more successful in dealing with Ottoman authori- 
ties. British officers represented European culture. Their constructed images of hum- 
ble and energetic personalities, with enthusiastic approaches to Ottoman life, 
impressed the local people in favour of European culture, which helped to promote 
the image of the Christian West. Recent science studies have demonstrated that skills 
and knowledge were transferred from one context to another most effectively through 
the movement of the skilled personnel themselves. The traditional Ottoman held the 
view that unless he was shown practically, he was not able to comprehend the nature 
of the phenomenon or know-how. The skilled person was more effective than the 
text. This attitude partly originated from the fact that the Ottoman lacked a long liter- 
ary tradition. Printing culture was not an important part of Turkish-Ottoman society 
until the late nineteenth century. There were only very few Ottoman printing houses 
which printed a small number of books in Turkish and Arabic. In this environment, 
British pashas and their staff provided an effective channel of communication and 
mediation between the Ottoman navy and British shipping and armament companies. 
Thus the British naval mission was a major link to Europe and European culture in 
the Ottoman navy. By the late nineteenth century the Ottoman navy became a 
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nucleus of the Ottoman Westernisation programme. Even the Sultan Abdul Hamid 
was afraid of the navy that they might overthrow him for the sake of Europeanising 
reforms. The British pashas of the Ottoman navy and their work for Ottoman naval 
defence could be the subject of a much larger study. Ottoman naval and political his- 
tories have not yet dealt with these pashas. 
Early contacts with British naval shipbuilding and industries came through British 
naval advisors to the Ottoman navy and the official British representatives in Turkey. 
Naval advisors and officers were largely responsible for reorganisation of the 
Ottoman navy on European models. The country to which they turned their attention 
was Britain, which was looked at as a primary example in naval power in Europe. 
British companies, expanding their enterprises overseas as a part of British imperial 
expansion, introduced both naval machinery and its complementary feature, technical 
instruction and infrastructure for their operation. Napier & Sons provided the 
Ottoman navy with steam engines from the early 1830s. They were also the engi- 
neers of the Ottoman ironclad programme in the early 1860, making the Ottoman 
ironclad fleet one of the largest in Europe. They were followed by other prominent 
naval shipbuilders in Britain, such as the Thames Iron Works and Samudas & Sons. 
Armstrongs' link to Turkey began with armouring naval vessels from about 1863. 
Armstrong guns became an interactive part of Ottoman naval warfare. Armstrongs 
expanded their trade to other military equipment. By the early 1880s they were 
designing and building fully armoured warships at their Elswick naval shipyard. 
Elswick also became the main center in Britain for instruction and training of the 
Ottoman navy. 
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Vickers entered the Ottoman naval and armament trade as a rival company to Arm- 
strongs. From the 1890s they provided the Ottoman navy with its most sophisticated 
weaponry and large naval ships. However, in the decade before the war, Vickers and 
Armstrongs began to cooperate, and soon formed a British industrial alliance in 
Turkey to increase their competitive power against other Europeans, in particular, 
against Germany, which was dramatically becoming the dominant industrial and 
financial power in Turkey. They provided the main bulk of machinery and infrastruc- 
ture for the new Ottoman naval programme. In the years before WWI, the two com- 
panies aimed to establish a complete monopoly in naval construction, arsenals and 
dockyards in Turkey. However, this was met with Germany's increasing military and 
political presence. By the early twentieth century Britain had lost most of its political 
and military influence in the Ottoman Empire. This was reflected in the British indus- 
trial and technological enterprises in Turkey. Complaining to the Sultan on the cur- 
rent state of affairs in 1905, Sir Nicholas R. O'Conor, the British Ambassador in 
Istanbul, pointed to "the unsatisfactory impression which had been created in Eng- 
land by the relatively unfavourable treatment occupied in Turkey to the representa- 
tion of British industry' ,. 4 They lost most railway and other industrial enterprises to 
Germany or other European powers. By WWI, the Smyrna-Aidin Railway was the 
only British owned railway in Turkey. The only area where the British maintained 
their significant influence was the Ottoman navy. 
The Ottoman Empire had been a largely closed environment to European-Christian 
culture and technologies until the nineteenth century. In Chapter One I argued that 
4 Lord N. R. O'Conor to Lord Landsowne, on the conversation with the Sultan, 24th October, 
1905, Therepia, F07815450 Extensions of Smyrna-Aidin Railway, 1902-1905. 
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the military channel constituted the nucleus of Ottoman Europeanisation and the 
opening to the West. I also discussed how a traditional Islamic culture could develop 
an intellectual framework to accommodate European technologies, which had been 
formerly considered as infidel. From an Ottoman perspective, they were introduced 
as a part of a programme to prevent the collapse of the empire. Whether they pre- 
vented or encouraged its collapse is a matter of another debate. Technological sys- 
tems increased the general Ottoman contact with Europe and the West by providing a 
medium for cultural communication. Technological systems, telegraphy, railways, 
naval shipbuilding and armament, in Turkey involved the establishment of a new 
order or environment. Traditional systems were replaced by European ones: the mes- 
senger system by the telegraph, camel and horse based transportation by railways, 
where they were introduced, wooden shipbuilding by iron and steel. 
The expansion of these European technological systems to a large environment of 
political, financial, institutional and legislative structures led to a wider Westernisa- 
tion programme. Their accommodation within Ottoman society presented a major 
problem. From a Muslim point of view, the whole process was a new Christian cru- 
sade. Military defence and institutions provided the main source of justification. This 
was often consolidated by the Sultan's authority and sanction for European reforms. 
Most effectively, the Ottoman Westernising elite developed a new ideology or an 
intellectual framework, which understood and presented Western technology as a 
neutral environment. Ottoman intellectuals often admired the way the Japanese 
adopted Western technology or "practical sciences" (as an historical actors' term), 
believing that they eliminated cultural values, such as religion and life style. In par- 
ticular, the Japanese military victory over Russia in 1905 provided the Ottoman elite 
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with an impressive example that they wished to follow. 5 
Ottoman Turkey and Japan were two of the earliest non-Western countries where an 
administrative elite undertook a Westernisation programme by adopting Western 
technology. A comparative study of Japanese and Ottoman-Turkish Westernisation 
might yield valuable results in evaluating the social and spatial construction of a 
technological system. 6 The process of Westernisation in both countries began in sim- 
ilar ways and around the same time. Apart from limited contact through a few ports, 
Japan had been virtually physically closed to the West until the Meiji period in the 
mid-nineteenth century, when the borders were opened to Western trade. Although 
never closed to Europe physically, which was simply a geographical impossibility, 
the core of the Ottoman Empire was largely closed to the Western world culturally, 
mainly due to its dominant Islamic culture, and religious and military rivalry with 
Europe. A Westernisation programme or the introduction of Western technological 
systems have taken very different forms in each environment. While Japan has 
become one of the most industrial countries, Turkey has remained largely dependent 
on the West for advanced technologies. 
This major contrast originated from cultural and spatial differences between the two 
environments. Unlike Japan, the Ottoman Empire was never geographically periph- 
eral to the Western world, but stretched over parts of three continents, on the main 
path of imperialist expansion across Asia. It lacked a racial, linguistic, and religious 
5 D'Eyncourt to W. Armstrong and Whitworth Co., (Elswick Shipyard), NMAG, DEY/88,16th 
May 1904; D'Eyncourt to Faulkner, NMAG, DEY/88,20th May 1904. 
6 For a comparative study of the political modernisation of Japan and Turkey, see R. E. Ward & 
D. A. Rustow (eds), Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1964. 
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homogeneity. Japan, on the contrary, was geographically an island, and culturally and 
ethnically a homogeneous country. It was culturally more receptive to Western tech- 
nology and general innovations, as no major objections were encountered on reli- 
gious grounds. The dominant religious culture, that is, Confucianism and Buddhism, 
was more a philosophical and ethical code, unlike Islam which claimed a political 
and social system. Most importantly there was religious pluralism and flexibility. For 
instance, there was not aa clergy class similar to the Ulema in Turkey. A study of the 
introduction of technological systems, such telegraphy and railways in both countries 
might provide us with the wider cultural implications of technology transfer to differ- 
ent environments. 
Although Ottoman intellectuals desired to present it as value-free and international to 
the wider public, Western technology was closely linked to a Western cultural envi- 
ronment. Telegraphy, railways, and other industrial enterprises could not be estab- 
lished in Turkey without Western educational, financial, legislative and other social 
institutions. The electric telegraph brought together Western educational, legislative 
and postal systems. With railways, naval shipping and armament industries, Western 
industrial and financial institutions, such as managerial, labour and banking systems, 
were introduced. This was also reflected on the wider political and social structures 
of Ottoman society. Its traditional order collapsed. After WWI it developed to a 
"nation state". The Sultanate was abolished. It became a republic, which initiated 
adoption of Western style democracy and institutions under the leadership of Atatürk 
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